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A PRIMER FOR
ILLINOIS MANAGERS

James D. Nowlan, Editor

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INSIDE STATE GOVERNMENT

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A Primer for Illinois Managers

James D. Nowlan
Editor

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of the University of Illinois

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PREFACE

This book is a primer for managers new to Illinois state government. It may also be of interest to students, many of whom will someday be managers in our public enterprise.

I have wanted to organize a book of this sort since January 1977 when I was serving on the transition team for newly inaugurated Governor James R. Thompson. At the conclusion of a Sunday evening briefing session on the education budget at the executive mansion, the governor turned to me and said offhandedly, "Oh, and by the way, Jim, tomorrow I'd like you to take over the Department of Financial Institutions for awhile." Only later in the evening did I learn that this agency regulates currency exchanges, credit unions, and abandoned property and oversees sundry other matters. The department was being buffeted by scandals at the time, and there had been hints of mobster influence in its operations.

Although as a professor and former state legislator I had some knowledge of public policymaking, I knew next to nothing about the responsibilities of an agency manager or how the role fit into the complex governmental setting. My situation was not unique. It is estimated that in a four-year term an Illinois governor appoints more than two thousand agency directors, senior managers, and members to dozens of boards and commissions. These appointees are often talented and accomplished in their own areas of expertise, yet most of them come to their new positions with little if any understanding of government budgeting, the legislative process, or of the legitimate webs spun by interest groups, the press, and the other agencies like their own that make up "the government."

Freshman state legislators are provided "new member" conferences and valuable guides, such as *The Illinois Legislature* by Samuel K. Gove and associates.¹ There has been nothing comparable for those asked to go in and actually run state government.

This book is not primarily about how to manage. For those interested in strategems for dealing with agency bureaucracies, I recommend Hugh Heclo's thoughtful, practical article, "Political Executives and the Washington Bureaucracy."² Although Heclo focuses on the national government, his observations are useful for state government managers, as well.

This primer introduces readers to the complex web of government with which agency managers must work and share their authority. Martha Wagner Weinberg includes "knowledge of the territory" as one of the situational resources important to statehouse chief executives.³ This knowledge is

equally important to their agency managers. Writing about private sector management, Henry Mintzberg considers it remarkable that until recent years there has been little mention of the liaison role of executives, "in light of the finding of virtually every study of managerial work that managers spend as much time with peers and other people outside their units as they do with their own subordinates—and, surprisingly, very little time with their own superiors."⁴ From my experience as an acting public agency head on three separate occasions, I can assure you this observation also applies to Illinois state government.

There are literally thousands of managers in Illinois state government—men and women who manage agencies, units, divisions, programs, and, of course, other people. This book is directed especially at managers who head agencies, those who serve as the primary link between their agencies and the web of government around them. Throughout the book, we use the generic term agency head to represent those full-time managers whose formal titles include director, executive director, chairman, and commissioner.

This book has been written by practitioners for practitioners. The chapter contributors all have extensive and highly creditable experience as participants in and observers of Illinois government and politics. Interviews were also conducted with the heads of eight complex state agencies. In addition, 66 of 101 agency heads representing the past two gubernatorial administrations responded, rather expansively in many cases, to a lengthy questionnaire distributed in fall 1981. Quotations throughout this book are from personal interviews or written comments from the questionnaire. To generate candor, confidentiality was guaranteed.

In the first chapter, agency heads assist in introducing us to the web of government in which they work. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide descriptions of the role, processes, cycles, objectives, and perspectives of the key executive branch units which assist—and sometimes frustrate—the agency head. In chapters 5 and 6, similar descriptions are set forth regarding the General Assembly and its major oversight officer, the Auditor General. The role of interest groups and the capitol press corps are explained next. The book concludes with a summary of practical observations and lessons learned by agency heads. The appendix is a bibliographical essay that provides a reading guide for students of Illinois government.

The high degree of professionalism exhibited in Illinois state government overall is well reflected in the contributions of our chapter authors and in the unstinting cooperation of the many agency heads who participated in this project.

Our pages are brightened by the timeless political cartoons of Bill Campbell. The keen observations and telling characterizations represented in this small sample were drawn before 1979 when an auto accident cut short a brilliant drawing career. Fortunately, while Bill can no longer draw, this spirited character provides astute guidance to aspiring cartoonists from his country home in western Illinois. Originals of Bill Campbell's cartoons are in the permanent collection at Carl Sandburg College in Galesburg.

Antje Kolodziej provided capable research assistance throughout. Jean Baker and her staff at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs did a typically excellent job of preparing the manuscript for the printer. Shirley Burnette deserves special mention in this regard. Mrs. Burnette suffered patiently as she transformed the authors' hieroglyphics into typed copy via the institute's new word processing system.

Institute editor Anna J. Merritt has increased the readability and improved the organization of this book markedly. To her, we owe a debt of gratitude.

As is the case with so many contributions to our understanding of Illinois government, this project has been supported and guided by Samuel K. Gove and the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois, which Sam directs so ably.

Errors of fact and interpretation reside with me as editor.

JAMES D. NOWLAN
Urbana, Illinois

Footnotes

1. Samuel K. Gove, Richard W. Carlson, and Richard J. Carlson, *The Illinois Legislature: Structure and Process* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976).
2. Hugh Heclo, "Political Executives and the Washington Bureaucracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 92, no. 3 (Fall 1977), pp. 395- 424.
3. Martha Wagner Weinberg, *Managing the State* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1977), Chapter 3.
4. Henry Mintzberg, "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact," *Harvard Business Review* (July-August, 1975), p. 55.

Chapter 1

AN INTRODUCTION TO ILLINOIS STATE GOVERNMENT

James D. Nowlan

Illinois has been called an economic and political microcosm of the nation.¹ While this is a simplification, Illinois is in fact highly diverse. According to the 1980 federal census, 83 percent of the 11.4 million residents reside in urban areas; 14.7 percent are black, and 5.6 percent are Hispanic. The state's northernmost latitude is close to that of Portsmouth, New Hampshire; the southernmost, near that of Portsmouth, Virginia. Its settlers came from both the South and the North. On the basis of 1880 census figures, the state could be virtually cut in half geographically, with the southern portion settled primarily by English stock from Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, and the northern part settled by a mix of northern Europeans and, later, central and southern Europeans. This cultural and regional diversity persists. For example, the classic "southern" movie *In the Heat of the Night*, with Sidney Poitier and Rod Steiger, was filmed almost entirely in the southern Illinois towns of Sparta and Chester, in large part because they provided a typical southern setting. At the other end of the state, Chicago has the world's largest Polish population outside Warsaw.

Illinois almost parallels the nation overall in proportionate activity in fully three-fourths of all the major manufacturing industries.² Like the national economy, the Illinois economy is subject to national and international influences, because of its extensive exports of agricultural products and heavy equipment.³ The state annually ranks first or second nationally in the export of feed grains. The state's economic diversity, plus its central location and fertile soil, have contributed to the state's overall wealth. Illinois ranks fourth in aggregate personal income and sixth in per capita income.

Politically, Illinois has contributed its electoral votes to every twentieth century president with the exception of Wilson in 1916 and Carter in 1976. Students of Illinois politics used to examine elections by dividing the state into Chicago and downstate. Now Illinois is viewed as having three discreet political regions: Chicago, with 3 million people; the 5½ "collar" counties that surround Chicago, with 4.1 million; and downstate, i.e., the remaining 96 counties, with about 4.3 million. Chicago remains heavily Democratic, the collar area maintains a strong Republican orientation, while downstate is balanced politically. As a result, Illinois has highly competitive statewide elections and a legislature wherein party majorities are often razor-thin and

control is often divided — one house organized by each of the two major parties.

Illinois state government is big business. If total state revenues are equated with business revenues, Illinois' recent annual receipts of \$12+ billion would rank about nineteenth in the United States, comparable to U.S. Steel and ahead of Western Electric and Standard Oil of Ohio.⁴ There are about 117,000 employees on the Illinois state government payroll.⁵ This is far more than the 86,000 employees worldwide of Caterpillar Tractor Co., Illinois' largest employer.⁶

Illinois state government structure is about as complex as the state is diverse. By the second decade of this century, Illinois government had grown into a sprawling, unmanageable collection of more than 100 agencies, boards, and commissions. In 1917 newly elected Governor Frank O. Lowden pushed a reorganization plan through the legislature that consolidated most activities of state government into nine executive departments as set forth in a new Civil Administrative Code.⁷ Since then, the number of units has increased, and today there are twenty-three "code departments," from the Department of Aging to the Department of Transportation. In addition, there are forty-seven boards and commissions, linked to the governor on the organization chart because he appoints the board members.⁸ (For a complete listing of these units, see Appendix B.)

These agencies vary dramatically in size. The code departments for aging, financial institutions, and nuclear safety have fewer than 100 employees each. The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities has more than 16,000 on its single payroll, while the forty-seven boards and commissions combined employ a total of about 5,000.

The range and pervasiveness of state government activity are significant. A few examples:


- There are twelve social or human service agencies, and 1½ million Illinois residents will receive assistance this year from one or more of these units.
- The state occupational licensing agency examines, licenses, monitors, investigates, and disciplines 800,000 persons across thirty-two occupations, from wrestling to real estate to health care.
- There are 30 million visits annually to state parks and facilities operated by the Department of Conservation. One and one-half million people in the state go fishing once or more often each year and are licensed for the privilege.

Illinois state government spends about \$38 million every working day.⁹ Total state appropriations, including distributions to local government, have been more than \$14 billion in each of the past four fiscal years. As Figure 1.1 shows, education receives 28 percent of these appropriations, followed by public assistance (21 percent), transportation (16 percent), and health and human services (10 percent).

FIGURE 1.1. PROPOSED APPROPRIATIONS BY MAJOR PURPOSE, FISCAL YEAR 1983.

Appropriations by Major Purpose All Funds

FY 1983—Percent of Total



Source: *Illinois State Budget 1983*, Governor James R. Thompson, Springfield, Illinois, 1982, p. 13.

To pay these appropriations, Illinois generates about 25 percent of its revenues from an income tax at a flat rate of 2.5 percent on individual incomes and 4 percent on corporations (see Figure 1.2). Federal funds comprise 24 percent of state revenues, and a sales tax, at a maximum rate of 4 percent, generates 20 percent of the budget revenues. The greatest portion of these revenues goes into the General Revenue Fund. However, there are about 40 special state funds dedicated to and limited to specific purposes, plus scores of federal trust funds for categorical expenditures.¹⁰ Examples include the Road Fund, the Wildlife and Fish Fund, and the Medical Disciplinary Fund.


During the 1960s and first half of the 1970s, Illinois state government expenditures grew more rapidly than either the state's economy or the rate of inflation. State spending as a percentage of Illinois personal income jumped from 5 percent in 1966 to more than 10 percent in 1976. Richard Kolhauser, deputy director of the Illinois Bureau of the Budget, notes that "the combined income of all Illinois taxpayers increased approximately fourfold in the last two decades, from \$26 billion in 1960 to \$102 billion in 1979. Yet, during the same period, [state] government spending increased eightfold."¹¹

Since 1977 growth of state government has slowed significantly, and since fiscal year 1981 has actually declined in both real and actual dollar terms.¹² In large measure, this reflects a decline in the Illinois economy relative to national activity. This has been the trend since the end of World War II. In

FIGURE 1.2. ESTIMATED REVENUES BY SOURCE FOR ALL APPROPRIATED FUNDS, FISCAL YEAR 1983.

Revenues by Source — All Appropriated Funds

FY 1983 — Percent of Total



* This total is less than that for appropriations in Figure 1.1 because not all appropriations authorized are expended in a given fiscal year.

Source: *Illinois State Budget 1983*, Governor James R. Thompson, Springfield, Illinois, 1982, p. 16.

1947 Illinois per capita income was 123 percent of the national average; by 1977 that figure had declined to 111 percent.¹³ On indicators of change in personal income and employment, Illinois ranked near the bottom among the states during the 1970s.¹⁴ For example, the state ranked forty-ninth in growth in both aggregate personal income growth and total nonagricultural employment. In 1979 retail sales in real dollar terms declined by 10 percent and by another 7.6 percent in 1980.¹⁵

Much of this relative decline reflects continuation of the mushrooming growth in the Sunbelt. Economists see no sign that this phenomenon is about to end.¹⁶ The sluggish economic growth in Illinois will therefore continue to generate challenges for state government. Agency managers are likely to face increased demands for services in a context of constrained, possibly even shrinking, real resources.

THE AGENCY MANAGER AND THE WEB OF STATE GOVERNMENT

With this background, what is the setting — the managerial environment — that confronts a new Illinois state government manager? The short answer is that agency managers work within a complex web of government which comprises numerous units and individuals who feel a need to influence, even share, administrative and policy activities of agency managers.

The extent of this situation became apparent in the responses given by sixty-six agency heads from the administrations of Governors James R. Thompson (1977-present), a Republican, and Dan Walker (1973-76), a Democrat, to a questionnaire about state government sent out in fall 1981. Eight of these also submitted to extensive personal interviews.¹⁷ A theme emerged from their comments: the enterprise of state government spins a web of interested parties around each agency that impinges on, frustrates, resists, and sometimes assists the agency head.

The director of a social service agency explains the web of government this way:

The biggest burden in running an agency is that created by many people who have their fingers in our pie. For example, you have:

- the governor's liaison to this agency,
- the governor's liaison to the rate review board (which sets purchase of service rates paid by the state),
- the patronage director,
- the legislative liaison office,
- the Bureau of the Budget, which is "knee-deep in what we can and can't do,"
- the appropriations staffs in both houses, as well as between the parties, each of which wants to be its own Bureau of the Budget, and each of which has different forms for us to use in presenting our budget,
- several key legislators who have an interest in the agency,
- Art Quern and Paula Wolff in the governor's office,
- and the interest groups.

All of which makes for a great number of people telling you how to do your job. However, the buck stops with the director. These other people are not accountable and indeed back away very quickly when something goes wrong.

Each agency is also set within its own web of interest groups. For example:

- Several hundred groups monitor the activities of the Department of Public Aid alone: the health professions, nursing home administrators, hospitals, government employee unions, poor people and taxpayers' advocates, and an array of federal agencies. All have stakes in the management of this multibillion dollar operation.
- The director of the Department of Public Health manages some 180 programs, each monitored by one or more professional, institutional, and constituency organizations.

Experienced managers feel oversight from this governmental and political web has been increasing. As one put it:

I would tell someone coming into the government that it is a different animal from what it used to be. After the Watergate scandals everybody is looking over our shoulders and thinking the worst about our motives: the FBI, grand juries, the press, the legislature.... So anybody coming in should be aware that in this litigious society there is much more oversight of our activities. A person can easily become involved in court suits and investigations no matter how clean he thinks he might be.

This oversight has many, often exasperating, manifestations. As a regulatory agency head exclaimed, "You know that there are many people watching over your agency when the hearing on your appropriations bill is held up purposely for eight hours simply because you moved a low-level employee within your agency who happened to be a friend of a legislator on the committee!"

Each new manager will confront a web of people and agencies unique to his agency. Nevertheless, there are components common to all, especially the executive and legislative branches and their support units. These cannot be brushed aside. In fact, they should be understood and utilized rather than resisted.

Figure 1.3 shows the extent of substantive contact between agency heads and the major service and oversight units, the press corps, and the lobbies that comprise the web. The major components of the governmental process are discussed extensively in subsequent chapters.

Agency heads have extensive major contact with the governor's office and his Bureau of the Budget (BOB). This is understandable, as these units are there to manage the managers. Yet what about legislators and their staff, with whom contact is almost as extensive?

The separation of powers concept certainly does not keep lawmakers at arm's length from the agencies. There are 177 legislators (236 at the time of the survey).¹⁸ Many work nearly full-time at their jobs. They are more knowledgeable and inquisitive, and thus more intrusive, than ever before. The lawmakers also serve as ombudsmen for the state's 11.4 million citizens, and they bring their constituents' problems to the agency heads and senior staff.

A few short years ago, legislative staff would not have ranked nearly so high on this scaling, for there were few staffers then. Now they are everywhere. In the 1960s, the staff consisted of neutral bill drafting and research units plus a few college interns. Today there are hundreds. They review agency budgets, bills, and proposed rules; and they audit agency compliance with legislation as well as performance and efficiency. They comprise a major new element in the web of government.

The frequency of contact with any unit on this necessarily selective list depends on the functions and needs of the agencies. For example, those agencies that rely heavily on federal funds, such as the departments dealing with transportation and rehabilitation services, tend to be in frequent contact with the Illinois office in Washington.¹⁹

While this web often constrains a manager, many persons and units can also assist the manager in his work. Figure 1.4 asks how much these same units in the web "contribute" to the ability of the respondents to function as managers. Again, as might be expected, the governor's office and BOB rank at the top of the scale. Lawmakers and their staff are credited with significantly higher levels of contribution than were support agencies such as personnel and administrative services. Several agency heads made specific notations about the staff, such as: "The legislative staff were very helpful in

FIGURE 1.3. INTERACTION OF AGENCY HEADS WITH OTHER UNITS.^a

Agency	Substantive Contact Scaling ^b	Extent of Interaction			
		Almost Daily and Major	Frequent and Major	Infrequent but Major	Frequent but Minor
Governor's Office	102	13	19	25	4
Bureau of the Budget	99	7	28	22	3
Legislators	98	9	25	21	7
Legislative Staff	85	5	23	24	7
Attorney General's Office	64	6	11	24	7
Lobbyists interested in your agency	57	2	19	13	6
Department of Personnel ^c	54	3	14	17	13
Auditor General's Office	41	0	5	31	5
Department of Administrative Services ^c	36	2	8	14	19
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules	36	0	7	22	11
Capitol Press Corps	27	1	8	8	11
Illinois Offices in Washington, D.C.	24	0	4	16	2
Comptroller's Office	22	1	2	15	19
Capital Development Board	22	0	2	18	1

^a This figure reflects the 66 responses to the question: "To what extent do the following agencies or actors interact with and affect you and your senior staff in the management of your agency?" For a description of the functions of the governmental agencies listed in this figure, see the *Illinois Blue Book*, published biennially by the Illinois Secretary of State, Springfield, Illinois.

^b This scale was derived by giving each response 3 points for "almost daily and major," 2 points for "frequent and major," 1 point for "infrequent but major," and no points for other responses or no answer.

^c In July 1982 these agencies were consolidated in the new Department of Central Management Services.

FIGURE 1.4. CONTRIBUTIONS TO AGENCY MANAGEMENT.*

Agency	Contribution Score ^b	Contribution			
		Invaluable	Major	Infrequent but Major	Minor
Governor's Office	104	18	18	14	10
Bureau of the Budget	92	8	28	12	9
Legislators	80	8	20	16	13
Legislative Staff	70	6	18	16	18
Department of Personnel	57	3	16	16	15
Attorney General's Office	44	3	5	25	21
Lobbyists interested in your agency	39	1	11	14	18
Department of Administrative Services	35	1	9	14	30
Auditor General's Office	33	1	5	20	28
Comptroller's Office	28	1	4	17	26
Capital Development Board	20	1	5	7	14
Joint Committee on Administrative Rules	19	1	2	12	26
Illinois Offices in Washington, D.C.	19	2	2	9	16
Capitol Press Corps	16	1	5	3	25
					30

* This figure reflects the 66 responses to the question: "Overall, to what extent do the following agencies or actors contribute to your ability to function as a manager?"

^b This scale was derived by giving each response 3 points for "invaluable," 2 points for "major," 1 point for "infrequent but major," and no points for other ratings or no answer.

getting a program moving," and "The legislative staff in a sense actually make the funding recommendations that are usually endorsed by the legislators."

We should keep in mind that not all units on this list exist to support or contribute to agency management. The press corps is an obvious example. Lobbyists might be another, yet lobbyists are viewed as major contributors to the operations of several agencies. The director of a large, complex agency stated:

A director must recognize that interest groups are not always wrong. He must listen to their stories. They do have a role in the process. The worst approach is to feel you have all the answers. All the interest groups really are asking is an opportunity to be heard. Sometimes the interest groups will go to bat for you in the legislature, even on issues which aren't of direct concern to them. In return, it makes sense to help the interest groups whenever it is consonant with the agency's objectives. . . . It is a two-way street.

The Auditor General's office is a legislative watchdog that monitors the executive branch. Its compliance and performance audits often make stinging criticisms of agencies, and implicitly, of their managers. Nevertheless, the audit agency is viewed as an important contributor by several agency heads. Said one agency director:

I took a positive approach toward the use of the Auditor General. I specifically asked the Auditor to do an audit of this agency since the last one done by a private firm had not been tough enough. By utilizing that office in a positive way, I was able to get a better handle on the agency and also develop good working relationships with and a sense of understanding of the Auditor General's Office.

Positive comments about the units in the web were far from universal. Figure 1.4 displays the distribution of responses to the question about contributions. Numerous respondents saw no contributions, or only minor ones, from the Governor's Office and the BOB. One saw "most of the offices mentioned as obstacles to what one is trying to do."

There was substantial congruence in the responses displayed in Figures 1.3 and 1.4 between the two groups of agency heads, representing Democratic and Republican administrations. This suggests that while the people throughout the web of government may change, the web is a set of institutionalized arrangements that remains in place.

OBSERVATIONS ABOUT KEY ELEMENTS IN THE WEB

In subsequent chapters practitioners provide descriptions of the web of government as seen from their own perspectives. Some of these practitioners are agency managers, others are leaders in some other aspect of the governmental system who deal extensively with agency managers. It should be kept in mind that these two roles have quite different objectives, and that the demands placed upon them are also quite different. Moreover, even those

units that are part of the agency manager's team have different objectives and demands. All of these perspectives are important for a full understanding of the agency manager's role in our state government. As a director for a visible regulatory agency advised:

I think it important when sizing up outside actors who have interests in your agency to determine what they are after. What are their motives? How are they going to benefit from your agency? Where is the tradeoff for our agency in whatever it is they may want? For example, we can help the press if they will be somewhat cooperative with us on matters of mutual concern.

Before turning to some statements by practitioners, let us turn briefly to a few observations made by agency managers about four of the most important branches of Illinois state government: the Governor's Office, the Bureau of the Budget, Personnel and Administrative Services, and the legislature.

The Governor's Office. Twenty-three code department heads are directly responsible to the governor. Another forty-seven gubernatorially appointed boards and commissions are monitored by the governor and his staff. In addition, the governor has to manage a staff of about 100 in his own executive office. The span of supposed control is so broad that Jim Thompson's first "cabinet" meeting had to be held in the ballroom of the executive mansion!

Several agency heads reflected on the practical consequences that this broad span of control had for gubernatorial relations with agencies:

- The way to develop the best relations with the governor [Thompson] is to prevent any bad news about the agency from reaching him. Don't bother him unnecessarily.
- This governor [Thompson] does not bother directors. If you stay out of trouble and do your work fairly effectively, the governor won't bother you.
- The governor [Thompson] is not inattentive to my agency's work, he is just not interested in the day-to-day activities. By contrast, Dan Walker [1973-76] involved himself deeply in directors' activities, as did Dick Ogilvie [1969-72] and Bill Stratton [1953-60]. For this governor, "no news, is good news."

Because no governor can oversee seventy agencies personally, the Thompson administration established subcabinets by functional groupings such as human services, the environment and natural resources, and regulation. While these units may appear logical, agency managers should not expect too much from them. As one major agency director stated:

Subcabinet meetings don't amount to much if the governor doesn't attend (which he doesn't). As a result, our meetings do not discuss current issues but instead focus on general problems, that is, they don't get into real interagency issues. Those real issues are handled informally with individuals such as Quern [chief of staff], Kjellander [legislative liaison, 1981], Baise [patronage], or Wolff and her people [agency liaison].

Even though the governor has limited office time for agency heads, he can be helpful to them and to himself when they are together at public gatherings. For example:

I do appreciate the fact that when he and I are together at cocktail parties or receptions sponsored by key interest groups, the governor always makes a point of personally and publicly identifying me as his trusted director and a person with whom these interest group people should deal. This enhances my credibility and authority and diminishes their need to take matters directly to the governor.

The Bureau of the Budget. The BOB is the governor's budget planning and management unit. There are fifty budget analysts on a total staff of about eighty-five. Agency heads are emphatic about the central role of the BOB. These two comments are representative:

- The BOB is always with us. It is instrumental in shaping our agency budget proposal. It is with us as we go through the appropriations process and then it is central to the execution of our budget, for example, through quarterly allotments, the release of funds, and freeze exemptions. And budget analysts are watching over our shoulder all the time.
- The BOB has the greatest impact on my agency of any of the outside units. BOB is always there; every day there is something that seems to require their input, their approval. As to the other support agencies, you seek them out when you need them.

There is great diversity of feeling about the relationship of the BOB with individual agencies. Based on the comments below from major managers, much depends on the nature, approach, and experience of the individual BOB analysts who are assigned to work with the respective agencies. Several managers feel the BOB has a strong program evaluation orientation. For example:

For this agency, the BOB is very heavily into program analysis and development. Our analyst in the Bureau is just recently out of school. She is good with numbers but doesn't understand much else. I have many problems with the BOB. Their people try to push the programs they think would be better. Every now and then we have situations where the BOB will say, "Do it this way," and I will want to do it another way.

If I don't agree with the Bureau, I become their enemy. This happens much too often. I'm accountable for program decisions and therefore feel I should make the ones I feel are the best. Indeed, that is what I do, but sometimes it is costly. We have had situations where the BOB has become so involved in our program activities that it has even suggested such detail as color schemes to be used in certain program activities.

Other managers discern greater BOB interest in aggregate dollar consequences than with individual program analysis.

- The BOB tries to be programmatic, but they are not very successful. They are pretty much a bottom-line operation. The BOB is concerned only at the margin and not with the base.
- Art Quern asked us directors how we should cut out agencies in order to meet the Governor's overall level of cuts for his reduction vetoes in July '81. Even though it would have been ideal to make cuts on a program basis, there was really no option but to take the cut basically as an across-the-board percentage from nearly all the agencies. Another approach might have been possible had the BOB been more program-oriented in its analysis of our respective budgets.

Personnel and Administrative Services. In 1982, soon after interviews for this project had been completed, Governor Thompson used his executive reorganization authority to consolidate two support agencies into a new Department of Central Management Services. To date there has not been any significant change in the personnel, central purchasing, and information management services performed by the two former agencies so that the comments made during the interviews would still seem to be valid. The observations suggest that it makes sense to develop good relations with the director of this new agency, if only to get a sympathetic hearing when problems must be resolved at the agency head level.

The Personnel Code is pretty rigid. It is important to get to know somebody near the top of that agency well as soon as possible. Not so that one can get anything improper, but so one can get help in interpreting their rules and regulations in a manner helpful to your agency. For example, we have a small agency, yet a very complex one, which processes lots of money and paper. However, under the Department of Personnel rules, positions, and salaries of the code departments are related to the size of agencies. Thus it has been held that I can't have an EDP 4 specialist even though I have complex data processing needs. I have lost this particular case with the DOP and it is hurting the agency. Now that there is a new personnel director, I'm hoping to go at the problem again.

No agency head had anything good to say about the agency which formerly handled administrative services. The following comments are representative.

- The Department of Administrative Services (DAS) is a general mess. One can go out to Sears and rent new cars cheaper than I can get cars from DAS.
- One of my staff lost a hubcap on a state car in Peoria. He went out and purchased a hubcap for \$25 and had it replaced. When a request for reimbursement was sent to the DAS, that Department said, no, *they* must do that kind of thing. The Department required the hubcap be returned, then DAS went out to the same place in Peoria and bought the same hubcap for \$48 and had it replaced.

The Legislature. As a former legislator, I was struck by repeated references of agency heads to their initial fears of legislators, their view of lawmakers as the enemy.

- Many managers view the legislature as the enemy. Even many present directors feel that way. They just don't understand the legislators, who themselves have several "masters," including constituents, influentials in their districts, interest groups, the electorate, and the demands of the electoral process. Directors need to educate themselves as to the legislative process. It is viewed as a mystery. It is viewed as mean, harsh, unreasonable. And even though some legislators may be unreasonable, most are not.
- I would look upon legislators as friends of this agency, generally. There are all kinds, of course. But many I can call for information and help. And this goes both ways. I don't know why people here in this agency fear legislators, but some of them have been here for years and still do. I think that they just fail to understand the nature of the legislator and the legislative process. Of course, in this agency we can do things for legislators and that helps us in our relations. If I had to rate the General Assembly, I would rate them well.

Most legislators want to be helpful. They want to feel a part of the process of shaping policy, improving administration, and delivering services to their constituents. One manager explains how she acquainted lawmakers with her agency problems:

I took a positive attitude toward utilization of the General Assembly. I told them my agency had many problems. I laid the problems out to the legislature and said we were going to tackle them, but I wanted them to know how severe things were. As a result, when new problems arise, I get a reasonable, open-minded rather than adversarial hearing on the problem for the legislature.

The above comments by agency heads about four elements of the web of government with which they have to deal (the governor, the Bureau of the Budget, Personnel and Administrative Services, and the legislature) suggest the pressures and constraints with which these high-level appointees must contend. We turn now to a more detailed discussion by key individuals who interact with such agency managers. We start with the governor and his office. As will be shown, tensions can and do develop between that office and the agencies, even though they are part of the same team.

Footnotes

1. See James Przybylski, "As Goes Illinois . . . The State as a Political Microcosm of the Nation," *Illinois Government Research*, No. 43 (August 1976), and Robert N. Schoeplein, "Illinois and the United States: Some Economic Parallels," *Illinois Government Research*, No. 42 (March 1976), Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.
2. Schoeplein, "Illinois and the United States."
3. Robert W. Resek et al., *Illinois Economic Outlook 1982* (Urbana: Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, 1982), pp. 4-5.
4. *Fortune* (May 4, 1981), p. 324, and the *Illinois State Budget*, annual publication of the Office of the Governor, Springfield, Illinois.
5. See the monthly reports of the Office of the Comptroller, Springfield, Illinois.
6. *Fortune* (May 4, 1981).

7. Robert P. Howard, *Illinois* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 447 ff.
8. See the Illinois State Government organization chart prepared by the Illinois Legislative Council and published by *Illinois Issues*, Springfield, Illinois, 1980.
9. Richard Kolhauser, "How Big Is State Government? And Is It Getting Bigger?" in Edgar G. Crane (ed.) *Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt 1980), pp. 272-277.
10. See the *Illinois Annual Report 1982*, Office of the Comptroller, Springfield, Illinois.
11. Kolhauser, "How Big Is State Government?" p. 274.
12. *Illinois State Budget 1983*, Office of the Governor, Springfield, Illinois.
13. A. James Heins, "Government and Economic Growth in Illinois," in Edgar G. Crane (ed.) *Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance*, pp. 278-286.
14. Resek et al., *Illinois Economic Outlook 1982*, p. 6.
15. Ibid., p. 24.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. These agencies are identified on the Illinois State Government chart. Agency managers are defined here as those seventy directors, executive directors, full-time chairmen, or chief managing officials who head executive branch departments, agencies, boards, and commissions. The chapter author interviewed eight managers in depth and received responses to a lengthy questionnaire from 66 of 101 past and present managers. More specifically, the questionnaire was sent to 70 current or recent managers serving Thompson in 1981; responses were received from 51. Thirty-one managers who had served Walker as of 1976 were reached; 15 responded. The respondents and the number of employees they represent may be described in the following way:

<i>Employees</i>	<i>No. Respondents</i>
1-50	20
51-200	16
201-600	10
601-1,000	6
1,000 & above	14

Confidentiality was guaranteed. In addition, the chapter author relied on insights gathered from his service as acting director of the Departments of Financial Institutions (1977) and Registration and Education (1977 and 1980).

18. In 1980 voters adopted an amendment to the Illinois Constitution which reduced the size of the General Assembly from 236 members to 177.
19. In recent years the governor, State Board of Education, and General Assembly have each opened offices in Washington, D.C.

Chapter 2

THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

Richard J. Carlson

Understanding the operation of the governor's office requires an understanding of the world in which the governor and his immediate staff operate. In his introductory chapter, Nowlan describes the extraordinary diversity of the state of Illinois. In political terms, this diversity translates into a complex network of interests demanding recognition and attention in Springfield. A brief look at the list of lobbyists registered with the secretary of state should quickly lead one to conclude that not only are there political interests in great abundance in our state, but they all seem to be represented at the state capitol.

The presence of many competing interests underlines the boisterous nature of state politics and creates a challenge for the state's chief elected official. Unlike his colleagues in the legislature who must deal only with the needs of a single district, the governor must deal with issues that concern all 11.4 million residents of the state. In meeting this challenge, he looks to his staff and the leadership of the agencies under his direct control.

The governor is the preeminent public official in Illinois. According to the constitution, he has "the supreme executive power" and is commander in chief of the state's organized militia. He is considered the *de facto* leader of his party and also the "chief legislator," since he determines a major portion of the legislative agenda through submission of the budget and substantive legislative proposals. Indeed the many responsibilities of the nation's governors led one observer to conclude that "no man acting alone could play so many roles."¹

In Illinois the governor has strong formal powers, at least compared to the governors of other states. One study that ranked the nation's governors placed Illinois second, behind New York, in terms of formal constitutional authority.² These powers include preparation of an executive budget, power to veto legislation, appointment of department heads, authority to call the legislature into special session, and the ability to run for successive terms. In Illinois the governor's veto power includes the authority to make substantive changes in enacted legislation (amendatory veto) and to reduce the amount of money in appropriations bills (reduction veto) as well as eliminate entire line items (item veto). He can also reorganize executive branch agencies "directly responsible to him" by executive order. Even with the emergence of a highly staffed and increasingly independent legislature, the governor re-

mains a powerful figure in state politics simply by virtue of his constitutional role in government.

The formal powers of the governor are enhanced by his stature as the state's highest elected official. The office symbolizes the people of the state and entitles the occupant to the deference one would expect to give to a "chief of state": a mansion is set aside for his use in Springfield, audiences rise when he enters the room at public appearances, and much of his time is devoted to ceremonial events. A 1971 study of Governor Richard Ogilvie's schedule for one month showed that the governor spent the largest amount of his time conducting what the author characterizes as public relations activities: ceremonial appearances, speeches, community meetings, and press relations.³ Thus much of the demand on a governor's time—and the source of much of his influence—relates to his stature as a public official.

Despite the many formal and informal powers of the governor, he operates within a system of very real constraints. The same constitution that grants him extraordinary executive authority also fragments power in a way that makes it difficult to control governmental decision making. Executive power is shared with other statewide elected officials, each with his or her own individual program responsibilities and political constituencies. They include the attorney general (the state's lawyer), the comptroller (the state's fiscal officer), the treasurer (the state's banker), and the secretary of state (the state's record keeper). The General Assembly makes the laws which the executive implements, while the judicial branch interprets their application.

Constraints on the power of the governor go much further than those dictated by the state's constitution. One major fact of life about state government is the role of the federal government. Many of the laws passed in Washington, D.C., are designed to be administered by the states with a combination of state and federal funds. Prime examples include air and water pollution control programs, medicaid, aid to families of dependent children, vocational rehabilitation, and transportation. Federal funds account for about one-fourth of the Illinois state budget, and federal bureaucrats now determine the manner in which many major state programs are run.

Even where state administration is unencumbered by federal rules, the governor faces limitations in controlling the bureaucracy. Individual agencies—and programs within agencies—often develop close ties with interest groups and legislators, who in turn develop "proprietary" notions about agency programs. It is difficult for a governor elected for only one or two terms to disturb these long-standing relationships, particularly when civil service systems severely limit the ability to hire and fire bureaucrats.

The governor, like the executive of a private corporation, is expected to set organizational goals and then implement them in a systematic and rational fashion. However, unlike his private sector counterpart, the governor must operate in a far more complex environment in which he shares jurisdiction over the agenda with many others and in which his ability to act may be significantly circumscribed by law and politics. The rest of this chapter describes how the governor and his staff deal with issues in this setting.

STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE

The structure described below and illustrated in Figure 2.1 represents the way the governor's office was organized under Governor James R. Thompson in 1982.⁴

At the head of the organization, of course, is the governor. His immediate personal staff consists of two secretaries — one in Springfield and one in Chicago — and two personal aides, who share responsibility for traveling with the governor, assisting with phone calls and correspondence, and coordinating internal office paperwork. According to a former staff member:

The governor's immediate aides are awfully important to the flow of work in the office. They're the ones who travel with him, and they make sure he sees all the staff memos and important correspondence. If they don't do their job well, things can get really screwed up. Getting to know them personally, and getting along with them, can really help you get decisions made — and that, after all, is the biggest challenge in any governor's office.


Chief of Staff. The governor typically delegates the coordination of his staff to a deputy who may be called deputy governor, chief of staff, or chief of governmental operations. Whatever the title, the job involves supervising the various parts of the governor's office. The job is a little like being secretary general of the United Nations. The governor's office is at times not so much an organization as an alliance among nations. The reason for this is twofold. First, the organization of the office reflects the conflicts that are a fundamental part of state politics. It should be no surprise that there are differences among staff members when that staff mirrors the conflicting interests of the political world. Second, and perhaps more important, it is difficult for any governor to delegate power. A governor draws his legitimacy from being the only person elected to do his job. The authority of anyone acting in his place can be easily undercut or become suspect unless continually supported by the governor himself. Since power is personal and not hierarchical, the notion of organization can become something of an exotic concept in the governor's office.

Ideally, the chief of staff runs the office to accommodate the decision-making style of the governor. That style may involve open debate among staff, preparation of detailed decision memos without much discussion, advice of people outside government, or a combination of approaches — depending upon the issue.

Program Office. The staff of the program office has a wide-ranging set of responsibilities for program management, policy development, and state agency relations. Numbering approximately fifteen professionals, it is the largest section within the governor's office and is directed by the governor's program coordinator. Their activities include:

- Providing program and policy advice to the governor.
- Monitoring legislative activities within an area of responsibility including occasional lobbying and extensive analyses of bills for gubernatorial action after passage by the General Assembly.

FIGURE 2.1. ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE.*



* Figures in parentheses indicate total staff (professional and clerical) associated with each office in 1982.

- Working on appointments to major boards and commissions.
- Recruiting directors and top agency staff (in conjunction with the governor's personnel office).
- Answering questions from the press, particularly in specialized areas where the press staff would have little knowledge or experience.
- Dealing with certain kinds of citizen complaints.
- Facilitating dealings with agency heads and other members of the governor's staff.
- Providing timely information to the governor and other staff members on agency programs and activities.
- Answering mail that requires more than a routine response from a state agency but not the personal attention of the governor.
- Assisting in the writing of speeches and press releases.⁵

Staff members specialize in policy areas such as education, human services, or economic development. A staff member working in the area of natural resources, for example, could be responsible for serving as a liaison with the following agencies:

Department of Agriculture
Department of Conservation
Emergency Services and Disaster Agency
Department of Energy and Natural Resources
Environmental Protection Agency
Illinois Commerce Commission
Department of Mines and Minerals
Department of Nuclear Safety
Pollution Control Board
Department of Transportation — Division of Water Resources

Figure 2.2 lists all other program staff agency assignments in 1982.

The liaison function involves developing a familiarity with the programs and personnel of each agency and monitoring the agency's general performance. It also involves channeling information back to the directors and agency staff on the policies of the governor. Staff members also serve as links to the interest groups associated with their agencies. To use the natural resources example again, the staff member may have frequent contact with groups such as the Illinois Coal Association, the Illinois Petroleum Council, the State Chamber of Commerce, the United Mine Workers, the Illinois Environmental Council, and a host of other organizations with an interest in environmental and natural resource issues.

The relationship between the program staff, their jobs, and agency directors is often complex, as a former member of the staff explains:

First of all you have to realize that we all worked in a highly unstructured situation. There was no formal job description and not a lot of direction from the senior staff. The people who usually did best were the self-starters, the ones who weren't afraid to take risks, as long as they mixed in a little common sense.

FIGURE 2.2. PROGRAM STAFF AGENCY ASSIGNMENTS (1982).

Human Services	Department of Labor
Department on Aging	Department of Transportation
Department of Children and Family Services	Environmental Facilities Financing Authority
Department of Rehabilitation Services	Housing Development Authority
Department of Veteran Affairs	Industrial Commission
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities	Industrial Development Authority
Department of Public Aid	Toll Highway Authority
Department of Public Health	Taxation, Education, Intergovernmental Relations
Health Facilities Planning Board	State Board of Education
Health Facilities Finance Authority	Board of Higher Education
Health Finance Authority	Education Facilities Authority
Purchased Care Review Board	Higher Education Loan Authority
Dangerous Drugs Commission	Department of Revenue
Developmentally Disabled Planning Council	Illinois State Scholarship Commission
Guardianship and Advocacy Commission	Intergovernmental Relations
Public Safety	Reorganization, Central Management, Regulation
Department of Corrections	Illinois Arts Council
Emergency Services and Disaster Agency	Banks and Trusts Commission
Department of Law Enforcement	Capital Development Board
Law Enforcement Merit Board	Department of Central Management Services
Liquor Control Commission	Civil Service Commission
Local Government Law Enforcement Officer Training Board	Board of Ethics
Military and Naval Department	Department of Financial Institutions
Prisoner Review Board	State Historical Library
Illinois Racing Board	Department of Human Rights
State Fire Marshall	Department of Insurance
Economic Development	Medical Center Commission
Bureau of Employment Security	Department of Registration and Education
Chicago Area Transportation Study	Savings and Loan Commission
Department of Commerce and Community Affairs	Special Events Commission
	Reorganization Projects

When I first started, I was told we had two marching orders: make the governor look good and do all we could to make state programs work better.

We had an ambivalent relationship with our directors. At times we would advocate within the governor's office for an agency or its program. Other times we'd be in the position of telling a director he or she shouldn't do something because it was politically dumb or inconsistent with a position the governor had taken.

In addition to their work with individual agencies, members of the program staff often find themselves embroiled in disputes between their agencies.

Like most states, Illinois is organized so that agencies tend to have narrow responsibilities that often overlap with those of other agencies.⁶ Agencies with common program interests but different values and political constituencies will often disagree over policy. Program staffers customarily find themselves in the middle of these disputes. If they cannot be resolved at this level, the senior staff or the governor has to resolve the impasse.

Under the Thompson administration, major state agencies were organized into subcabinets that followed roughly the same functional lines as program staff liaison responsibilities (see Figure 2.3).⁷ The subcabinets meet on a monthly basis and in the absence of the governor are chaired by the governor's program coordinator and staffed by an agency liaison. They are designed to allow agency directors to share information on a regular basis, resolve interagency issues, and develop policy. One director had this to say about subcabinets:

It wasn't very often that we actually made major policy decisions, although that did happen. Usually we talked about what was happening in each of our own agencies. But I have to say that it's easy to underestimate the value of just talking to each other on a regular basis. It is incredible to me how little directors see of each other.... I also thought the subcabinets were very useful for learning about what was going on in the governor's office. In a system as big and as loosely structured as state government, I'm grateful for any opportunity to know more about what's going on.

The program staff is responsible for coordinating the development of policies and programs advanced by the governor. As an example, an initial

FIGURE 2.3. SUBCABINETS (1982).

Natural Resources	
Department of Agriculture	Department of Public Health
Department of Conservation	Department of Rehabilitation Services
Environmental Protection Agency	
Emergency Services and Disaster Agency	Economic Development
Department of Energy and Natural Resources	Department of Commerce and Community Affairs
Department of Mines and Minerals	Environmental Protection Agency
Department of Nuclear Safety	Housing Development Authority
Illinois Department of Transportation — Division of Water Resources	Industrial Development Authority
	Industrial Commission
Human Services	Department of Insurance
Department on Aging	Department of Labor
Department of Children and Family Services	Department of Revenue
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities	Department of Transportation
Department of Public Aid	Management
	Capital Development Board
	Department of Central Management Services
	Department of Human Rights

priority of the Thompson administration was reorganization. The governor chose to reorganize functions selectively rather than on a government-wide basis. Each year the staff researches alternatives and presents them to the governor with an analysis of the programmatic and political impacts. Once an option is chosen, the staff coordinates the drafting of executive orders and legislation, assists the press office in drafting news releases, works with key legislators and interest groups while the General Assembly considers the proposal, and ultimately it monitors implementation of the plan.⁸ The development of policies or programs is occasionally done in conjunction with a task force appointed by the governor. During the Thompson years, these groups addressed issues such as protection of the Kankakee River, the impact of state mandated programs on local governments, investment policies of public pension systems, and improvement of the management efficiency of state agencies.

Legislative Office. Maintaining effective relationships with the General Assembly is one of the more significant challenges facing the governor and his staff. The legislature plays a role in the governmental process by enacting substantive legislation proposed by the governor and his agencies, passing the annual budget, and overseeing the activities of the executive branch through committee hearings, biennial audits by the auditor general, and the review of agency rule making by the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules. In addition there are a variety of permanent legislative commissions concerned with specific agency programs, such as the Legislative Advisory Commission on Public Aid, the Transportation Study Commission, and the School Problems Commission. The legislature maintains a presence in virtually every area of executive branch activity, and it is important for the governor — as well as each of his agencies — to take legislative relations seriously.

The governor will often select an ex-legislator or legislative staff member to supervise his legislative office. Familiarity with the members of each house, their personalities, and the politics of their districts is essential if the head of legislative affairs is to be an effective strategist for the governor. Under the Thompson administration, the head of the office was assisted by three other staff members. One staffer was responsible for acting as liaison with the Senate, the other two were responsible for relations with the House. House liaison responsibilities were divided by programs, with one person handling human service issues and the other handling most other issues. Two staff members were needed for the House because of its larger size (177 House members vs. 59 Senate members).

The governor sets the tone for legislative relationships by deciding what his personal posture will be with the General Assembly.⁹ According to a former member of the staff:

When a governor comes into office, he has to decide whether he wants to get along with the legislature or whether he wants to use them as whipping boys. Walker ran as a party critic, and he carried his talent for confrontation over to the legislature.... Of course, a lot depends on other things,

like which party is in control and all the personalities involved, but the governor decides whether he wants to work closely with them or keep them at arm's length, and this means a lot for executive-legislative relations.

Generally, the legislative office engages in the following activities:

- Lobbying for passage of the governor's budget and other gubernatorial programs.
- Monitoring legislative activity to protect the governor's political and program interests; this includes lobbying against bills opposed by the administration or those that would be politically embarrassing for the governor to sign or veto.
- Channeling information on legislative developments back to the governor and other members of the governor's staff.
- Coordinating administration legislative policy; this includes working with the program staff and the agencies to decide which bills they will introduce and which they will support or oppose during the session.
- Serving as a contact point for legislators who wish to deal with the governor or his agencies.
- Providing advice to other staff members and agencies on legislative issues.

To do its job effectively, the legislative office must develop a close working relationship with the leadership of the governor's party in each house of the General Assembly; they must work through the leadership in selecting sponsors for administration bills, communicating the governor's position on major legislation, scheduling legislative activity, and developing overall legislative strategies. Since much of the work of the legislature is done in committees, the staff must also work closely with the committee chairman or the minority spokesperson.

The governor's legislative staff also spends varying amounts of time working with the directors and legislative staff of the agencies, since the major agencies have strong legislative interests. Each, for example, is responsible for lobbying its appropriation bill through both houses so that the governor's original budget level remains intact — that means no increases, especially in state general revenue funds, without approval of the BOB and the governor's office — and so that the original budget submitted by the agency is not restructured in a way that adversely affects programs or agency priorities. Agencies may also be involved in major debates over substantive legislation. The governor's office will often defer to the agency's expertise on such issues, unless it involves a specific issue of interest to the governor or in cases where two agencies disagree. In the latter case, the governor's office steps in and tries to resolve the disagreement. On issues which the governor initiates himself, his staff will often take the lead in dealing with each step of the legislative process.

Even with the best of intentions, compatible personalities, party loyalties, and common interests, the maintenance of consistently harmonious executive-legislative relationships is a difficult task — mostly because of basic differences

in institutional roles and responsibilities. A former legislative staff member and agency director explains:

There is always some antagonism between legislators and the executive branch, including the governor, even when they belong to the same party. In fact it may be worse when they belong to the same party, for the same reasons that families fight. Part of it is the natural kind of jealousy between two branches of government that share decision-making responsibilities. A lot of it, I think, comes from the fact that most legislators are dependent on the governor and the executive branch for issues and information, and they resent it. Despite all the legislative staff and all the various committees and commissions, in the end the agencies run the government, and all legislators — and legislative staff — can do is try to keep up.

Legal Office. The governor maintains a traditional lawyer-client relationship with the lawyers on his staff. They advise him on the extent of his statutory and constitutional authority and explore with him the legal implications of individual decisions. Usually the governor appoints a chief counsel who supervises several other lawyers.

In addition to providing assistance to the governor on specific issues, the legal staff spends a considerable amount of time working with agency lawyers on litigation — particularly those cases which are politically sensitive, involve large judgments against the state, or could commit the state to new and recurring program expenditures. The attorney general is designated by the constitution as “the legal officer of the state,” but with the exception of environmental issues, the bulk of the state’s legal work is conducted by agency lawyers with the attorney general’s concurrence. The stakes in some cases are quite high. A strong and continuing interest in these cases by the governor’s office is well justified.

The legal staff also engages in a set of more routine activities. The constitution allows the governor to “grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons” to convicted criminals. Four times a year the Prisoner Review Board refers fifty or so requests from prisoners to the governor’s office for commutations of sentences. The legal staff reviews each one and makes a recommendation to the governor. The staff also coordinates extradition requests. Most of the extradition paperwork is done by the Department of Law Enforcement, but the governor’s signature is required on each warrant.

One time-consuming activity involves the interviewing of final candidates for appointment as agency directors or as members of boards and commissions requiring senate confirmation. The process is nicknamed “woodshedding” and is designed to identify conflicts of interests or other problems that might cause public embarrassment if the appointment is made. The Department of Law Enforcement checks its files for arrest and conviction records, but the legal staff poses questions about individual financial conditions, business interests, civil litigation, or other personal factors that might cast doubt on a person’s ability to hold public office.

The lawyers also draft executive orders, which must be limited in scope to operations internal to the executive branch, and review all legislation passed by the General Assembly for adherence to the requirements of the constitution and other problems of legal consistency. The latter activity keeps the lawyers well occupied in the months of July, August, and September. Of course, in addition to providing legal advice to the governor, the legal staff provides the same service to the rest of the governor's staff.

Press Office. The press plays a prominent role in government because what the press writes about and what public figures say in print defines much of what government and politics is all about. Therefore, the management of press relations is a major part of any elected official's concern. The press office becomes the focal point of this effort.

The governor's press office is headed by a press secretary, who functions as the governor's primary spokesperson, and two assistant press secretaries who work in the Springfield office. One specializes in writing press releases and serving as the primary contact for the print media, while the other assistant works with radio and television reporters. The staff is customarily made up of ex-reporters. A small press staff operates out of the governor's office in Chicago, home of the state's largest media market. The governor's speech writer is also attached to the press office.

The press office operates in several ways. First, it prepares news releases on the governor's activities and those of his agencies. In the first two weeks of July 1982, for example, the press office issued the following releases:

- July 1:* Governor announces Illinois has retained its AAA credit rating.
- July 2:* Governor commends legislature for providing "fiscal stability during the current recessionary times."
Governor announces shipment of ten Illinois-made street sweepers to Alexandria, Egypt, from Port of Chicago.
- July 2:* Governor says legislation will help Chicago schools "open on time and achieve a balanced budget."
- July 7:* Governor signs legislation revamping the Chicago Housing Authority.
- July 8:* Governor announces new rules for lease, management, and sale of state property.
Governor declares Warren County a disaster area due to heavy flooding.
- July 8:* Governor announces sale of state bonds at a rate lower than previous year.
- July 9:* Governor announces First Annual Governor New Product Awards for Illinois companies making innovations in product designs.
- July 13:* Governor signs legislation that prohibits car dealers from doing business on Sunday.
Governor commends Congress for overriding presidential veto that could have been harmful to the Illinois printing industry.

July 14: Governor signs legislation raising \$300,000 in fees to improve regulation of the horse racing industry.

Governor's Office of Consumer Services opposes rate hike by Illinois Power Company.

Governor authorizes \$21.8 million advance payment to the Regional Transportation Authority.

Governor announces that Department of Law Enforcement laboratories win national accreditation.

Governor will meet with President Reagan on law enforcement legislation.

The level of staff effort associated with individual events varies considerably. The announcement of appointments to a board or commission requires a review of resumes, a few phone calls, and the drafting of a short press release. Preparation of the materials describing the governor's annual budget submission each March involves days of preparatory effort, in addition to the scheduling of numerous briefings and press conferences for the governor and his budget director during the week the budget is announced, and the answering of dozens of phone calls from reporters.

Second, the press office serves as a contact point for all the media interested in the activities of state government. The press office assists the Springfield press corps — and other reporters around the state — in developing stories about the executive branch. The staff's primary focus is the governor, but it also aids the press in pursuing stories that are agency oriented.

Third, it provides a logistical service to the media in arranging press conferences and other contacts with the governor. Press conferences, which typically involve radio and television media, can become technically complicated, particularly when they occur outside of the statehouse or outside the State of Illinois Building in Chicago.

Personnel Office. Patronage is the one activity of the governor's office that comes closest to being purely political, at least in the sense of party politics. Every governor is a member of a political party, and it is not uncommon for members of the same party to expect preferential treatment in areas where the governor and his agencies exercise discretion. This is especially true when it comes to hiring state employees.

The appetite for job patronage among Democrats and Republicans is in many ways more of a reflection of the past than an accurate picture of the present. At one time, there were thousands of state jobs for which people could be hired or fired at will.¹⁰ That situation has changed significantly over the past decade due partly to court rulings — that political firings violate First Amendment freedoms — and partly to the growth of public employee unionism and the extension of the civil service system.¹¹ State programs have also grown more technical and complex; as a result, there are not as many jobs available to unskilled and semiskilled people who typically come up through the patronage system.



Despite these changes, there is a strong expectation among activists of both parties that job openings in state government should be filled by members or friends of the party in power. It is the job of the governor's patronage office to attempt to meet these expectations.

The head of the patronage office is often a key political advisor to the governor and a major link to local party organizations. Requests for jobs come up through the county chairmen or state legislators, and usually one full-time staff member acts as the primary contact for each group.

Virtually every employee hired by the state must meet some kind of qualification in the form of educational credentials, experience, or test results. When there are two candidates who both meet the basic job requirements, the role of the patronage office is to ask, "Why not hire the person friendly to our administration?" It is a difficult role to perform, as recalled by a former member of the staff:

It's an impossible job in a lot of ways. On the one hand, you've got county chairmen crawling all over you thinking that all you've got to do is snap your fingers and their guy's got a job. Then you've got the agencies and the personnel system to deal with. Let's say you get an agency's okay, then you still have to make sure all the civil service requirements are met. That can take a lot of time and a lot of party people get impatient. They can't understand the delays. That's one of our biggest problems. That, and the fact that there are just not enough jobs because of the recession and budget cuts.

In addition to responding to party pressure for jobs in the bureaucracy, the patronage office also coordinates the governor's direct appointment of well over 1,300 positions on 172 independent boards and commissions.¹² Most of these positions are nonpaying, and the boards perform only advisory functions. Most of the 23 departments created under the Civil Administrative Code, for example, have an unpaid advisory board created by statute. Within departments there are boards and committees to advise agencies on such things as endangered species, group insurance for state employees, long-term care facilities, migrant labor camps, swine brucellosis, and beekeeping. There are also boards with significant regulatory powers, such as the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Pollution Control Board, and the Liquor Control Commission; and those that simply administer programs, such as the Dangerous Drugs Commission and the Delinquency Prevention Commission.

Some require that members represent specific interests. The Economic and Technical Advisory Committee to the Department of Energy and Natural Resources, which is responsible for coordinating the economic analysis of proposed state environmental regulations, is made up of members representing municipal government, labor, industry, agriculture, public health, and commerce. In most cases there is a requirement that no more than a majority of members appointed to a board or commission may be of the same political party.

The existence of so many boards and commissions stems from several factors: the desire to provide a formal mechanism for public participation in

agency programs, including that of the technical specialist; and the desire to separate some sensitive quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions from direct executive control in order to promote the perception of fairness or to keep these functions "out of politics."

Whatever the reason for the creation of an independent board or commission, the governor is typically the appointing authority, usually with the concurrence of the state Senate. Managing this system within the governor's office is a full-time job for one professional and one clerical worker.

Washington, D.C., Office. The growing importance of federal programs in state government led Governor Ogilvie to establish a separate office in Washington, D.C. Each governor since then has maintained an office in the nation's capital in order to lobby for the state's fair share of federal funds and to ensure that federal legislation and program regulations do not disadvantage the state of Illinois. The staff is typically made up of people familiar with Capitol Hill and the federal bureaucracy. The office engages in the following activities:

- Coordinating the development of policy on congressional issues, usually by working with the governor's staff in Springfield and the appropriate state agencies.
- Lobbying Congress and the White House once state policy positions are established.
- Serving as the governor's link to the National Governors' Association.
- Channeling information on congressional and federal agency developments back to the Springfield staff and state agency personnel.
- Staffing the governor while he is in Washington; this includes making arrangements for appointments with members of Congress, the White House staff, or members of the cabinet as well as preparing briefing information.
- Serving as the governor's liaison to the Illinois congressional delegation.

A former member of the Springfield staff had this to say about the Washington office:

I kind of viewed them as consultants. If we needed to get something done in Washington or wanted to respond to some federal issue, I relied on them to tell me how to do it. And their judgment was usually sound.

The Extended Office of the Governor.¹³ Governors Ogilvie, Walker, and Thompson all maintained special units to perform such functions as receiving and processing citizen complaints or to serve as a kind of outreach office for certain programs or constituencies. Under Governor Thompson, this unit is entitled the Governor's Office of Interagency Cooperation. It has staffs in Chicago and Springfield. The office provides additional services through the Governor's Office of Consumer Services which helps citizens and consumer groups (with technical assistance and legal representation) who wish to

intervene in rate cases before the Illinois Commerce Commission. It also makes factual assessments of the financial and economic impacts of proposed utility regulatory changes.

The Office of Interagency Cooperation also includes a number of special assistants who deal with specific constituencies. In 1982 assistants were designated for Hispanics, ethnic minorities, women, other minorities, and consumer affairs.

Administrative Support. There are several other sections of the governor's office that provide basic support services to the governor. The scheduling office receives hundreds of invitations each month for the governor to speak or appear at various functions. The staff processes and organizes these invitations and works with the governor, his personal aides, and senior staff to arrange the governor's schedule of personal appearances.

The Mail Control Office is the central receiving point for the governor's mail — and it is voluminous. In an average month, it is not uncommon for 10,000 or more separate pieces of mail to come into the office. The mail is sorted by the staff into: (1) "VIP" mail that the governor looks at personally, usually from senior elected officials, personal acquaintances, prominent politicians, and so forth; (2) "negative" mail that criticizes the programs of the executive branch — these are usually answered by the agencies, but are reviewed by the program staff; and (3) the more "positive" mail that complements the governor on agency programs or raises basic questions about program operations — these are usually answered by the governor's staff and go out over the governor's signature.

The mansion staff runs the executive mansion, which is in effect a public building dedicated to public events, and organizes the governor's social agenda at the mansion, usually under the supervision of the governor's spouse. The mansion was extensively renovated during the Ogilvie administration and now serves as the location for numerous political and governmental events.

Bureau of the Budget. While the bureau (BOB) is formally a part of the executive office of the governor, it occupies a position quite apart from the rest of the governor's staff. The budget process gives the work of the BOB a much more structured focus than other staff activities. New employees are hired by senior BOB staff, and there is less likelihood of major staff turnover with a change in administrations. For these and other reasons, the bureau tends to have an institutional life of its own.

The BOB is dealt with more extensively elsewhere in this book, and I mention it here only to emphasize the significance of the budget in the work of the governor's office and the strong role often played by bureau staff. The governor must deal with budget issues for several reasons. First, there are many issues raised during the budget process; while most are resolved by BOB and the agencies, some can only be resolved by the governor or his staff. Second, there are many influential interest groups with a stake in the outcome

of the budget process (e.g., social-welfare agencies with boards made up of prominent citizens, psychiatrists, doctors). All must be dealt with, and often the governor must take the lead in selling his budget decisions. Third, mistakes in budgeting can cost the governor dearly. There are tremendous political pressures to spend tax dollars, or to give tax relief, and virtually none to control spending. However, the constitution requires a balanced budget, and any governor who allows spending to get out of control runs the risk of severe embarrassment. This means that the bureau, and the governor, must carefully monitor revenues and agency spending.

The bureau staff plays a significant role in the governor's office because of their knowledge of state agency programs gained through the budgeting process and because many of the issues that surface within the governor's office have budgetary implications. The bureau's attitude in all these deliberations, however, is usually driven by fiscal rather than program concerns.

CYCLES OF WORK

The work of the governor's office, like the work of most of state government, centers around a few milestone dates established in the constitution.

JANUARY: Second Monday — New State officers take office following a general election; Second Wednesday — Annual legislative session begins

MARCH: First Wednesday — Governor submits budget to legislature; Third Wednesday — Primary election in even-numbered years

NOVEMBER: First Tuesday after First Monday — General election in even-numbered years

OTHER: June 30 — Target date for end of spring legislative session; July 1 — Beginning of new state fiscal year; October or November — Beginning of fall session to act on vetoes. Other significant dates include early August, when the State Fair occurs; and October 1, the beginning of the federal fiscal year.

From a program and budget perspective, the annual cycle starts in the late summer and early fall. In August the Bureau of the Budget distributes its basic circular giving agencies instructions on budget preparations for the next fiscal year. In the fall, agencies begin to negotiate their budgets with the BOB. All issues are resolved by February in time for the March budget submission. Each annual budget reflects basic decisions by the governor on (1) state revenue projections and (2) the allocation of revenue growth to education and public assistance, other state funded programs, and new state program initiatives.

While the budget is being prepared, the governor's office and the staffs of his agencies are preparing bills for introduction at the spring legislative session. The governor and his staff will determine which legislation he will initiate and decide whether or not he will have any agency bills introduced as part of the governor's program. The agencies will also decide, with the concurrence of the governor's legislative office, which bills they will introduce.

Decisions on these issues will be made in time to meet deadlines established in the House and Senate for the introduction of bills. Under the constitution, the governor has until April 1 to decide on any reorganization initiatives that he wants the General Assembly to consider that year.

The rest of the spring is spent by the governor's office and agency staff in working with the legislature to pass appropriation bills and substantive legislation. The process can be quite time-consuming — especially throughout the month of June, when most of the major legislative decisions are made.

Once the General Assembly adjourns, the governor's staff — primarily the program and legal staffs — must analyze all substantive bills passed and make recommendations to the governor on which ones to sign, veto, or amendatorily veto. The Bureau of the Budget is primarily responsible for making recommendations on all the enacted appropriations bills, and these are the first ones acted upon by the governor.

The order in which substantive bills are dealt with usually depends upon when they are received by the governor's office. The governor has sixty days from the time of receipt to act upon bills, otherwise they become law without his signature. This is a busy time for both the BOB and the governor's program staff. A former member of the program staff comments:

A lot of people, including some lobbyists who ought to know better, assume things are over once the legislature goes home. But the governor's amendatory veto power means there's almost a second legislative session that takes place. Some people figure they've got a second shot at stuff they didn't get during the session. Sometimes that puts an awful lot of pressure on the governor. On the other hand, it gives you a chance to correct screw-ups that happened during the sessions but everyone missed. On the whole, though, the period from July to early September — at least in odd-numbered years — is incredibly hectic as each of us scrambles to review 50 to 150 bills, along with doing our regular work.

Once the bill review process is over in late summer, the entire cycle begins again.

AGENCY RELATIONS

From a governor's perspective, there is virtually no incentive for devoting a large amount of time to the management of state agencies. Any attempt at serious supervision is a practical impossibility within the structure of Illinois state government. There are simply too many people to supervise. The Illinois Task Force on Governmental Reorganization, in its 1976 report, concluded that:

It is obvious that management functions cannot be performed for all of the approximately 315 persons in managerial posts in Illinois government responsible to the Governor. Thus, by decision or design, the Governor will not effectively supervise, on a one-to-one basis, his many appointees in the current governmental system in Illinois.¹⁴

The report went on to quote a former governor of a large eastern state on the assumption that a governor can personally manage his agencies.


If a governor seeks to forego delegation of authority and attempts to involve himself personally in the details of day-to-day tasks, he will mire in the quicksands of minutiae and inevitably abdicate his decision-making powers to others who will move into the resultant vacuum, whether those others be members of his administration or of the bureaucracy. So, delegation becomes inevitable to achieving the goal of effective administration. Either the chief executive structures the delegation to his liking or a *de facto* delegation will come into being by virtue of inattention or non-involvement.¹⁵

There is another disincentive to active management by the governor. Former Governor Dan Walker explains:

Nobody cares. The media doesn't care whether you are actually managing state government or not. There's no glamour in it. Very few people care about it.... It's not a political plus.... In terms of getting votes or a better image or better reputation, you'd better spend your time somewhere else.¹⁶

The lack of appreciation for gubernatorial management skills stems in part from the absence of a model of what makes a governor a good manager. The private sector comparison is clearly inappropriate. As the introductory section of this chapter points out, a governor operates in a world vastly different from his corporate counterparts. Yet governors do develop reputations for being good managers or bad managers, probably for reasons that are unique to each administration. Even though the governor cannot be a manager in a traditional private-sector sense, he and his staff are involved in agency decision making to some extent. One measure of this involvement is the amount of attention given to an agency and its programs.

At one end of the spectrum are those agencies that require only a modest amount of attention, either because they administer programs that never become controversial (e.g., Illinois Natural History Survey) or, more likely, because the governor has no real control over what they do (e.g., Illinois Commerce Commission). At the other end are those agencies that require constant attention. These include agencies that administer expensive programs and affect large numbers of people (e.g., public aid, mental health, education); those where a crisis — should it happen — would be so dramatic that it should be anticipated (e.g., corrections); and those associated with well-organized and influential interest groups (e.g., public aid, mental health, education). Between these two extremes are agencies that become involved with the governor's office because of a single issue or event. Groundwater contamination that threatens the water supply of a major city would heighten involvement with the Environmental Protection Agency. Tornadoes and major floods raise the visibility of the Emergency Services and Disaster Agency. Other agencies may become strongly involved with the governor's office because of a special interest of the governor's.



Although it is true that the governor is not involved in the day-to-day management of state agencies, it must be remembered that agency directors and assistant directors are appointed by the governor, albeit with the consent of the state Senate. They are his subordinates and should be expected to respond to his needs. Even here the governor does not have complete and unfettered discretion. Each of the major interest groups expects to have some influence over who is selected to run the programs that affect the well-being of their members. For example, the Illinois Coal Association and the United Mine Workers expect to have a say in who runs the Department of Mines and Minerals; in the case of the AFL-CIO, United Auto Workers, and other unions, it is the Department of Labor; with the state Chamber of Commerce and the Illinois Manufacturers Association, it is the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Industrial Commission; with the Illinois Farm Bureau, it is the Department of Agriculture; and so on throughout state government. Groups that object strongly to a gubernatorial appointment can create political problems for the governor by attempting to stall or prevent Senate confirmation, criticizing the governor publicly to their members and otherwise stirring up trouble. A governor is usually sensitive to these interests in making his appointments.

Once appointed and confirmed, directors gradually become part of a bureaucracy with concerns and interests often quite different from those of the governor or his staff. Agencies — and divisions within agencies — have longstanding relationships with local and federal bureaucracies, old ties to legislators and legislative committees, strong commitments to existing procedures, and many inter-agency relationships. While the directors and assistant directors may owe their appointments to the governor, they are quickly exposed to new claims on their loyalties.

For political and bureaucratic reasons, then, there exists a subtle institutional tension between the agencies and the governor's office. Whether or not this tension becomes a problem depends on the individuals involved. Said one former staff member:

After awhile it's easy to develop an antagonistic attitude toward the agencies. People on the staff clearly develop the attitude that agencies need to be watched and directors need to be controlled. And I suppose the truth of the matter is that they do. Unless a director is personally close to the governor, he's going to respond to the more immediate demands of his agency, unless someone directly tells him not to.

The good staff people work around the problem by developing an understanding with the good directors. For the most part, what the governor's office wants is not that time consuming, just unpredictable and sometimes difficult to understand. And besides, agencies generally do what they want most of the time. The only real exceptions to this involve patronage and budget issues, and this can get to be a real sore point. Except for the big ones, most agencies have to give in on both issues almost all the time.

CONCLUSION

The governor's immediate staff help the governor make decisions about the management of state government: what legislation to introduce; how to resolve a policy dispute between two agencies; whom to appoint as an agency director; how to satisfy the demands of an interest group; or which speaking invitations to accept. In performing this role, the staff provides two important and related services: they manage the flow of information to the governor, and they serve as his surrogates with the many groups that want the personal attention of the governor.

Information can flow to the governor in a variety of ways: memos, discussions with individual staff or agency personnel, group debates within the office, contact with outside advisors, newspaper articles, and meetings with interest groups or legislators. How this flow occurs depends upon how the governor likes to make decisions and how he likes to deal with staff. In this sense the governor can encourage or discourage the full flow of information. However, the staff, particularly those in daily contact with the governor, have a strong influence on how much information reaches him and in what form. One staff member summed up his approach this way:

I always felt that my first priority was to analyze completely all of the programmatic and political implications of a particular issue. I felt I should point out the ups and downs of each response and then argue what I thought the best solution would be. The job of the staff is not to argue a point of view to the governor. It's to present a balanced analysis of all options to the governor, make sure he understands what his alternatives are, and then implement his decision.

Another staff member provides a different perspective on this staff role:

It seemed to me that the office was set up to reflect the basic conflicts in most of the problems the governor had to face. We had political types who were interested in satisfying party people, the legislators, and the interest groups; and then we had the people who were worried about how the programs were affected; and then we had the bureau, and all they worried about was whether or not it involved money. And all these people had some access to the governor. I never felt that I had any special responsibility to present somebody else's point of view. It seemed to me that everybody had their oar pretty deep in the water anyway. To me, that was a good reason for pushing my own view and letting everybody else fend for themselves.

The second major staff role involves acting as the governor's surrogate, since it is impossible for the governor to attend to the needs of all who seek his favor. Acting in place of the governor, a staff member can have a strong impact on the governor's image with many people and groups outside the administration. As one staff member relates:

I don't know about the rest of the staff, but I think at least half of my job is just dealing with outside groups and letting them know the governor's office — and through us the governor — cares about their problems. I have

worked with some groups on an issue for literally months with no real, concrete payoff for them. Yet, they seem satisfied, just because we paid attention to them.... Let's face it, a lot of politics simply boils down to being nice to people and doing small favors for them.

Utilizing staff as a go-between with interest groups and legislators has some obvious tactical advantages for the governor. It tends to preserve his flexibility on issues. He can always disavow the position taken on his behalf by a subordinate, whether that subordinate is a staff member or an agency official. It can also make it easier for the governor to say no, insulating him from some of the unpleasant messages that come from his office.

Staff members can sometimes abuse their representation role, and this can undercut their credibility and that of the governor as well. One director recalls:

This wasn't true of most of the governor's staff, but I know one person who would *always* say that 'this is something the governor really wants' almost every time he asked for anything. There's no way in hell the governor wanted as much information as this guy used to ask for. I usually gave him what he wanted. He may have thought he was doing the governor's bidding, but he greatly annoyed me and the rest of my staff.

It should be clear from these comments that the role staff plays in representing the governor is significant. In many situations and for many people, contacts with the staff are, in effect, contacts with the governor.

Footnotes

1. Charles Adrian, *State and Local Governments* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 255.
2. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown, 2nd ed., 1971).
3. Ronald D. Michaelson, "An Analysis of the Chief Executive: How the Governor Uses His Time," *Public Affairs Bulletin*, Public Affairs Research Bureau, Southern Illinois University — Carbondale, vol. IV, no. 4 (September-October 1971). A complete breakdown of how Governor Ogilvie used his time in June 1971 is as follows:

Public Relations	27%	Legislative Relations	16%
Management of State		Political Leadership (intra-office)	11%
Government	19%	Responsibilities	6%
Personal (attendance at private functions)	18%	Out-of-state Travel	5%

4. Descriptions of the governor's office are based upon the author's experience as a member of Governor James R. Thompson's staff from 1977 until 1981 and interviews with past and present members of the staff and directors of state agencies.
5. The development of the liaison function with the governor's office is briefly discussed in the report of the Illinois Task Force on Governmental Reorganization, *Orderly Government: Organizing for Manageability*, November 3, 1976, pp. 66-67:

It is the nature of the work of the Budget Bureau that all agencies of Illinois government that spend money have a single point of contact

in the budget staff who is called . . . the budget analyst. These examiners are grouped by function under common supervisors called unit chiefs, or assistant directors. Thus, to the extent that the Budget Bureau is considered a part of the governor's immediate staff, a structured set of liaison relationships to agencies already exists, and there is a question whether another set of liaisons is necessary. Both Governor Ogilvie and Governor Walker decided that it was necessary.

About half of the states have an agency liaison function in the governor's office in the sense that every agency has a designated general point of contact (in addition to specialized points of contact for such functions as press and legislative relations, legal, mail, etc.), and there is a group of individuals in the governor's office whose members consider their full-time job to be liaison with or coordination of one or more state agencies. The states that do not have such functions tend to be those that have adopted a super secretarial form of organization, those that are relatively small, or those that by tradition and/or by a governor determined to keep his staff small have simply not adopted the practice.

6. Administration of the surface mining program, for example, is split among four agencies: Agriculture, Conservation, Mines and Minerals, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Regulation of drinking water supplies is shared by EPA and the Department of Public Health; Public Health shares responsibility for inspecting and certifying nursing homes with the Department of Labor, the Department of Registration and Education, the Department of Public Aid, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, and the State Fire Marshal; the State Fire Marshal investigates suspected arson cases but must turn them over to the Department of Law Enforcement for criminal prosecution.
7. Subcabinets emerged under both Thompson and Ogilvie as one approach to the problem of coordinating over sixty major executive branch agencies. The sheer number of agencies made it virtually impossible to develop a cabinet system as it exists in a few states or at the federal level.
8. The governor's power to reorganize state agencies by executive order was granted in the 1970 Constitution and was exercised for the first time in 1977 when Governor Thompson reorganized the Department of Law Enforcement and merged the departments of Finance and General Services into the Department of Administrative Services (DAS). In 1982 DAS was combined with the Department of Personnel into the Department of Central Management Services.
9. See Taylor Pensoneau, "Walker, Ogilvie, and Kerner Used Different Techniques in Dealing with Legislature," *Illinois Issues* (February 1975), pp. 51-53.
10. According to one estimate, as recently as 1969 there were "10,000 state employees, including the lame, the halt, and some with less than a month to go for their pensions, who were dismissed by a new Republican governor, Richard B. Ogilvie, who had been a persistent critic of Mayor Richard Daley's patronage politics, but who felt that he needed these patronage jobs to firm up his own power base." Martin and Susan Tolchin, *To the Victor: Political Patronage from the Clubhouse to the White House* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 10.
11. Many states have had to establish or expand their civil service systems as a condition for receiving federal program grants. The growth of civil service in general has led to frustration among governors and senior agency officials. This sense of frustration is reflected in the comments of fifteen former governors interviewed in 1978 and 1979 under the auspices of the National Governors' Association:

Governors are remarkably consistent in their view that the protection afforded state employees through civil service systems has become unreasonable. But their motivation seems to lie not in the desire to make more patronage appointments, but in the difficulty they face when trying

to discharge an employee they consider incompetent. From Lynn Muchmore and Thad L. Beyle, "The Governor as Party Leader," *State Government* (Summer 1980), p. 123.

12. The governor must also concur in the appointment of members to another 75 or so boards made by agency directors, such as the numerous licensing boards in the Department of Registration and Education. He also directly appoints the public administrators in each of the state's 102 counties; these officials serve as executors for the estates of people who die without a will.
13. This phrase comes from *Orderly Government*, p. 55.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
16. Quoted in Joe P. Pisciotte, "What Made Walker Run? Former Governors Reflect on Past," *Illinois Issues* (June 1981), p. 13.

Chapter 3

THE EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROCESS

Craig S. Bazzani

As implied by its functional name, the executive branch of state government is responsible for the overall planning and management of the state's resources. However, several units of state government assist the governor in discharging the day-to-day operations of the state. In Illinois one of the primary support functions is provided by the Bureau of the Budget (BOB).

Created over a decade ago (1969) during the administration of Governor Richard B. Ogilvie, the BOB has both line and staff functions inside the office of the governor. These functions are probably best explained in the context of the support provided by the BOB to the executive budget of the state. For a concentrated period of six months each year, the BOB performs a staff function to the governor by assisting in the "development" phase of the executive budget. In general, this effort entails an examination of the program needs of the state (as defined by its code departments, the governor's office, and the General Assembly) and the fiscal or monetary impact associated with delivering the services required to meet those needs. This "demand" vs. "dollar" assessment, in global terms, is public policy analysis designed to assist the governor in determining where best the state should spend its marginal dollar.

The BOB's second major activity, the line function, is performed as it assists the governor in the "execution" phase of the executive budget. Here, the BOB exercises a stewardship role by directing and coordinating (and occasionally, controlling) the rate at which revenues and expenditures are provided to/by the departments of state government. While multiple sub-functions can be identified in the execution phase, in a broad sense the bureau — on behalf of the governor — is the keeper of the state's "operational" checkbook (apologies to the state comptroller who by statute is the state's chief fiscal officer and thereby has formal check writing authority).

MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

While the principal task of the BOB is to assist the governor in developing and executing the executive budget of the state, it has several secondary objectives necessary to achieve those goals. Because of the size and complexity of Illinois state government, it is simply impossible for the governor to respond to or

evaluate in detail each of the issues that occur on a day-to-day basis, or to pass judgment on all areas of an agency budget during the annual review process. For these and other related reasons, the governor relies on the bureau to achieve consensus on issues and to eliminate surprises wherever possible.

Agency heads are given a good deal of flexibility in administering and planning for their agencies which requires that they make numerous judgments about how scarce resources are to be allocated. Since almost every program of every agency is defined by its budget, it is in this context that most public policy decisions are made. The governor, therefore, utilizes the bureau, specifically its director, as a surrogate to make these decisions. As the budget review process unfolds and program and/or resources issues are identified, the BOB (generally in cooperation with others in the governor's office) works to reach agreement with an agency head on a specific course of action and a specific set of funding parameters that can simply be reported to the governor. While the governor must give final approval to all major budget and policy decisions, the early analysis and agreement on all but the most significant matters is a vital task performed by the bureau.

A second major objective of the BOB can be defined as a desire to achieve fiscal integrity or fiscal responsibility. The effectiveness of the BOB at any point — certainly over the long term — is a function of its reliability and consistency, i.e., its "track record." No state budget can begin to lay out the state's program or the state's agenda unless the program is somehow properly funded and then properly measured.

Performance for the BOB means a high level of success year-in-and-year-out in its ability to forecast state revenues and expenditures. Inconsistent or unreliable fiscal predictions can create an environment that ranges from confusion to chaos.

A similar objective, operational credibility, is of equal importance in the relationship between the agencies and the bureau itself. As part of the budget review process, which is always both *retrospective* and *prospective*, the bureau will generally establish with each agency an agreed upon set of performance criteria, or measuring sticks, to assess such factors as need, cost, and volume. It is important that both entities, certainly from the standpoint of the BOB, select performance criteria which accurately portray the state of affairs for that agency. Since BOB analysts live by the tenet "we are the independent conscience of the governor," presenting a true picture of agency needs to the governor (without gimmickry and without using false or manipulated data) is of extreme importance to the BOB as an organization and to each individual analyst.

The objectives or goals noted above suggest that the BOB is similar to a program/fiscal auditor. This is an incomplete picture. The bureau is also something of an "efficiency engineer." As a protagonist in the budgeting process, it is the bureau's job to help departments find a more efficient way to "build a better mousetrap" — (that is, educate more students at less cost, improve prison management, or save more agricultural land).

ORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

The BOB is organized around three major units or divisions, each with sub-parts that are altered only slightly from time to time. These three units are: (1) the budget and fiscal analysis division, (2) the program division, and (3) the planning division.

Budget and Fiscal Analysis Division. The budget and fiscal analysis division of the BOB is primarily responsible for monitoring the state's revenues and expenditures. From the standpoint of revenue, this unit tracks the near- and long-term trends of each source of revenue (income taxes, sales taxes, motor fuel taxes, and so on) in an effort to provide the governor with some measure of the fiscal health of the state. With this kind of information, the governor can better understand the monetary parameters within which the annual budget for the state must be developed.

Of equal importance to the governor are trends that relate to the expenditure of current funds. While the General Assembly and the governor together determine the appropriation limits for all agencies of state government, various social and economic factors often require changes in certain expenditure levels. As a consequence, it is crucial that the budget and fiscal analysis division provide "watchdog" information on those key variables that influence government spending. Among the most significant of these factors are: unemployment rates, public aid case loads, changes in federal spending, the acquisition or loss of business/industry in the state, interest rates, and various types of demographic data.

The budget and fiscal analysis division also assists the governor in other capacities. Tax policies, the relative equity of various taxes, and tax reductions or tax increases are only a few of the public policy issues addressed by this unit in support of the governor's planning efforts. In similar fashion, this unit performs a liaison role for the governor with the Illinois banking/financial community and those private agencies that provide "ratings" on the bonds that are issued by the state in support of capital improvements. The state, like individual homeowners, must occasionally borrow funds for long-term improvements; therefore, the timing, security, level, and format of such borrowing become important considerations. In practical terms, this division must present to the governor options or strategies for meeting the demand for capital expenditures, such as new highways, prisons, and university facilities, within affordable spending limits on an annual and long-term basis.

The Program Division. Perhaps the BOB staff members most familiar to the departments of state government are those individuals who serve as analysts in the BOB's several program divisions. The units contained in the Program Division have been traditionally organized along the following general lines: education; social service departments (Public Aid, Mental Health, Corrections); general government (Revenue, Personnel, Central Management Services); and economic development (Commerce and Community Affairs, Transportation).

The analysts who examine the budget requests and program needs of the departments do what might be called "pick and shovel" work: that is, they examine whether the objectives of a department are being accomplished in the most efficient manner from the perspective of both *spending* and the *delivery of services*. Regardless of whether they rely on "program" budgeting, "zero-based" budgeting, or "incremental" budgeting, Program Division staff members hold budget review sessions for the governor and each agency head during which different levels of spending are tied to different sets (or levels) of program services. The theme, "let's get the biggest bang for the buck," is pervasive throughout this review process. The governor, of course, must ultimately decide not only *where* to find the balance between funds available and program needs within each agency, but also *how* best to allocate resources among all of the departments to achieve the many objectives (on some priority basis) of state government.

As will be more fully discussed in later sections of this chapter, the units and staff that comprise the Program Division represent the front-line contact for the governor in nearly every aspect and phase of the budget process. These wide-ranging roles include dealing with agencies on day-to-day operational issues (current budget), assisting in the development of future budgets, and providing support to both the governor and the agency on legislative deliberations.

The Planning Division. The Planning Division of the BOB is an information and service unit that deals with a variety of long-term concerns of state government. For example, the Planning Division is the depository of demographic, regulatory, and economic data that assist other units of the BOB (and selected state agencies) in the task of public policymaking. Analytical work will typically involve a review of statewide population projections, including inter- and intra-state migration patterns, the modeling and testing of alternate tax programs and school aid formulas, and the identification of changes in federal statutes — to name just a few of its several major activities. In addition, the Planning Division serves as a clearinghouse for grants and programs that are jointly sponsored or financed by units of local government, the state, and the federal government (or some combination thereof). The Planning Division staff is not generally involved in the annual budget cycle but can be considered part of a "think tank" where new ideas can be tested and cultivated.

THE BUREAU ANALYST: A PROFILE

While there are exceptions, of course, most bureau analysts have educational and work-related experience in economics, public policy/public affairs, or political science. Most analysts are in their twenties or thirties and are positive thinking, energetic, and fair-minded (if you happen to be an agency head, naturally your analyst will be a shade "crazy" and uncooperative). Analysts should not be mistaken for green-visored accountants; they are professionals looking at their agencies from a program, not a bottom-line, standpoint.

The governor and/or bureau director, however, generally establish a "game plan" that relates to the annual review of agency budget requests (e.g., holding all increases in the aggregate to a "bottom line" figure of not more than 5 percent). The analyst's mentality, in contrast, is typically directed at achieving closure on the bottom line by an examination of programs rather than objects of expenditure (travel, commodities, printing, contractual services). Recognizing full well that budgets and appropriations bills are largely expressed in object-of-expenditure terms, the evaluation of agency needs and agency service levels must ultimately be reduced to the program or function level.

The typical analyst does not see himself or herself as either an opponent of or an advocate for an agency's goals. Others, such as legislators, interest groups, and the agency director, fill the advocacy role. The analyst's job is to sit on the other side of the governor's table and politely suggest that perhaps there are better, more economical methods of meeting the goals of a particular agency (or at a minimum, to give the governor several alternative ways of achieving essentially the same objective).

The role of the analyst changes slightly when he or she is called upon to represent the governor's views to the General Assembly or its staff. While the analyst is free to debate openly on the inside of the executive branch, any role which requires work on behalf of the governor — short of a political role, that is — necessarily implies that the analyst ignore personal biases in favor of presenting the administration's official position. For example, an analyst may recommend and defend to the governor a program that provides scholarships to university students on the basis of "financial need." However, if the governor decides that scholarships should be awarded on a "merit" (or scholarship) basis, then the analyst is obliged to support that position. The governor's decision may be based on political reasons (perhaps because a larger number of students would be reached with merit scholarships); nonetheless, the analyst's job is to defend that decision on an analytical or substantive or public policy (good government) basis.

Several fundamental principles govern an analyst's working relationship with the department. Of primary importance to the analyst is open and frequent communication, the timely response to questions, and the collective meeting of deadlines. The preparation of the annual state budget is a difficult, tedious, and time-consuming ordeal. The mere scheduling of meetings among agencies, their staff, BOB analysts, the BOB director, and the governor (not to mention occasional meetings with many others, such as interest groups, lobbyists, chambers of commerce, taxpayer federations), sometimes requires a seven-day workweek with ten- or twelve-hour days for a period of several months. A missed deadline, incomplete data, or an unfinished report of the agency's agenda prior to gubernatorial action are all cardinal sins.

The very same ground rules pertain to the bureau's responsiveness to the General Assembly. As the executive budget begins to be translated into legislation (both appropriation and substantive bills), bureau analysts are frequently called upon to supply information or material needed for a more

complete evaluation of a given issue. Because legislative staffs are usually organized like that of the BOB, legislative inquiries are frequently made directly from one staff member to another. Occasionally, however, more formal requests are made by legislators, interest groups, or agencies with an interest in some specific issue.

THE BUDGET PROCESS (AND RELATED WORK CYCLES)

While the twelve-month fiscal year is not easily divided in terms of specific activities during specific periods of time, the calendar chart illustrates the most significant work assignments within the Bureau of the Budget in a typical year.

Phase 1. The first phase of the executive budget generally begins in September of each year — fully ten months in advance of the fiscal year in which new legislation and new budgets (appropriations) will become effective. To underscore the relative difficulty of long-range planning and fiscal forecasting, it should also be noted that agency budgets will be refined and executed in a framework that covers at least twenty-two months (the ten months preceding the beginning of the new fiscal year plus the twelve months over which that budget must be executed). In many cases, the development of agency budgets by agency staff will occur six to twelve months in advance of the point when the Bureau of the Budget begins its official review cycle (shown as September 1 in the calendar chart, Figure 3.1). Given these time frames and the volatility of the economy in recent years, it should come as no surprise that even the best analysts, economists, and agency heads have difficulty providing accurate revenue and expenditure forecasts.

While the budget review phase runs from September through January (sometimes early February), final decisions on the relatively "small" agencies of state government are made in the early stages. This schedule is traditionally followed for two main reasons: first, it gives the bureau additional time to update revenue forecasts (with perhaps the final major report to the governor in early January), and it allows the governor sufficient time to make decisions on the five or six agencies or units of government that command perhaps 80-90 percent of the state's general revenue fund appropriations (education, public aid, mental health, corrections, children and family services). Since the executive budget must be presented to the General Assembly in early March, the longer the governor waits to make final resource and allocation decisions, the better the decisions will be (in terms of the beginning of the next fiscal

FIGURE 3.1. CALENDAR OF EVENTS.

Executive Budget Development			
September 1 Budget planning Preparation	January 31 Budget detail Bill drafting	April 1 Legislative action	July 1-August 31 Bill analysis & approval

year). Therefore, while all agency budgets will be "previewed" by, say, Christmas of each year, absolutely "final" budget decisions are likely to have been made only for those agencies which collectively require a small percentage of the state's budget resources.

In an effort to streamline the budget evaluation process, the bureau will generally begin this phase by sending agencies a specific reporting format to be used for submitting its budget request. This document is likely to ask for at least three major pieces of information from each agency:

1. How it would reduce its programs if it received a budget at only 90 percent of the current year's level (at likely decrements of 2 percent: that is, at 98 percent, at 96 percent, etc.). In many respects, this approach combines "program" budgeting and "incremental" budgeting inside a range of plus-or-minus 10 percent. This technique has generally proved to be a more practical approach to budget analysis than the bottom-up requirements associated with "zero-based" budgeting.
2. The cost implications of any new program initiatives requested by or required of the agency for the upcoming fiscal period in some kind of priority order.
3. Any special or significant issues/trends/problems that require attention by the governor.

This information is then forwarded to the BOB where the appropriate analyst will determine whether any additional information is needed. Before the director of BOB reviews the agency budget, the agency and the analyst will attempt to resolve as many budget issues as possible without, however, predetermining final decisions by the governor on significant matters. Issues, or new budget requests that remain after the analyst-agency sessions, are then typically reformulated for presentation to the director of the bureau. At this level, while no final resolution has yet been reached, it is generally the analyst's responsibility to prepare all relevant material for the director's review, and to ensure that (even where disagreements or unresolved issues exist) data are accurately presented in a concise and understandable format.

As the review of the agency's budget moves up to the BOB director's office, the director and the agency will probably resolve or reach agreement on an increasing number of issues or budget requirements. Again, the director of the bureau must balance any authority the governor may have delegated to that office in a surrogate role against the need to ensure that the governor passes judgment over the vast majority of the significant agency issues/budget needs.

It is common practice for governors to allow agency directors to appeal decisions made by the BOB director; however, frequent requests to overturn BOB decisions signal to the governor an unwillingness on the part of the agency to "get on the team." The governor's receptiveness to an appeal is obviously enhanced when an agency presents a "trade-off" that will offset the spending increases generally associated with the area or program for which an appeal is being made.

During the last step in this segment of the budget development process, the governor personally reviews the agency budget. While the governor will hold a large number of budget review sessions (over a several month period) with the agency directors and the director of the BOB, only preliminary decisions are initially issued by the governor. There are a number of valid reasons why the governor will not act on agency budgets in any "final" sense, including: (1) the need to review his budget plans occasionally for a specific unit of government with members of the General Assembly or individuals who represent related interest groups and (2) the need to understand the budget needs and program objectives of *all* agencies of government *in the aggregate* so that a determination can be made as to where *priority allocations will finally be made*.

To illustrate the points made above, suppose the governor has given preliminary approval for the acquisition of 100 new vehicles to the director of the Department of Central Management Services. Sometime after making that decision, the governor discovers that nearly every dollar of new state revenue will be required to help the increasing number of children supported by the Department of Public Aid. At that point, it is very likely that the governor would reverse the earlier (preliminary) decision to buy automobiles in favor of directing the state's marginal dollar toward supporting public aid recipients (theoretically, those individuals have a "higher order, priority call" on available resources).

Phase 2. The second segment of the budget development cycle generally runs from January through March. As indicated earlier, the governor's final budget decisions are made no later than late January or early February; however, concurrently, the bureau's internal assignments are directed at "producing" the written form of the executive budget. The logistics surrounding the preparation of this document (usually two volumes: one involving budget detail, the second involving budget/program narrative) include the almost endless calculation and recalculation of numbers and other related data, all directed at allowing the governor to present the "budget book" to the General Assembly in early March. The final phase of this exercise involves the drafting of "appropriations bills" that reflect the budget decisions and program initiatives as they relate to nearly every agency of state government. This particular task, as well as the verification of budget and program material presented in the budget book, is oftentimes a collaborative effort involving both BOB and agency staff.

Phase 3. The third segment of the budget cycle, from the viewpoint of the BOB, might be characterized as reactive. It involves legislative reaction to the governor's budget. While the initiative in the review of agency budgets is in the hands of the General Assembly and its committees, the BOB is routinely called upon to provide information in support of agency budgets as they have been cast in the governor's executive budget. In this respect, the bureau does not replace or supplant the agency head in the official or formal presentation of the agency budget but rather is available in a support/service role.

As either the bureau or the agency provide budget/program information to the General Assembly, it is absolutely critical that the two entities achieve a high degree of consistency in their reporting efforts. While most agencies have a budget staff (sizes vary widely, of course), it is not likely that staff can respond in depth to legislative information needs and at the same time work with analysts and support staff from the BOB. At a minimum, agency heads would be well advised to have the bureau review the budget/fiscal forms that are submitted by the agency to the staff of the General Assembly. Although the legislative "budget evaluation" process is not substantially different from the governor's internal "budget development" process, the questions and reporting format can and do differ in many respects. The point here is that the bureau is a resource that should not be overlooked by agencies.

One final, but significant, aspect of the bureau's role during the legislative session should be underscored. Decisions about the level and configuration (along program lines) of an agency's appropriations bill are ultimately in the hands of the General Assembly. While a historical study of the differences between governor-supported budgets and legislative appropriations would reveal a relatively high correlation, appropriations for a specific agency are rarely identical to its budget. Legislative priorities or determinations may differ from those of the governor and the agency, and often compromise positions must be reached on either the level of fiscal support or the manner in which funds are to be expended. The formal and informal byplay that occurs in finding areas of compromise will on many occasions place the Bureau of the Budget in a liaison position between the legislature and the governor (or the agency). While the governor and the governor's support staff will generally deal with an agency or the legislature to define (i.e., contract or expand) program parameters, any alteration in the governor's budget having a material impact on revenues or expenditures will almost automatically draw the BOB into the debate. Again, agencies should not underestimate the significance of the need to keep the bureau apprised of potential alterations in the budget and, additionally, should seek assistance from the bureau in achieving administration (gubernatorial) agreement/consensus on such changes. Any governor will place heavy reliance on the bureau in this liaison role, certainly as regards the continuing definition of fiscal boundary conditions.

Phase 4. The fourth and final phase of the budget cycle commences in the first minute following adjournment of the General Assembly (on or shortly after July 1 of each year). While many statehouse observers are inclined to breathe a sigh of relief at this concluding point (the so-called battle of the budget having ended), the next four-to-six week period is not one that agency heads should schedule for their vacation. Agencies should stay in communication with the BOB until the governor has acted on all significant pieces of legislation that affect the agency. Although the governor's legislative and program staff will have substantial input into any recommendation given to the governor on each bill, heavy reliance will again be placed on the bureau's position.

Because legislation (both substantive and appropriation) enacted by the General Assembly will sometimes differ from the governor's budget, the agency and the BOB have a joint responsibility to inform the governor about the impact that each bill will have on the original budget. These communications are typically channeled through the governor's legislative staff. Because this staff is generally burdened by the review of several thousand pieces of legislation following the conclusion of the legislative cycle, timely and accurate analysis by the agency and bureau of all bills affecting the budget is critical. Where minor deviations from the original budget have occurred, the bureau will usually support some flexibility for the agency; if spending bills are significantly beyond the budget, however, the bureau will take a strong position for amending/reducing the appropriation back to the budgeted level. Agency heads should be wary of reopening the budget debate at this point since it may mean risking a good relationship with the BOB. Successfully persuading the governor's program and/or legislative staff to recommend approval of an appropriation which is in excess of the governor's budget may only backfire in the execution of that higher spending level in the current year or in the review of next year's budget request (when the bureau's pencils will be even sharper!).

The last step in the final phase of the budget cycle begins following gubernatorial action on all appropriations bills. For agencies under the direction of the governor's office (the code departments), the BOB is empowered — on behalf of the governor — to cause agencies to prepare and execute a spending plan which relates to the appropriation level established by the General Assembly and the governor. This apportionment/allotment process requires agencies to identify planned expenditures for each object of appropriation for each quarter of the fiscal year. Once it has been approved by the bureau, the agency is practically compelled to follow this apportionment/allotment plan. Identification of expenditures on a quarterly basis is done for three reasons: (1) it forces the agency to refine its internal budget in a way that is manageable (and can be monitored), (2) funds that are not expended in the quarter planned are "lapsed" and are not available for use later in the fiscal year, and (3) the lapsing of allotted, but unspent funds, prevents the buildup of "excess" funds at the end of the fiscal year when heavy expenditures would otherwise create annualization problems for the following fiscal year. As part of the annual apportionment/allotment scenario, the bureau will usually "reserve," or hold back, 2 percent of the appropriation — that is, the total spending permitted for a given year (save emergencies) will be restricted to 98 percent of the appropriation level.

GUIDELINES FOR CREATING EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS

Developing an effective working relationship between two units of government requires an effort by both parties. However, the two sides may have very different views about the significance of various matters. Moreover, it is difficult to separate personalities from the positions they hold in the bureau-

cracy, and yet people-to-people relationships tend to represent the foundation for good relations between agencies. As summary comments, the following guidelines are offered to those (principally agency staff) who desire a solid relationship in the BOB.

- Presenting and defining a budget is best accomplished along program lines (not by objects of expenditures), especially when the agency can describe an overall budget “theme.”
- Eliminate surprises; good management gets good rewards (if you’re seeing the governor or the bureau director too often on management issues, you may find yourself working for the federal government!).
- Be consistent in the presentation of data or arguments to all units inside the governor’s office, including the bureau, the legislative liaison, the press secretary, and the program staff. Let the individuals in these areas reformat your information in terms they best understand (don’t try to do their work for them by making assumptions inside a framework you don’t deal with on a daily basis).
- Get work into the BOB on time; make sure it is accurate and presented in the fashion requested.
- See your analyst often (budget analyst, that is!). Going over the analyst’s head to the bureau director is not a good long-term strategy. Frequent or periodic visits with the analysts help build rapport and trust, especially when contacts are not at the height of the budget season. If you keep your analyst informed about what’s going on in your agency, then he or she is more likely to help you understand what is going on in state government.

Chapter 4

PATRONAGE AND PERSONNEL

James D. Nowlan with the special assistance of Donald A. Udstuen

There are several employers in state government. The governor is the largest, with about 70,000 employees. The other four independent elected state officials, the University Civil Service System, the State Police Merit Board, and the Illinois Tollway Authority comprise additional employee units. Three employee groups—the engineering and technical staffs of the Illinois Department of Transportation, the Illinois Commerce Commission, and the Capital Development Board—are outside the regulations and protections of any personnel system.

In this chapter we focus on the role, functions, and objectives of the separate personnel and patronage operations which affect the 70,000 persons who work for the governor—61,000 of whom are covered by the Illinois Personnel Code. The Illinois Department of Central Management Services (DCMS), which absorbed the Department of Personnel in 1982, is based in the Stratton Office Building, immediately west of the capitol. The patronage office is located in the governor's executive offices on the second floor of the capitol. The two personnel operations have quite different purposes and objectives. The history of how the two operations developed is quite fascinating.¹

Illinois adopted a merit-based Civil Service Act and Civil Service Commission in 1905, but by 1930 many state positions originally under its jurisdiction had been exempted from its provisions by amendment, interpretation, and evasion. In the 1940s there was a reversal in the exemption trend, and certain job classifications subject to patronage politics were placed under merit protection. In 1941 public university employees were placed in a University Civil Service System. In 1949 the state highway police, who had been subject to termination and replacement when the governorship changed hands, were placed under the protection of a State Police Merit Board.

Elsewhere in state government, personnel practices were highly decentralized during the 1940s. Each agency had its own personnel officer who might or might not cooperate with the weak Civil Service Commission. There was nonuniformity of pay and hours of work; one department would raid another for personnel; and job classifications were changed frequently, as a means of providing pay increases. Concerned about the state's ability to recruit skilled

professionals to manage the delivery of state services, a combination of legislators and public affairs groups began looking into the situation, and in 1955 the Illinois Personnel Code was enacted. It provided for a central personnel function and a new code agency, the Department of Personnel. The department had jurisdiction over classification and pay, merit and fitness, and conditions of employment. Only employees at the bottom and top — that is, the unskilled for whom the "principal job requirement is good physical condition" and those in policymaking positions — were to be exempted from the provisions of the code.

During the early implementation period, there was (understandably) conflict between the county-level political party leaders who sponsored people for patronage posts and the "reformers" who wanted to protect employees from the abuses of patronage. Ultimately the opposing forces reached a compromise. Six thousand unskilled employees were exempted from the code. The Civil Service Commission approved 235 of the 347 "policymaking" exemptions requested by the administration of Governor William G. Stratton.² Thirty thousand employees were covered by the code. Since then outgoing administrations have "coded" as many of their political appointees as possible. Governor Richard B. Ogilvie was successful in amending the code in 1971 to provide special qualifying examinations for the 2,000 highway maintenance workers who had been in the unskilled exempt category.³ By the late 1970s governors had whittled the number of policy exempt positions from 235 to 135.⁴

In 1979 legislation was enacted which makes 800-1000 senior coded employees subject to four-year terms renewable by their agency heads.⁵ In signing the legislation, Governor Thompson noted that incoming governors are faced with many departments and agencies where the second or third in command has civil service protection. He expressed the hope that this legislative "experiment" would increase institutional accountability to the state's chief elected official.⁶

The term-appointment law went into effect on August 1, 1982, following an unsuccessful court challenge. Under the law, agency heads are not required to show cause for nonrenewal of term appointments, although DCMS has counseled agency heads to meet with employees to discuss term renewals and to keep agency records of causes that lead to nonrenewal. There is no administrative recourse under the law for those whose four-year terms are not renewed. Twelve of 386 employees reviewed in 1979 through 1981 have been terminated by their agency heads, according to DCMS records.

We turn now to a discussion of two personnel operations: patronage and personnel code practices. First we will consider patronage.

PATRONAGE PRACTICES

Patronage is a term used for appointments to government jobs that are based on sponsorship by a political patron. A patron can be a county chairman for a political party, a state legislator, or an employing public official and his or

her staff.⁷ Patronage considerations affect almost every vacancy that arises among the corps of 70,000 employees who work for the governor.

Patronage is used to: (1) satisfy the job demands of a governor's political party leaders, primarily county chairmen, and, for Cook County, the ward and township committeemen; (2) develop support for a governor's legislative program; and (3) build a statewide network of political operatives and supporters useful in re-election bids.

An example of patronage from my own legislative experience may serve to explain this. At one of my first House Republican membership conferences in 1969, the Republican Speaker asked who could vote for the governor's (Ogilvie) proposed new income tax. I promptly raised my hand. Most of my colleagues sat on theirs. Among them was my seatmate, C. L. McCormick from Vienna, in relatively poor, deep southern Illinois, where government jobs count for more than they do in many other sections of the state. Later I noticed that at least once each week C. L. would excuse himself during a lull in our afternoon legislative session to go down to the governor's office. Following each trip, he would return with a smile and note the newest patronage plum he had garnered: it might be a "weights and measures" inspector with Agriculture or a beauty shop investigator with Registration and Education. Ultimately, C. L. voted for the politically difficult income tax.

C. L. McCormick is an almost legendary "patronage haw," a politico who can whiff the scent of a patronage job in his territory the second it becomes vacant. In addition, McCormick has displayed real ingenuity in getting the greatest benefit from limited patronage. Donald A. Udstuen, Illinois patronage chief from 1968-72, recalls this example:

When the Vienna Correctional Center opened in 1969, there was a patronage payroll spot for a chaplain at \$1,000 a month. Since the center was in Johnson County where C. L. was county chairman as well as local legislator, I called him to see who he would recommend for the position.

C. L.'s first comments were that he already knew it was vacant and that we had to deal with this situation carefully. If he picked *one* of his preachers and gave him a \$1,000-a-month job, that would make all the other preachers mad and probably create problems for the preacher with his own flock.

Therefore, C. L. came up with a unique solution that solved everyone's problem. Instead of having one chaplain, we ended up with four. The salary was split four ways. That way we could appoint Baptist, Methodist, and Lutheran ministers, and a Catholic priest. Each complemented his meager salary at his home church, four denominations could be represented instead of one, and old C. L. made four preachers and their parishioners happy.

Traditionally, patronage politics meant firing employees and replacing them with persons loyal to an administration. Prior to adoption of the Personnel Code, terminations were a wholesale activity when one party replaced another in the governorship. Even after the code, which provided some protection against political firings, it was possible and legal to use the

"transfer authority" to induce persons to leave their state posts. Thomas Keane, a former legislator and lieutenant of the late Mayor Richard J. Daley, explains it this way: "In the old days a new governor would take all the civil service workers who lived downstate and send them to Chicago and transfer all the Chicago workers to Springfield, or Marion, or some place they never heard of. If they did not choose to live in such an uncertain manner, they could quit."⁸ Although it is true that the transfer technique was utilized, Keane's comment is somewhat exaggerated. One present agency head who has been in and out of state government for two decades estimates personnel turnover between the Stratton and Kerner administrations in 1961 at less than 10 percent of total employees.

Another technique used to make room for party loyalists was simply to eliminate job classifications held by persons the new administration wanted out and then create new, but very similar classifications, for which it could get its people qualified.

Today all that is changed. In addition to the protections of the code, union contracts (see discussion of collective bargaining, below) have made re-classifications for patronage purposes almost impossible. But the single most important impediment to traditional patronage politics has been the 1972 Shakman Decree, named after Michael Shakman, an anti-Daley machine activist. This federal order permanently enjoined government officials, including those in Illinois state government, from firing public employees for political reasons. It also eliminated political transfers. Says Keane, "a person who gets transferred today is in federal court tomorrow."⁹

As in any personnel system, there are informal pressures which can be applied to make life miserable for a job holder — whether by isolating the person or withdrawing responsibility and authority. Nevertheless, employees covered by the code receive strong formal protection by which to withstand patronage efforts to oust them from their jobs.

As a result, patronage considerations now focus on filling naturally occurring vacancies. Even then, the patronage chief must see that a sponsored job candidate is qualified by examination before he can get the person appointed to a position covered by the code. How then does the beleaguered patronage director ever fulfill all the demands placed on him by county chairmen and legislators?

Udstuen explains the dilemma as follows:

The patronage chief is in a no-win situation. On one hand he has the insatiable demand for jobs by his political party, and on the other he has only so many jobs open. And there are only so many things you can do with the Personnel Code. Inevitably, as various jobs open, the type of people you are being pressured most to take care of don't quite fit. There's an awful lot of square pegs for the round holes in the patronage business.

Working out those problems becomes the primary task of the patronage chief. This is never easy. There's an old quote in the patronage business: for every good job you fill you make nine people mad, and you create one monumental ingrate.

Since leaving government after Ogilvie's defeat in 1972, I can assure you that I can count on one hand the number of people who have come up to me to thank me for what I or Governor Ogilvie might have done on their behalf. This is out of somewhere between twelve and fifteen thousand people who were placed on the payroll during Ogilvie's administration. Yet still to this day, it's rare that I don't go to a political event that someone doesn't come up to me and introduce themselves to remind me about some job they should have gotten, but didn't.

The assistant to the governor for personnel (patronage) has a small staff both in Springfield — to handle jobs located downstate — and in Chicago — for metropolitan area appointments. The patronage director will have a "key man" in each major agency. The key man is usually an administrative assistant to the director and is not assigned to the agency personnel office. He or she serves as liaison to the patronage director, monitors personnel actions, relays vacancy information, and represents patronage interests within the agency. The patronage director maintains lists of prospects, their sponsorship, backgrounds, and the geographic areas in which they are willing to work. The key men provide weekly updates on anticipated vacancies and new job classifications.

The patronage chief has his governor's broadest interests at heart: re-election and success of the governor's legislative program. These ends justify giving a job to a person who is politically deserving and who appears qualified, i.e., who is "at least as qualified as many of the screwballs the previous governor buried in your agency." Former patronage chief Udstuen provides a rationale for patronage:

People often ask if it bothered me that I was involved in firing some twelve-to-fifteen thousand people from their jobs. I can honestly say it never did, for two reasons. First of all, virtually all the people I had a hand in firing, whether they were in exempt jobs or in the Personnel Code, were people who got their jobs through politics in the first place. Now, over the years they may have tried to 'professionalize' themselves by getting under the code; but in effect they were political people, and we were replacing them with political people. I think the old adage that 'if you live by the sword you die by the sword' fits in very well here.

The second reason I never felt any remorse about this was that you need to turn over the management of any administration on a regular basis or the bureaucracy becomes so deeply entrenched government doesn't move at all. There are so few exempt positions — that of agency director plus a very few others — that you're not really impacting at all the day-to-day management of that department by changing directors.

You need to change people throughout any agency on a regular basis in order to have it be responsive. How often have we heard the old saying in politics 'it doesn't matter who you elect, everything stays the same.' That's because it's very difficult under the code to change the day-to-day managers. There's nothing wrong with shaking up the bureaucracy every four years or eight years, whenever a new governor comes in, and turning over some new faces. It's healthy for the people and the taxpayers.

The patronage director will work assiduously to achieve placement of "his people" when he or she has one or more qualified for a vacancy in an agency, whether the agency head feels the new employee is best qualified or not. In contrast, the agency head is likely to see that vacancy in terms of his or her need for special qualifications and experience to improve program delivery services by the agency and which the patronage candidate lacks. This is a point at which conflict can and does arise between the agency head and the governor's office.

Another key element in patronage is the director at the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (DCMS). If a governor believes patronage has a role to play in the administration's success, the chief executive must have what Udstuen calls "a friendly director" at DCMS. Within the legal framework of personnel statutes and rules, the director of DCMS and his personnel division head can either be very helpful to the patronage job candidates or, conversely, create a monumental bureaucratic tangle which will prevent any patronage candidates from being appointed.

As most positions are covered by the code and require qualification by examination, it is important to get patronage prospects on the "eligible list" for one or more job classifications. Job classification exams are graded *A*, *B*, *C*, or failure. The code and DCMS rules require that new employees be hired from the *A* list if there are three or more on the list with *A* grades. Thus for most positions, the sponsored job prospect must get on the *A* list, certainly on no lower than the *B* list. When a vacancy occurs, DCMS sends the agency a list of eligible candidates. If the total eligible list comprises only ten to twenty names, DCMS will send the complete list of those with *A*, *B*, and *C* grades. If the list comprises hundreds of names, DCMS will usually send only the names of all who received *A* grades.

Eligible lists are dated. If the patronage office has a candidate who has not yet qualified for a vacancy, that office can direct the agency to withhold its request for an eligible list until the patronage candidate has been examined and a new list certified and dated.

There are several tactics which make it possible to "work through" a relatively short *A* list to reach a patronage candidate on the *B* list. One tactic is to convince candidates in their job interviews that the job is not really what they want, or is otherwise unattractive. The *A* list is shortened by each candidate who signs a form saying he or she is no longer interested. Agencies consider candidates for a position from a pool of at least three eligible persons. Thus if the *A* list is shortened to only two candidates, the pool is automatically enlarged to include all persons on the *B* list.

The patronage office will often insist the vacancy be held open while it tries to identify a biologist, health occupations investigator, or other technically trained person from among its applicant lists, or from searches among county chairmen and legislators.

This takes time, often six months or longer. If the job seeker scores a *B* on an exam for which there is a long list of eligibles with *A*s, then the patronage



director must look for another job classification for which the job seeker can qualify, and the process starts over again.

If the sponsored job seeker has been especially valuable in the preceding campaign, or if an important sponsor is insistent the job seeker be placed immediately, patronage directors have been known to use emergency, temporary, or provisional appointment authority to place the candidate more quickly, even though they are likely to be bending DCMS rules.¹⁰ An emergency appointment is good for a maximum of sixty days, during which time an appointee can be examined and, if successful, placed on an eligibility list. A temporary appointment can be made for a maximum of six months even if no vacancy exists, as if to meet an extraordinary workload in an agency. While these appointments are to be made "from eligible lists to the extent determined to be practicable," the practicability is often interpreted in favor of the sponsored job seeker. During the temporary appointment, the patronage director can be seeking something permanent.

Third is the provisional appointment, which can be made without examination in cases "when there is no appropriate eligible list available." This may occur if there is a new job classification for which an exam has not yet been established. A provisional appointment can be made for a maximum of six months in any twelve-month period. Of these special appointments, Udstuen notes that the "temporary appointment has long been a significant weapon in the hands of patronage chiefs for getting around personnel codes." He adds:

Though now there are some significant limitations on what the state can do, it is still the prime way that the city of Chicago and Cook County get around their personnel codes. Both Chicago and Cook County are known as patronage-dominated administrations. What people don't understand is that both have very complete personnel codes. However, examinations aren't ever given for various positions; therefore, there are no eligible lists and people can be appointed to temporary appointments pending the development of a list of qualified people. There are people on the payroll of the city of Chicago and county of Cook who have had temporary appointments for twenty years or longer.

Despite the growing number of obstacles to the patronage system, the patronage office still has enormous power. Its stamp of approval is required for just about every agency appointment, as well as for promotions. Udstuen explains:

Stamp approval is an important tool by which to reach compromise with the various agencies. For example, during the Ogilvie administration, my initials had to appear on every appointment, or it was not processed. During conflicts with the departments, this became important. For example, there were significant problems between the patronage office and Pete Bensinger, director of the Department of Corrections. Bensinger could always find money for placement of social workers, psychologists, and other people in various prison jobs, but he never wanted to refill vacant positions, such as truck driver, carpenter, and other positions that would normally go to the patronage office.

When one of these positions became vacant, he would cry lack of funds, or the need to shift emphasis, and he would reject all applicants. The only way this situation was ever worked out so that there would be a more 'equitable apportionment' was that I would withhold my 'D.U.' [initials of approval] from all the appointments he was interested in. These appointments would eventually backlog to a monumental proportion. In order to break the backlog, he'd come over and would negotiate how many of the people he wanted would get appointed and how many people I wanted would get appointed. While this might seem strange or cumbersome, in effect it worked out to be a fair balancing act between the legitimate needs of a department and the legitimate need to have that department contribute to the political well-being of the administration.

In recent years the patronage office has increased its influence over personnel actions because of its central role in administering "hiring freezes" imposed by governors. Ostensibly an executive management tool for controlling personnel levels during times of tight budgets, the hiring freeze shifts control of personnel actions from DCMS and the agencies to the patronage office. One experienced personnel manager quips that he "can't remember when there wasn't a freeze of some kind in effect."

Freezes are not absolute, since agencies must fill certain vacancies if programs are to operate and services are to be delivered. The patronage office alone has the authority to grant "freeze exceptions." Agency heads must present their cases for exceptions to the patronage chief. This puts a card in the hand of the patronage chief who can use it in placing his people or in convincing the agency head to hold off a bit longer on another vacancy until a patronage candidate can get on the eligible list.

Agency heads can and do resist pressures from the patronage office, on a selective basis. As one agency head put it:

When it comes to patronage, there are times when you have to develop strategies for resisting someone whom the governor's office wants to place in your agency. A legislator wanted someone moved into a position; we had a candidate we felt was much better technically. On this key position, we felt we shouldn't fold; so I went to the patronage chief and outlined our case and said I'd appeal to the governor if absolutely necessary. We won; the governor's office finally backed off.

I talked to the legislator involved, and while I didn't convince him, it was important and constructive to pat his ruffled feathers down a bit. The problem was it took us seven months to resolve this one personnel conflict!

And in cases where the patronage office has been holding a vacancy open too long for an agency's good, one agency head recommends the aggressive approach: "You find the type of person you want for a key spot, then go out and find the political sponsorship you might need to get that person approved by the patronage office." This may speed the process, but, as with most exchanges, it incurs a debit with a legislator or other influential out there in the web of government.

In sum, the patronage office is generally given high marks by agency heads in the Thompson administration.

- As regards to patronage, I have not found it is a 'you have to take so-and-so' situation. Instead they have a bank of people whom they are interested in placing, and they ask you to consider those people for positions as they come up.
- Generally speaking I have had no problems with the patronage office. I can say no to the patronage office, at least from time to time. However, one had better not do it too often because the patronage office has pressures on it, and it is important to be seen as a manager who understands their problems.
- If directors let themselves become intimidated by the patronage office, they will end up taking more people from that office than necessary. Explain that you will work with them but that you will take only qualified people. I have only taken one dud from the patronage office, but even for that I got something in return.

PERSONNEL CODE PRACTICES

DCMS offers state government agencies personnel guidance about organizational design, pay levels, and classification standards. It can teach a new manager something about the do's and don'ts of personnel actions, the intricacies of the Personnel Code, and the status of union and contractual relationships for an agency.

Each code agency has a personnel manager. That manager is liaison to DCMS, much as the key man is to the patronage office. A personnel manager with twenty years experience says, "If I were a new agency head, one of the first things I would do is make certain the person who handles personnel is one in whom I have trust and confidence. If not, I would try to develop that, or seek a change in the person holding that position."

Hiring. Most agency heads with both private and public sector management experience have found it more difficult to hire top quality personnel in the public sector. Of thirty-one agency heads responding to the question, "In comparing your management experience in government and the private sector, in which have you found hiring top quality personnel more difficult?" twenty-six said state government, one said private sector, and four saw no difference.

The primary problems seem to be salary and the inflexibility of personnel rules. Said one agency head, "I think the Personnel Code stinks. The rules provide no flexibility for providing the pay raises one needs to attract or keep the right kinds of people." To counter the criticism about problems in hiring top quality persons, an executive recruitment division was set up in 1981 to assist agencies with recruitment. According to DCMS Director Louis Giordano, the division completed 100 successful searches in 1981 for skilled, technically trained professionals. The most effective selling points were: (1) an opportunity to run one's own shop, or programs; (2) to be able to learn from the inside about government regulatory policies that will increase the

professional's value in the private sector later; and (3) state government can be attractive to those who have taken early retirement.

If all goes well (i.e., if the patronage office has no particular interest in a position and does not delay matters until it can get a candidate qualified), the hiring process has eight steps and takes only two or three weeks. The steps in the hiring process are as follows:

1. An agency supervisor fills out a form requesting a new person to fill a vacancy in the supervisor's unit. This goes to the agency head's office.
2. If the request is approved, the form goes to the agency personnel unit where a requisition is filled out and submitted to DCMS.
3. DCMS sends the agency a list of eligible candidates. If there are three or more persons qualified with *A* grades, the agency must interview from the *A* list first. The agency can go to the *B* list only if there are two or fewer persons on the *A* list.
4. The agency supervisor interviews three or more candidates.
5. The agency supervisor notifies the agency personnel unit of the candidate whom he or she wishes for the vacant position.
6. The agency personnel unit obtains clearance from the patronage key man in the agency head's office.
7. The agency personnel unit notifies the person selected and tells the person the actual salary offer and the salary range for the position.
8. The personnel unit processes the appointment papers for final approval by DCMS.

Firing for Cause. As was true for hiring, agency managers with private sector experience were close to unanimity in their feelings that firing is more difficult in state government (25) than in the private sector (1); only five thought there was no difference. A health agency director provided this illustration.

It is almost impossible to fire people; at least it takes a great deal of time and effort to do so. We had one case in which an employee suspected of wrongdoing was put on administrative leave in April, suspended in November, and discharged in December. However, it wasn't until September of the following year that the Civil Service Commission okayed our discharge. This was shortly after his indictment and just before his felony conviction. Nevertheless, my agency paid him from April of one year until September of the next, even though he wasn't working for us.

The firing process is extremely lengthy and draining inasmuch as it takes so much staff effort. The easy way out is to shuffle bad employees from one job to another but I won't do that.

Six steps must be followed in disciplining and terminating an employee covered by the code.

1. An agency supervisor must personally counsel the employee on his or her deficiency or problem, e.g., absenteeism.

2. An oral reprimand.
3. A written reprimand.
4. Suspension without pay for up to twenty-nine days.
5. Suspension of the employee pending discharge. If there is a major infraction, such as catching an employee with his hand in the cash register, then it is possible to go to Step 5 immediately.
6. Discharge for cause.

An employee may appeal any action taken at each of the steps. Final disposition of appeals is made by the Civil Service Commission. The process of terminating an employee may take from three months to over a year.

Employee Grievances. Another personnel action that can consume significant agency staff time is the grievance. This is a difference, complaint, or dispute filed by an employee against his or her agency. If taken through each step, the procedure can take five or six months:¹¹

1. An employee presents his grievance to his supervisor orally. The supervisor must respond within five days.
2. If not satisfied at Step 1, the employee presents his grievance in writing to an intermediate administrator. That person has ten days in which to respond.
3. If still not satisfied, the employee presents his grievance in writing to the agency head. A meeting between the employee and the agency head or his designee is required. The agency must provide a written response within twenty days.

The first three steps are the same for employees working under union contracts and noncontract personnel. At the next and final step the two groups follow different paths.

4. *Noncontract employees:* If the agency fails to respond at Step 3, or if the problem is not resolved there, noncontract employees may advance their complaint to a three-person grievance committee appointed by the director of DCMS. The committee is selected from a panel of state employees and nonstate personnel experienced in employee relations. A DCMS employee is appointed chairman of the committee. The grievance committee submits recommendations to the director of DCMS who renders a final decision.
- 4.a. *Union contract employees:* If Step 3 does not result in a satisfactory solution, the union and/or employee may request a meeting between the union and the DCMS Bureau of Labor Relations. If that meeting fails to resolve the grievance, the employer or the employee/union may submit the issue to binding arbitration. An arbitrator is selected by mutual agreement of the union and DCMS from a list maintained at DCMS. Written documents and witnesses may be presented, and it should be pointed out that unions represent their members at each stage of this grievance procedure. After the hearing, both sides must abide by the decision of the arbitrator. Decisions are published and circulated throughout state government.

Several agency heads feel there has been an increase in the number of grievances in recent years, as well as in the number that go all the way to arbitration. They attribute this to increased competition among government employee unions since the initiation of collective bargaining.

Developing a New Job Classification. Agency reorganization and the statutory assignment of new programs to an agency can result in new job responsibilities for which there are neither job descriptions nor existing job classifications, or titles. DCMS works hard to fit new job descriptions as developed by the agencies into existing classifications. In the infrequent cases where this is not possible, as when legislation established a special health investigation unit at Registration and Education, certain steps must be taken to create the new classification. They are as follows:

1. An agency head directs his personnel unit to coordinate development of a proposed new classification with DCMS.
2. DCMS reviews the agency proposal to determine if a classification study is necessary. This study, which typically takes a minimum of three months, is required for most requests.
3. If DCMS determines a new job classification is not justified, the agency head may appeal to the director of DCMS. While the DCMS director will probably be sympathetic to an appeal by a fellow agency head, there have been cases of rejection at this level.

Reassignment of Employees. Managers who want to reassign an employee within an agency face several restrictions, especially if the person is covered by a union contract. Those not covered by a union contract may be reassigned so long as there is no loss in pay and responsibilities are similar. If the position to which an intra-agency transfer is desired is covered by a union contract, then persons already eligible for that position from within the agency may bid for the position. Selections must be made strictly on the basis of seniority. An example would be a vacancy for a Clerk IV for which several Clerk IIIs in the agency are eligible. (All clerical titles, Clerk I through Clerk IV, are covered by a contract with the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.) It is possible for an agency to demonstrate to DCMS that the person it desires for the job has skills superior to those with higher seniority. As might be expected, this often leads to grievances.

Collective Bargaining. Illinois does not have a collective bargaining law for state or local governments. However, in 1973 Governor Walker issued an executive order which authorized collective bargaining for employees under his jurisdiction. Governor Thompson kept this order in force, and the first contracts were signed in 1977 during his first term. About 47,000 employees are now covered by contracts between the state and nine unions. The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), an AFL-CIO affiliate, bargains for most of those covered. Other bargaining agents include the Teamsters, the Illinois State Employees Association, and the Illinois Nurses Association. The bargaining agreements have wrought

dramatic changes in personnel operations. One experienced personnel manager explains that "there was *much more* latitude in new appointments, promotions, reassessments, and reclassifications prior to the first union contracts in 1977. Now the first question asked in advance of any personnel action is 'Is the employee under a contract?'"

Several agency heads feel the unions place unreasonable restrictions on administrative flexibility. A regulatory agency head provides this illustration:

The unions are intrusive. For example, in times of tight budgets we must sometimes bend the terms of a union contract in order to get the most out of our people. We are reorganizing one of our sections at present. Sometimes an old job classification doesn't fit neatly into a new organization chart. So we are asking people to do tasks that possibly aren't in their job description. The unions are not bending. Another example is found in data processing. We feel we must have work load standards and believe we can measure output there. The unions oppose this. I have had a Step 3 grievance on this already.

Another problem from the agency head's perspective is the fact that DCMS negotiates master contracts with the unions. These cover such matters as pay, grievance procedures, hiring, promotion, and reassignment. Fringe benefits have not been negotiated thus far. While agencies may participate in the central negotiations through management caucuses, several agency heads have expressed the fear that the state's negotiators are short on experience and talent, and are therefore "outgunned" in deliberations. These problems are alleviated somewhat by the fact that most contracts provide for supplemental negotiations at the agency level, even though DCMS approval is required for an agency to participate in these negotiations. Typical issues bargained at the agency level include the makeup of each organizational unit in an agency and the number of union stewards allowed for the agency. Each union that has a contract with an agency elects a chief union steward; additional stewards may be desired by unions depending on the number of employees covered and the number of organizational units. Each issue raised by an employee covered by a contract is taken to the agency personnel unit by a union steward.

Finally, it should be noted that when code rules and union contracts have been in conflict, the collective bargaining agreements have been interpreted to supersede code rules. An executive branch official noted:

Sometimes this has been helpful, as in the situation where the federal government required cutbacks in CETA employees of the State of Illinois. Our rules would not have allowed for cutting back CETA employees who had more seniority than regular employees. However, the union contracts did allow for bumping CETA employees, and that provision proved to be the more reasonable one in this case.

STATE GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

Whether covered by the Personnel Code or appointed to a patronage position, government employees generally receive good marks by their bosses.

FIGURE 4.1. PRIVATE SECTOR/GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE COMPARISONS.

	State Government	Private Sector	No Difference
In comparing your management experience in state government and in the private sector, in which have you:			
Found the more diligent personnel?	6	8	17
Found the better-trained personnel?	8	12	11
Found the more capable personnel?	7	10	14

The thirty-one agency heads questioned who had both private and public sector management experience found the diligence and capability of the respective employees comparable; only in the area of training did private-sector employees seem to rank higher (see Figure 4.1). Despite these good marks, the employees themselves may not have such a high view of their work. One agency head reflected the views of several in noting that "state personnel seem to have a relatively low expectation of success and have myriad reasons why something can't be done. This becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. They are competent, however, and need only encouragement."

The structure of dual, often conflicting, patronage and civil service personnel operations is clearly a complicating factor for agency managers. New managers should, therefore, expect to devote more time to personnel matters than they might in the private sector, a point borne out by those with experience in both areas. In answer to the question "In comparing your management experience in government and in the private sector in which have you devoted more time to personnel matters?" nineteen said state government, four said the private sector, and eight felt there was no difference.

Footnotes

1. For more on this, see Thomas Page, *State Personnel: Reorganization in Illinois* (Urbana: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1961). This monograph provides an informative treatment of the development of the Illinois Personnel Code.
2. Ibid., Chapter 5.
3. See the *Illinois Revised Statutes*, Chapter 127, par. 63b/104e, for the amendatory language.
4. Message from the governor to the Illinois General Assembly, September 22, 1979.
5. *Illinois Revised Statutes*, Chapter 127, par. 63b/108b/18. According to the 1979 law, most coded employees in or above Merit Compensation Salary Range 12 are subject to the term appointments. There are nineteen "merit comp" salary ranges. Those employees in range 12 earn salaries from \$25,212 to \$38,556. Those in the highest range are paid from \$41,628 to \$57,996. There are a few exceptions to the term appointments among senior employees. For example, agency "technical advisors," who are lawyers, are exempt from the provisions of the law.
6. Message from the governor to the Illinois General Assembly, September 22, 1979.

7. There is also bureaucratic patronage. Several agency heads pointed out that savvy state government employees have been known to take care of their own with a skill that would put politicians to shame. One agency head declared, "They hire friends, lovers, neighbors, and relatives with impunity." He goes on:

I have copies of personnel transactions that defy description. For example, a broad who was sleeping around goes from a Methods and Procedures Advisor (a glorified Clerk III) to an Executive III to an Accountant V. She did this in less than one year and had a grand total of two semester hours in business at a community college.

Or the time an agency [representative] went to Cardiff, Wales, to hire a Social Worker III whose father was a classmate of the head of the state institution that hired him. At the time there were 10 As on the list, including a black veteran, and the turkey hired was the only C on the list!

8. Thomas Keane, "Thomas Keane on Life after Daley," *Chicago Lawyer* (April 1982).
9. Ibid.
10. For more details on these types of appointments, see the Illinois Personnel Code at Chapter 127 of the *Illinois Revised Statutes* and the rules for this code as promulgated and issued periodically by the Department of Central Management Services, Springfield, Illinois.
11. For complete details on grievance procedures, see "Agreement Between State of Illinois and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), July 1, 1981 to June 30, 1983." Available from Illinois Department of Central Management Services, Springfield, Illinois.

Chapter 5

THE LEGISLATURE

Phillip M. Gonet and James D. Nowlan

In the fifties and sixties, journalists muckraked state legislatures over the coals with articles such as “The Octopus in the Statehouse,” “The Two Ring Circus Under the Capitol Dome,” and “The Illinois Legislature: A Study in Corruption.” In self-deprecating defense, legislators framed the quotation from an 1866 New York court decision which declared that “No man’s life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in session.”

All that has changed. In the past fifteen years there has been a dramatic transformation of state legislatures, led in many respects by Illinois.¹ Until the mid-1960s the Illinois legislator had no office, no staff, no telephone, and insignificant pay. The state constitution authorized each lawmaker only \$50 per biennium for postage. Lawmakers traditionally met for several short months once every two years.

Illinois legislators finally rebelled against their self-imposed structural inadequacies, and under the leadership of the late Senate President W. Russell Arrington initiated rapid modernization. In 1971 the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures published an evaluation of the effectiveness of state legislative bodies.² The report rated Illinois as having the third most effective legislature in the nation. It credited the Illinois General Assembly with having one of the strongest staffing patterns, relatively good compensation, and private offices for each lawmaker.

Today there are individual offices in Springfield and the home districts; a substantial staffing structure for committees and individual legislators; and salaries close to \$30,000 annually, higher for leaders. The legislature is in session about 175 days per biennium. There are committee and commission meetings every month of the year, and several specialized units have been established to oversee the executive branch. As a result, many legislators devote full time to their public duties. It should also be noted that the General Assembly maintains an office in Washington, D.C., operated by the Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation.

Rapid change has not been without what some consider pitfalls. A 1979 study by the National Conference of State Legislatures said of Illinois:

With more than 100 joint, special purpose, or general service agencies and commissions, the Illinois General Assembly is one of the most fragmented and decentralized legislatures in the country. Each commission

operates independently, and there is no mechanism for joint or uniform management procedures as in other populous states.³

Figure 5.1 shows a simplified organization chart of the Illinois General Assembly.

In addition to the changes generated by legislators, structural changes have been imposed by the electorate. In 1980 the legislative article of the Illinois Constitution was amended to reduce the House from 177 to 118 members, and to abolish the unique provisions for cumulative voting and minority representation in the House.

Cumulative voting allowed a voter to cumulate up to three votes for a single candidate. The purpose and primary result of this system was to give the minority party, i.e., Republicans in Chicago and Democrats in the suburbs and many areas downstate, one seat in each three-member House district. This tended to blur partisanship, for a suburban Democrat might now and then vote against a Democrat from Chicago on a matter dividing city and suburbs, such as mass transit, election laws, or education funding. The system also contributed to extremely thin margins for whichever party had a majority in the House, and it allowed some members to exhibit independence from majority constituent pressures, since far less than majority support was adequate for re-election.


With 118 House members now elected from single-member districts, it is expected that partisanship and regionalism may increase, because nearly all suburbanites will be Republicans and nearly all Chicagoans will be Democrats. And House members may become more cautious overall, at least for awhile, since they will have to seek majority support in their election bids.

Legislative modernization in Illinois has also had a major impact in another area. It has brought about significant changes in the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. Agency officials can no longer easily protect weak programs. Questions in committee hearings are tougher, and thus agency managers must prepare more extensively for those hearings than was necessary fifteen years ago. Lawmakers not only seem to have increased self-confidence and esteem for their branch, they also have increased knowledge of agency operations and problems.


While only the legislature is constitutionally authorized to propose and enact statute law, governors continue to propose budgets and programs, and the legislature continues to react. In fact many observers feel that in spite of valuable legislative modernization, the governor is more dominant than ever as a result of the 1970 constitution which gave the chief executive extensive veto powers. Nevertheless, the legislature can reject, modify, frustrate, delay, badger, and exasperate the executive branch; and it has been doing so more assertively with its increased informational and time resources. In addition, there is now greater potential than before modernization for comprehensive policy initiatives from within the legislature, rather than from just the executive branch and interest groups.

In this chapter we introduce readers to the annual legislative cycle and to the dynamics of the several types of committees that deliberate on and shape

FIGURE 5.1. THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH IN ILLINOIS.*



* From the State Organization Chart, by the Legislative Council, Springfield, 1980.



legislation. Then we assess the people who comprise the legislative branch — the elected lawmakers, their staffs, and others who have influence on the legislative process. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of decision making in the General Assembly.

THE LEGISLATIVE CYCLE

The Illinois General Assembly convenes each year on the second Wednesday in January and continues to meet, with occasional recesses, for a two-year period. The 1983-84 biennial period is formally referred to as the 83rd General Assembly. In what some observers see as an effort to preserve the concept of the part-time "citizen legislature," lawmakers have tried, with only partial success, to limit the second year to consideration of the annual budget plus "emergency" legislation. However, the number of days in session from April through June have been about the same in each year of the biennium.

The yearly legislative cycle may be broken down, for the sake of simplicity, into three phases (see Figure 5.2).

Phase 1: Regular Spring Session. The regular spring session begins slowly and ends with a roar in early July. Laws can be enacted by bills only, and bills may originate in either house with the sponsorship of one or more members. More than 4,000 bills will be introduced in the course of the biennium, most during the spring session of the first year, and hundreds of these during the very first week. Bills are assigned to standing committees by the Committee on the Assignment of Bills, which is controlled by the Speaker in the House and by the president in the Senate, the leaders of the majority party in each body.

In contrast to the U.S. Congress where committees control bills, sponsors steer their bills through the Illinois legislative process. For example, tradition dictates that the committee hearing date for a bill is scheduled at the pleasure of the sponsor, if at all possible. Timing is important, as a sponsor must gather support and "count heads" in committee as well as at passage stage on the House or Senate floor. The sponsor must also work with several deadlines

FIGURE 5.2. YEARLY LEGISLATIVE CYCLE.

<i>Phase 1</i> Regular Spring Session	<i>Phase 2</i> Interim Period	<i>Phase 3</i> Fall Veto Session
Bill introductions	Gubernatorial bill review	Consideration of vetoes
Committee hearings	Study commission hearings	"Emergency" legislation considered
Budget hearings		
Bill passage stage		(October to December — Begins in November in election years)
(January to early July)	(Late July to October)	

which have been established to expedite and smooth the flow of bills through the legislature. Typical deadlines are:

Introduction of bills: April 1

Committee action in the house of origin: May 1

Floor action in the house of origin: May 31

Final floor action in second house: June 30

Each bill receives three formal "readings" by title into the record on the floor of each house. The first reading occurs at introduction; the second after committee action (described below), when amendments are considered by the entire house; and the third at passage stage when voting occurs.

Even with the imposition of successive deadlines for legislative action, a logjam of unfinished bill action develops as the spring session approaches its scheduled June 30 conclusion. This is understandable, as timing is a critical component in the brokering among lawmakers who have highly diverse objectives. Because of the balance between parties and the fact that no region—Chicago, the collar counties, or downstate—comprises a majority of lawmakers, coalition building among parties and interests is often imperative for controversial legislation. Bills must receive a majority of the votes of all those elected—60 in the House and 30 in the Senate—rather than just a majority of those voting on a bill. Thus, for instance, it is not surprising that Chicago lawmakers would not commit themselves on a downstate road bill until commitments had been extracted from downstaters to support a property tax rate increase for Chicago schools.

During the June logjam the daily calendars of pending legislation expand to many pages, and hundreds of bills may be voted on in a single day. Keeping track of the scores of bills that might affect a single agency becomes a challenge for the agency legislative liaison and his or her boss.

The Illinois Constitution encourages negotiation and commitment by June 30, for bills passed after that date cannot take effect until the following July unless passed by three-fifths of those elected. In recent years the General Assembly has completed its spring session by July 4.

Phase 2: Interim Period. After the legislators depart for the summer, the governor's staff, the BOB, and agency managers face the task of reviewing the 300-800 bills enacted. The constitution states that the governor shall receive a bill within thirty days of passage. The governor then has sixty days in which to sign a bill or to impose one of several types of vetoes.

Legislative staff members are also busy during the interim between sessions. They compile summaries of the accomplishments of the spring session and analyze gubernatorial bill actions. The budget staff monitor implementation of the budget to assure that legislative intent is being fulfilled. Other staff are preparing for and attending public hearings of standing subcommittees or study commissions. Some staff have even been known to devote "after hours" assistance to the re-election campaigns of their bosses.

Phase 3: Fall Veto Session. In odd-numbered years, the veto session opens in October. In even years, the lawmakers reconvene about a week following the November elections. The legislature is generally in session for only ten to twelve days in the fall.

Vetoed bills are returned to the house where they were introduced. The house of origin has fifteen calendar days in which to act. If a veto is overridden there, the bill is sent to the second house where the same fifteen-day action period applies.⁴

Vetoes are not the only things considered during this short session. Because of retirements and defeats suffered at even-year primary and general elections, there are numerous “lame duck” lawmakers who may feel less need to respond to party leaders and constituency pressures. Some will even change from being opponents to being proponents of certain parts of the governor’s program. The governor can provide a job, which in addition to salary provides service credit toward one’s legislative pension program. In other words, all bets are off during these even-year fall sessions. Tax increases, pay raises, and other difficult political issues may receive more favorable consideration here than in a spring session.


This short session can also be important to agency heads. The Illinois fiscal year begins on July 1; the federal fiscal year, October 1. The fall session offers an agency head the opportunity to adjust his budget in the wake of actions taken in Washington between June 30 and October. It is possible that bills important to agencies might become caught in the June logjam. If agency heads plan and coordinate effectively with the governor’s office and the right legislators, they are more likely to get favorable action on these matters at the veto session. However, there have been cases where, two days before the end of the fall session, agency heads urge emergency action to amend a budget or correct a bill passed earlier. Attempts to force hurried remedial action without providing adequate information or advance notice upsets legislators and staff. Even if they accede to the requests, they may well give those agency heads grief during the next budget hearings.

COMMITTEES

Two decades ago respected observers of the Illinois legislature declared, “As an independent determinant of the fate of legislative proposals, the standing committee is of scant importance.”⁵ This is no longer true. Though committees in Illinois are neither so influential nor so independent of legislative leadership as in the U.S. Congress, they have been killing and amending bills with increasing frequency. Prior to 1971 at least 80 percent of all bills were reported favorably by committees; by 1975 that figure was down to 60 percent.⁶

Figure 5.3 shows how bills on higher education were winnowed a few years ago as they went from committee in the house of origin through the steps of the legislative process. The committee hearing in the house of origin is often the most significant deliberative arena for a bill in the Illinois legislative

FIGURE 5.3. BILL WINNOWING, FINAL RESTING PLACE FOR HOUSE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED INTO 77TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1971-72) AND REFERRED TO THE HOUSE HIGHER EDUCATION COMMITTEE.



* Of the 23 bills and 2 resolutions which failed to get out of the committee, 7 received Do Not Pass recommendations, 5 failed on Do Pass motions, and the remainder were never called for a vote, although several were heard in committee.

Source: James D. Nowlan, *The Politics of Higher Education: Lawmakers and the Academy in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 22. Reprinted with permission of the University of Illinois Press.

process. All committee hearings are open to the public and all votes are recorded.

In contrast to the Congress where committee chairmen can refuse to hold hearings on assigned bills, Illinois rules require that every bill be accorded a public hearing and vote. Each of the 15 to 25 standing committees in each house may have 200 or more bills assigned for hearings and action. It is not unusual to schedule as many as 50 bills for consideration on a single hearing day. The volume of legislation to be considered by a committee in any week determines the time that can be devoted to staff analysis for each bill. Often it is not much.

Staffing, discussed separately below, is a key element in committee operations. Each committee, other than the extensively staffed appropriations committees, has at least two part-time or full-time staff analysts — one for Democrats and one for Republicans. The staff members prepare individual bill analyses for their own party members prior to each hearing. The analysis typically provides a synopsis and explanation; describes possible problems with the bill; discusses positions of affected agencies, interest groups, and the governor's office; and suggests questions for the hearing. In most cases the analysts will have contacted the affected agencies and other interested parties to generate information. Several executive branch agencies have even developed mechanisms to publish and distribute position papers on their legislation and on bills that affect them.

While bills on the budget, the governor's program, and election laws divide the parties sharply, most bills are considered on a bipartisan basis. It is common to observe lawmakers from both parties and their staff working together on bill analyses and in committee deliberations.

The governor's office for legislative liaison and agency heads and their staff work together to develop administration positions, provide information, and prepare testimony for committee hearings. Members of the liaison office and selected agency staff are expected to attend such hearings. There they will be called upon to respond to the standard question, "How does the governor's office stand on this bill?" and to answer technical questions. Committee members can make life uncomfortable for poorly prepared agency staff. Then, too, lawmakers enjoy probing for differences between the governor's office and its agencies.

Committee leaders can exert a good deal of influence. The committee chairman, who is always a member of the majority party, can dominate the committee hearing if he has the support of his party colleagues, can manipulate the order of bills at a hearing, and controls the time allotted for testimony on each bill. Moreover, the chairman and his counterpart, the minority party spokesman, direct the work of the staff, who are assigned to committees by the respective party leaders.

An agency head shepherding a bill through a committee hearing needs to develop a sense of timing, as well as an understanding of the moods of a committee. Frequently an agency head will have orchestrated testimony in behalf of a bill by a team of several agency people, interest group representatives, and outside experts. Some of these people will have come hundreds of miles. If the bill hearing is postponed and those to testify must come back another day, they will want their full turn at bat when the bill finally comes up. However, if the hearing on other bills has consumed a great deal of time, and if the committee wants to adjourn to go to dinner, the agency head may be well advised to curtail his team's testimony so the bill's sponsor can request a timely vote.

Appropriations Committees. The governor is directed by law to make his budget recommendations to the legislature by the first Wednesday in March. The BOB prepares individual appropriations bills for about sixty agencies; to-

gether these bills represent the governor's budget. The governor's office selects the house in which it wants each bill introduced and requests a legislator from the governor's party to sponsor each one. Another fifteen appropriations bills are prepared by the two education boards, the State Board of Education and the Illinois Board of Higher Education — entities not under the direct control of the governor.

Although the executive branch develops its budget over an eight-month period, the legislature must react, evaluate, and authorize the annual budget in the four months between March and July. Each house divides its review of budget bills between two committees, known as Appropriations I and II. As with committee work generally, the appropriations committees are having an increasing impact on legislation. The percentage of bills coming from appropriations committees with "do pass" recommendations and no amendments decreased from 80.2 percent in 1963 to 44.2 percent in 1973.⁷ Conversely, appropriations bills killed or held in committee increased from 4.0 percent to 18.8 percent in the same period.

In addition to the governor's budget bills, appropriations bills are introduced by individual legislators for items that were not included in the governor's budget, or for institutions (such as universities) which they feel should be funded at levels higher than recommended by the governor. The appropriations bill for each agency proposes specific dollar amounts by "line items" such as personal services (personnel), Social Security, contractual services, equipment, travel, and telecommunications for each program division within the agency. To supplement this skeletal information, appropriations staffs in each house request detailed information from each agency, on different forms. The House form is called an "I.S.L." for the "Illinois State Legislature," while the Senate form is known simply as the "schedule." Through these forms, agencies must provide detailed documentation to explain how each line item in their budget was calculated. Democratic and Republican staff share information within their respective houses. For state agencies, this entails second and third rounds of budget submissions and attendant negotiations, shortly after the completion of a similar cycle with the BOB.

Appropriations committee staff analysts are generally assigned agencies by functional categories. For example, one budget analyst may be responsible for economics-oriented agencies such as commerce and community affairs, agriculture, and labor. Another analyst may have public safety units such as law enforcement, corrections, and the state fire marshal. Frequently, an appropriations analyst also provides part-time staff assistance for one or more substantive nonappropriations committee in his or her functional area; thus an education budget analyst may work for awhile with the elementary/secondary and higher education committees. This helps link the appropriations and substantive committees and builds staff expertise.

After receiving completed budget forms from an agency, appropriations committee staff will meet with the agency's fiscal officer and other staff, often including the agency head, to discuss the pending budget bill. Analysts repre-

senting both parties may be present at the same meeting. If one party or both parties in a house have adopted a budget objective, such as an across-the-board 4 percent reduction in all personal services lines, or an analyst has support from his or her legislative boss for a specific cut in a budget line, then analysts will attempt to “seek closure” with an agency on these items in advance of the committee hearing. If this can be achieved, an “agreed amendment” will be recommended to the committee leadership.

Staff representing each party feel a professional need to represent the legislative branch in holding the executive accountable; however, those from the same party as the governor tend to be more cooperative and helpful, at times even more so than analysts from the BOB.

Before each budget hearing, appropriations committee staff directors generally meet with their respective chairman or minority spokesman to discuss staff recommendations on each agency bill. Other committee members will often sit in on these meetings. This is the point at which legislative positions on an agency’s bill are determined. Any remaining differences among agency, staff, and the two parties are then thrashed out in the committee hearing.

It is important for agency management to know in advance of this annual process what line items or programs committee staff are focusing on for the year, whether the parties are working together, and how the governor’s office wants individual agencies to respond.

During the executive budget process, an agency head and his staff are in constant communication with the BOB. In contrast, during the legislative budget process, agency managers do not participate directly and often feel like outside observers. At certain critical points, an agency head may feel a need to enter the legislative deliberations to protect a line or program under scrutiny. While this is acceptable, it can backfire if done in a condescending or directive manner.

Conference Committees. If the House and Senate versions of a bill are not alike, a conference committee is created for the sole purpose of attempting to resolve the differences, since a bill must pass both houses in the same form. Five members are appointed from each house, three by the presiding officer and two by the minority leader of each house. Generally, the bill sponsor and committee members who are specialists on the bill’s subject matter are appointed.

These short-lived committees are not required to meet publicly, nor to meet at all for that matter. One freshman senator noted that “in the two years I’ve been here, I’ve been appointed to nine and I’ve yet to attend a meeting.”⁸ Often a legislator or staffer will simply circulate a conference committee report for signature that is based on agreement between two or more key conferees. A report can be filed with the houses for a vote if it is signed by six of the members. The more important the bill, the more likely it is that legislative leaders, the governor’s office, and key lobbyists will become involved. Meetings may be held in a corridor off the Senate or House floors, or in the privacy of a leader’s office.

Bills have been changed significantly, even completely rewritten, by conference committees. During the sometimes chaotic windup of the spring session, there may be a score of conference committees in existence simultaneously. It is a challenge for agency management to keep track of changes being considered by conference committees. At these times good relationships nurtured earlier with lobbyists, legislative staff, and legislators become valuable.

Study Commissions. In addition to standing committees, the legislature continues the tradition of providing separate appropriations to about forty permanent and temporary study commissions. These units are established to focus on specific problems or topics. In recent years there have been commissions on the status of women, atomic energy, pension laws, school problems, electronic funds transfers, the executive mansion, Spanish-speaking peoples, and the placement of monuments in the capitol complex.

The funding for these commissions provides a staff person, secretarial assistance, and reimbursement for travel to hearings around the state. Sponsors of commission bills are often named chairmen of these legislative and public-member units. From time to time legislators attempt to abolish these commissions, arguing that the resources could be applied more effectively to the standing committees responsible for the same subject matter, and to which any legislative proposal must ultimately go anyway. Such efforts have met with a notable lack of success.

Oversight Committees. In the course of its modernization, the Illinois General Assembly established an impressive array of specialized oversight units to oversee the executive branch. They complement the oversight activity inherent in committee hearings, budget review, constituent casework, as well as the work of the Auditor General and Legislative Audit Commission. Agency managers should be familiar with the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR), the Select Joint Committee on Regulatory Agency Reform (the Sunset Committee), and the Illinois Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation.

JCAR was established in 1977 to review all rules proposed by executive branch agencies and to re-review all rules every five years. The unit was given authority in 1980 — by legislative override of a gubernatorial veto — to suspend proposed agency rules for 180 days, during which time the legislature may veto suspended rules. JCAR's purpose is to see that agency rules carry out legislative intent. Many agency officials complain privately that JCAR is a time-consuming nuisance, while legislators generally feel the rule review agency is effective in fulfilling its purpose.⁹

The Sunset Committee was created in 1979 with unrealistic expectations that it would terminate many government programs. Sunset Committee staff feel lawmakers should shift their expectations from dramatic reductions in the size of government to using the sunset process to assess the desirability and efficacy of a wide range of programs.

The Illinois Commission on Intergovernmental Cooperation (CIC) has become an aggressive legislative unit in recent years. For instance, the commission proposed legislation, enacted into law in 1982, that creates within the state CIC an Advisory Committee on Block Grants. The twelve-member unit, comprising eight legislators and four public members appointed by legislative leaders, was given the task of developing priorities to assist the state in allocating eight federal block grants. It also oversees management of these funds.

Effective oversight is thought by scholars to require the active involvement of legislators and not just the work of staff. Traditionally most legislators have considered processing legislation and constituent services more valuable politically and more satisfying than oversight. Lawmakers would rather spend their limited time solving problems than uncovering them. This may be changing, as several generally younger, activist legislators have been specializing in oversight work in Illinois in recent years.¹⁰

LEGISLATORS AND THE LEGISLATIVE STAFF

Many state employees, including agency managers, are somewhat afraid of legislators, who can appear rather bluff, outspoken, assertive, even intimidating. They often carry with them constituent requests which they rather forcefully pass on to agency staff. Committee hearings can take on the aura of verbal inquisitions, as lawmakers glare down on agency staff seated in the well of the hearing room. And stories have undoubtedly circulated among the bureaucracy of legislators calling directly to mid- or low-level staff to demand action, or "Otherwise there'll be trouble for you!"


Whatever the perceptions, a legislator's bark is usually much worse than his bite. Most legislators know and respect the limitations of their influence, yet feel a need to advocate their constituents' concerns assertively, as this helps build electoral support in the district.

Legislators tend to reflect the habits and mores of the districts they represent. In the capitol rotunda, you will see solid kelly green sports jackets and white shoes standing toe-to-toe with black wing tips and somber pinstripes. Southern Illinois lawmakers are likely to be deeply concerned about jobs and capital improvements for their relatively poor region. Chicago legislators focus on state funding for transit and schools and on protecting their home rule authority.

Most legislators are male: 85 percent in the House and 93 percent in the Senate, in 1981-82. Most are white: 91 percent in the House and 88 percent in the Senate. Although Illinois now has more than 600,000 Hispanics, no one of that heritage had ever been elected to the Illinois legislature until 1982. In 1977 the average age of legislators was 49.¹¹ About one quarter were under forty, and one in ten was over sixty. Most legislators are either lawyers or in business. As is true of the U.S. Congress, there were more lawyers (42.4 percent) in the upper chamber than in the House (23.7 percent).


Members elected to the 1977-78 General Assembly had significant legislative experience. About one-third were serving in at least their fourth biennial

An Illinois Legislator, As Seen By...



... A DownStater

A Chicagoan...



session. Only one-fifth of the House members were new. Overall tenure will be significantly less than this in the 1983-84 session, as a result of decennial redistricting and a reduction in the size of the House.

But legislators are also real people, not just statistical composites. They have needs, ambitions, doubts, and anxieties. The following pages are intended to give a general impression of how legislators behave and what they do with their time. It takes great motivation to expend up to \$100,000 in campaign funds and endless nights out to run for a two- or four-year legislative post that may undercut one's nonpolitical career in the process. People are spurred to candidacy for varied, highly personal, and internal reasons: a sense of civic responsibility; a need to prove one's self; the challenge of the game of winning; professional advancement, especially for Chicago Democrats for whom politics is often a lifelong career; the salary and attractive pension benefits; and opportunities to mix with well-known figures and to participate in important issues. Many legislators, especially those from downstate, see the General Assembly as the culmination of their public service. Others see it as a stepping stone to a Cook County office, the Chicago City Council, Congress, or the U.S. Senate. Senator Alan J. Dixon and Adlai Stevenson started in the legislature; half the 1981-82 Illinois delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives served at one time in the state legislature.

Legislators want to feel good about what they are doing. They want to feel their work is important and to take pride in having contributed to a better hometown and state. For all these reasons legislators enter the General Assembly with high hopes. Often these hopes go unfulfilled. Each lawmaker is but one in an unwieldy group of 177. Their personal involvement in the wide range of issues is in most cases limited to a final passage vote on policies shaped without their involvement. The executive branch and its unelected staff often seem to be in charge.

This is not to suggest that there is little for them to do. Usually there is more than time permits. They must shepherd bills of their sponsorship along the winding legislative path; process legislation in committees and on the floor; respond to scores, even hundreds of letters weekly; host visiting constituent groups; and speak to civic and political organizations back in the district. And most legislators read until their eyes cross with tiredness: bills, staff analyses, interest group position papers, letters, several newspapers, and research reports. They must return endless phone calls from lobbyists, constituents, reporters. They serve as ombudsmen, for example, with the departments of transportation on road repairs, revenue on tax matters, registration and education on occupational licenses, conservation on park improvements, public aid on social services, and public health on nursing home care. And if there is any time and energy remaining, they look after their law practices or businesses.

As a result, lawmakers must establish priorities. First and foremost for nearly all legislators is re-election; all other activity may be regarded as a means to this end: sponsoring legislation, handling constituent problems, and overseeing the executive branch.

Legislators also tend to specialize. For the sake of simplicity, we might categorize lawmakers into four types: the issues advocate, the district advocate, the committee specialist, and the broker. The issues advocate specializes in sponsoring ideological or iconoclastic legislation. The district advocate focuses more on those issues having a specific benefit for his or her constituents, such as public works projects, the location and staffing of a new prison, or funding for higher education. All representatives and senators sit on committees, but some sit on the same one for many years and become known as experts in the area covered by that committee. Finally, there is the broker, a legislator who truly enjoys the legitimate game of trying to put together coalitions to build majorities for controversial bills.

In many ways the legislature is a fraternity in which a degree of camaraderie develops during a legislative session. While liberals and conservatives disagree on many issues and while country boys and Chicago La Salle Street lawyers may enjoy different cuisine, they also have a great deal in common. All ran for office, raised campaign funds, and put up with voter abuse somewhere along the line. In the end, all were elected, and all those who want to stay will have to go through the process again. All must respond to constituent inquiries, meet visiting school groups, listen to lobbyists, and spend more than a hundred nights a year in Springfield eating and drinking in the same places.

For this reason, patterns of mutually useful behavior have developed. Legislators generally treat their colleagues with respect, avoid becoming personal in the heat of debate, keep their word and commitments, reciprocate favors done, and are helpful to one another whenever possible. These patterns help explain some otherwise irrational behavior. For example, legislators will often help a colleague, even one from the other party, get his or her bill out of committee. If the committee vote looks close, observers will often hear a committee member change his vote "so that my respected colleague can get his bill reported to the floor for the full debate it deserves, even though I may have to vote against it at that time." This helps the colleague get a little favorable publicity in the home district; it does not necessarily help the legislative process.

The strains and pressures of legislative service also affect behavior. Even with increased pay, larger staffs, and the availability of informational tools, the legislator's job is more demanding and imposes greater stress than was the case in decades past. Campaigns are longer and more costly; the job is nearly full time. Legislative leaders try to assist members who need to keep law or dental practices or businesses alive by scheduling as many Tuesday through Thursday sessions as possible, so tired lawmakers will have precious Mondays and Fridays to work at their other careers. Even this is impossible several months a year when five days or more are required each week.

Family life may suffer as well. Even when the legislator is home, the family faces competition for his or her time from business matters, constituent inquiries, obligatory civic club speechmaking, and political meetings.

For all these reasons, legislators are often harried, with too little time to do anything as well as might have been wished. Tempers become short, and

lawmakers may vent their frustrations on agency officials, or on one another. Skillful lawmakers sense when — and when not — to bring matters to the floor for a vote. For example, they try to avoid action on controversial issues in the evenings after longer than expected sessions, when legislators are tired, thirsty, hungry, and attendance is dwindling.

Legislative Staff. Fifteen years ago this subsection might not have appeared in a book of this sort, because there would have been very little to write about. Today this discussion is essential to an understanding of the dynamics of the legislative process.

Staff now far outnumber legislators. There are several staffing categories: those who work for leadership, committees, or individual legislators, and those who work for the support agencies shown in Figure 5.1. Those in the first three groups are appointed on a strictly partisan basis, while those who work for the support agencies do so for the most part on a bipartisan, or neutral, basis.

Leaders of each party in each house have a complement of chiefs of staff, parliamentarians, legal counsel, press aides, and budget and research directors. Eighty professional analysts are assigned to committees — fifty in the House and thirty in the Senate. By tradition the majority and minority party in each house divide staff funding equally.

Each year sixteen or more legislative staff interns are selected on a competitive basis from colleges around the nation. These college graduates work as paid professionals from October to July and serve as committee analysts with the partisan staffs. In addition, they participate in weekly seminars and are eligible for graduate credit at many Illinois universities.

Individual legislators are allocated \$17,000 per year for an office allowance. From this they can rent space for a district office and hire someone to assist with constituent problems and issue research. Numerous legislators take on college student interns who work generally without pay, often in return for supervised college credit.

The support agencies listed in Figure 5.1 provide a wide range of bill drafting and research services for individual members. In addition, the Illinois State Library has a legislative reference staff that responds quickly to requests from lawmakers.

Legislative staff are typically in their twenties and hold or are working on master's or law degrees. As with the legislators for whom they work, staff members have ambitions, priorities, norms, and frustrations which affect their behavior. In addition to the credential-building and the experience, staff work is seen as a valuable stepping-stone to careers in government and politics. Illinois Secretary of State Jim Edgar and U.S. Representative Thomas Corcoran are among scores of former legislative staffers who have subsequently served as legislators, agency heads, top gubernatorial aides, and well-paid lobbyists.

Another important ambition of staff is to see their bill drafts, amendments, and budget recommendations implemented as public policy. This understand-

able objective should be appreciated by agency heads as they work and negotiate with staff. Senior legislative staff are closer to the ears of their leaders than are most agency heads. Thus if an agency head's idea can become the idea of a respected legislative staffer, an important step has been taken in the public policy game.

Anonymity is a frustrating institutional requirement from the perspective of an ambitious young staffer. Credit always goes to the boss, so staff members appreciate agency managers who are sensitive to and respect the contributions a staffer has made in shaping a piece of legislation or in moving an appropriation bill along the legislative path. Bipartisan cooperation, even within the context of partisan assignments, is another staff norm. Committee staff from the respective parties will often work together and share information behind the scene of partisan public debate among their bosses.

The substantial legislative staff networks have become important conduits of information to and from legislators. Agency managers who fail to understand this, or who believe they must always deal directly with the legislators, will have more than their share of problems in the legislative process.

OTHER INFLUENTIALS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

If influence is defined as power exerted over the behavior of others, there are several people and groups with influence on the Illinois legislature. Figure 5.4 displays a scaling of general influence among an incomplete list of political actors, as perceived by sixty-six agency heads from the Thompson and Walker administrations who responded to a questionnaire mailed in the summer of 1981. While the question did not ask specifically about legislative influence, the ranking reflects an ordering of influence which is applicable in many respects to the legislative process as well.

Clearly, the governor exerts a great deal of influence in Illinois government circles. It might also be said that the governor and his top aides comprise a kind of "third house" of the Illinois legislature, primarily because of the governor's reduction, amendatory, line item, and total bill veto powers. In addition, the chief executive can dispense jobs, appointments, highway work, campaign help, and other perquisites of office.

In recent years a number of legislators have shown an interest in gubernatorial appointment to agency management positions and salaried commission posts following their voluntary or involuntary retirement from the legislature. In addition to continuing their careers in government, these persons increase their often sizable legislative pension benefits base by 2½ percent for each year of additional government service. This interest in a post-legislative career in government can induce strong loyalty to a governor and his program. Every legislator is going to need the governor more than once in each term, and they know it.

Legislative leaders have several but limited institutional power resources. The Speaker of the House and the president of the Senate dominate the appointments of chairmen of all committees and the assignment of bills to com-

FIGURE 5.4. AGENCY HEAD PERCEPTIONS OF INFLUENCE IN ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS.*

	Influence			
	Little 0	Some 1	Much 2	Great 3
Governor				
Governor's Chief of Staff				3.9**
Director, Bureau of the Budget				3.4
Senate President				3.3
Mayor of Chicago				3.3
Speaker of the House				3.2
Illinois Supreme Court				3.2
House Minority Leader				3.1
Governor's Liaison/Program Staff				2.9
Senate Minority Leader				2.8
Chicago Network				2.8
Television Stations				2.7
<i>Chicago Tribune</i>				2.7
<i>Chicago Sun-Times</i>				2.7
Illinois AFL-CIO				2.6
Illinois State Medical Society				2.4
State Capitol Press Corps				2.4
Illinois Agricultural Association				2.4
Secretary, Dept. of Transportation				2.4
Illinois State Chamber of Commerce				2.2
Republican State Chairman				2.2
Auditor General				2.2
Archbishop, Diocese of Chicago				2.2
Democratic State Chairman				2.1
Illinois Manufacturers' Association				2.1
Director, Dept. of Public Aid				2.1
Executive Director, Board of Higher Education				2.1
CEO, Continental Illinois Bank				2.1
CEO, First National Bank of Chicago				2.0
State Superintendent of Education				2.0
Illinois Association of Realtors				2.0
Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois				1.9
Illinois Association of School Boards				1.9
Director, Dept. of Mental Health				1.9
President, University of Illinois				1.8
Mike Royko				1.8
President, University of Chicago			1.5	

* The question on which this figure is based read: "Influence is sometimes defined as power exerted over the behavior of others. Based on either your knowledge or perceptions, how much influence overall does each of the following have in Illinois government and politics?" The above list was originally alphabetical and has been rearranged to reflect the results of the survey by listing the office of greatest (perceived) influence first and others following in descending order.

** Figures are rounded to the nearest tenth.

mittees. As presiding officers, they can affect the flow of legislation on the floor. Through their control of the rules committees, the Speaker and Senate president determine which bills are "emergencies" during the second year of a biennium, thus breathing new life into or snuffing out a lawmaker's pet bill. The presiding officers share with their respective minority leaders from the other party the appointments of their own party members to all committees and commissions. Because of their positions, leaders are also better able to raise and dispense campaign funds and to generate support and resources from the governor or the mayor of Chicago. For example, the Illinois House Democratic and Senate Republican campaign committees each raised about half a million dollars for the 1982 campaign. These funds were used in behalf of candidates in close races and will generate significant "due bills" that the leaders can call in during the biennium.

The parliamentary, political, and leadership skills of these legislators comprise another important power resource. Every back-bench lawmaker is going to desire his leader's support on several occasions each biennium. The problem for legislative leaders is that there are often more demands made on them than they can fulfill.

The mayor of Chicago is of central importance to most of the city's Democratic lawmakers. The mayor controls more jobs and raises more campaign funds than the governor. Most Chicago Democratic lawmakers are professional career politicians who must be sensitive to the needs of the job holders they have sponsored and to the ward organizations of which they are a part, so they tend to be quite responsive to the mayor. This has generally meant a closely-knit, disciplined unit in a legislature where coalition- and majority-building is a continuous process. Republican governors have often found it easier to build majorities by negotiating with the mayor for a bloc of votes than to do so with individual GOP lawmakers.

Interest groups have significant influence on the legislature. While we should not discount the access to legislators which comes with thousand-dollar campaign contributions, greater influence on behavior is generated overall by the information provided and by the actual or perceived importance of hundreds of physicians, realtors, or farmers back home in the districts.

The media, especially the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Sun-Times*, have more influence over legislative behavior than they would admit. The media can provide visibility to lawmakers. This is particularly important in metropolitan Chicago where legislators are less visible than downstate. Newspapers bestow endorsements in advance of primaries and general elections. Newspapers and television stations cover lawmakers who demand action or propose corrective legislation in the wake of lengthy and costly media investigations of ambulance chasers, bad doctors, or abortion clinics. Preliminary results of a survey of Illinois legislators shows that respondents consider newspapers and television much more likely to spur oversight of administrative actions than either constituent complaints or reports from the Legislative Audit Commission.¹²

DECISION MAKING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A legislator makes thousands of decisions each year — from the insignificant to the momentous — in committee, on second reading, at passage stage, and in response to lobbyists, constituents, and reporters who seek commitments and positions. The lawmaker must apply a split-second calculus to many of these decisions. Should he help a colleague get his dubious pork barrel bill out of committee (an easy decision for most)? How to vote on possibly career-threatening tax increases or funding of abortions for the poor? A legislator cannot stand aside to let those who know more about an issue make the decision. The constitution requires that bills receive a majority of all those *elected*, so failure to vote or a formal “present” vote operates as a “no” vote. There is no easy way out.

The legislative institution has developed attitudes and approaches which work to reduce the conflict in decision making to manageable proportions. One of these approaches is “going along,” that is, voting for legislation unless there is visible opposition. In committee, as members try to wrap up a long hearing, one often hears a legislator ask of all in attendance, “Is there any opposition to this bill? If not, I move the last favorable roll call.” As one legislator put it, “Bills are judged innocent ‘til proven guilty.”

Reciprocity is another consideration. It makes more sense to help a colleague than to stand in his way, for his assistance may be useful some day. Reciprocity often takes place in committees; it is one reason many bad bills get out of committee to clog floor action later. Passing a problem along also seems to simplify decision making. “Let the Senate clean up the problems with this bill,” or “Let’s send it to the governor, and let him resolve the conflict.”

Inducing agreement outside the legislature reduces conflict. In the past legislators directed labor and management interests to work out their differences on workers’ compensation rates and to come back to the General Assembly with an “agreed bill.” Sometimes it worked. The same thing will often take place in committee, as legislators direct competing interests to “work out your problems, and then come back.”

Making commitments is a way of reducing the pressures of conflict. Keeping one’s commitment is a hallowed norm. Thus an early commitment to a colleague or lobbyist on a controversial bill that is going to plague the legislature all session effectively takes the committed lawmaker out of the political crossfire.

Not all conflict can be resolved, pushed along, or reduced. For the thousands of decisions that involve conflict, the lawmaker complements his or her own values and knowledge with important cues provided by staff, colleagues, lobbyists, the governor’s office, the press, and constituents.

For most decisions by most lawmakers, information is an extremely important cue. Legislators have more information available than they can digest, and the amount they do absorb is impressive. Nevertheless, on any one decision the information absorbed and available is likely to be incomplete. Thus

the credibility of the information and of the provider become critical. The best informational cues tend to come from expert colleagues, veteran lobbyists, senior legislative staff, and long-time state agency experts. Chapter coauthor Nowlan recalls one use he made of informational cues on the house floor:

I respected the seatmates to my left, right, and in front of me. One was on the judiciary committee; another, on local government and agriculture; the third, on revenue. I was on appropriations and education. We had most of the committees covered among us.

So on third reading as each bill came up, we would ask who had it in committee, what he remembered, and how he was going to vote. While we didn't always agree, it was an invaluable set of cues.

Constituent attitudes — from mail and personal contact — provide a cue that is important for many lawmakers, especially for those in competitive districts. Most voters have little or no idea how their legislators are voting, let alone know who they are. Legislators understand this, so one might conclude lawmakers could act without concern for constituent attitudes. This is generally not the case, for lawmakers view their political worlds in terms of *marginal votes*. They are sensitive to actions that might increase or decrease the margin of their electoral base. In this context, the support and endorsement of large membership organizations of realtors, farmers, or labor unions, or of advocates of gun ownership or anti-abortion causes is often calculated as worth several score or several hundred votes, *at the margin* of their established electoral base.

In summary, we would note that legislative leaders in Illinois encounter severe problems of regional parochialism as they attempt to develop statewide policies and budgets for transportation, education, and social services. There is not much sense of statehood in Illinois. Citizens identify with Chicago, the suburbs, or southern Illinois. They tend to be suspicious about the motives of those from other regions.

Funding for mass transit in Chicago is seen as a drain on funds for roads downstate and vice versa. Changes in the school aid formula are seen to benefit one region at the expense of another. Citizens from each region feel they receive less in services than they pay in taxes, i.e., that their tax dollars are used to benefit those in other regions. And lawmakers in turn tend to reflect the attitudes of their respective Chicago, suburban, or downstate legislative districts.

This complicates policymaking. It probably also means that in the years ahead, governors and legislative leaders will continue the present strategy of mutually-beneficial coalition building among the three primary regions of the state.

Footnotes

1. The best book on contemporary state legislatures is *Legislative Life*, by Alan Rosenthal (New York: Harper & Row, 1981). For Illinois, see *The Illinois Legislature*, by Samuel K. Gove, R. W. and R. J. Carlson (Urbana: University of Illi-

- inois Press, 1976); though a little out of date, this book provides an excellent introduction to the Illinois legislature's structure and process.
2. Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, *The Sometime Governments: A Critical Study of the Fifty American Legislatures* (New York: Bantam Books, 1973), Chapter 4.
 3. Lucinda S. Simon, *A Legislator's Guide to Staffing Patterns* (Denver: National Conference of State Legislatures, 1979), pp. 38-39.
 4. See Gove et al., *The Illinois Legislature*, Chapter 4, for a thorough discussion of "lawmaking" and legislative action on vetoes.
 5. Gilbert Y. Steiner and Samuel K. Gove, *Legislative Politics in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 82.
 6. Figures taken from Gove et al., *The Illinois Legislature*, Chapter 4. This chapter provides a thorough discussion of the committee process.
 7. Ibid., pp. 102-103.
 8. Ibid., p. 97.
 9. From a survey of legislators by Alan Anderson in "Legislative Oversight in Illinois," a master's thesis in progress, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana. Anderson found that 68 respondents gave JCAR an effectiveness rating of 2.25 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 equalling "high effectiveness."
 10. For a more thorough examination of this issue and other related topics, see James D. Nowlan and Anna J. Merritt (eds.) *Legislative Oversight in Illinois* (Urbana: Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1982).
 11. These demographic data from 1977-78 are taken from "Legislators and Roll Call Voting in the 80th General Assembly," Jack R. Van Der Slik and Jesse C. Brown in *Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance*, Edgar G. Crane, Jr. (ed.) (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, 1980), pp. 109-118. The 80th General Assembly sat in the 1977-78 biennium.
 12. Alan Anderson, "Legislative Oversight in Illinois," op. cit.

Chapter 6

AUDITING STATE GOVERNMENT

Robert G. Cronson

It is said that the two biggest lies in the auditing business are the auditor's statement to the agency that "we're here to help you" and the agency's response that "we're glad to see you." In fact, "being here to help you" is one of the auditor's purposes. And, an informed agency head ought to be glad to obtain the information and insight which the auditor can provide for improved agency administration. However, the thrust of the Illinois auditing program lends some credence to this wry humor.


It is the responsibility of the Illinois General Assembly to determine what activities government shall undertake, the degree to which these activities will be carried out, the amount of public funds which shall be spent, and how these funds are allocated.

For more than 150 years, these determinations were initiated and completed within each fiscal period, essentially unconnected to either the preceding period or to the one that followed. Agencies submitted appropriations requests, the legislature passed appropriations bills, and the governor acted on these bills. Agencies would then expend their appropriations and return to the legislature at the end of the fiscal year with a new request. During this process, legislative attention was generally limited to immediate needs. The same process was repeated during each session, regardless of what had gone on in preceding fiscal periods (see Figure 6.1).

As a result, the legislature did not have accumulated and objective performance information needed for informed decision making. Should old programs be maintained? Should new programs be created? Where should changes be made for optimum benefit? How should programs and expenditures be ranked? To address these questions effectively, a different approach was needed: one that would provide an evaluation of government activities and their interrelationships; relate the results of such evaluations to past, present, and intended future conduct; and make these results available to the legislature in a timely and useful form. Such an approach would connect the ends of a linear process to form a dynamic, closed loop process, and close the circle for effective legislative action (see Figure 6.2).

The Illinois Constitution of 1970 established an effective auditing program for the state and closed the loop. The constitution abolished the Office of the


FIGURE 6.1. STRAIGHT-LINE UNCONNECTED APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS.



Auditor of Public Accounts, created the elected Office of the Comptroller, and established the Office of the Auditor General.

The auditor general, unlike the other constitutional officers, is not an executive branch official, but a legislative branch official, elected by and responsible only to the legislature. Thus, for the first time in Illinois, we have a program of legislative oversight and accountability, under a legislative official operating with a constitutional mandate.

FIGURE 6.2. CLOSING THE LOOP.



The auditor general of Illinois is elected for a ten-year term by a three-fifths vote of those elected to each house of the Illinois General Assembly. The auditor general's jurisdiction covers all agencies of state government, including the executive, judicial, and legislative branches, and all institutions of public higher education with the exception of community colleges. Agencies of local government are exempt from jurisdiction, except for the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), and all carriers that receive subsidies from the RTA. The auditor general has organized 61 professional and 15 support staff employees into compliance and performance audit service groups.

To implement the fundamental changes contained in the 1970 constitution, in 1973 the General Assembly enacted the Illinois State Auditing Act (ISAA). The ISAA took a broad view of the concept of auditing. It authorized traditional financial and compliance auditing and — more importantly — added performance, program, and managerial auditing requirements. We turn now to a discussion of some of these auditing functions.

AUDITING

The term "audit" as it is used here must be clearly understood. It has a far broader meaning and scope in the Illinois audit program than it does in the commercial sector.

A commercial audit report is commonly thought of as a document setting forth the financial results of operations for a stated period. It usually contains a *balance sheet* and an *income statement*. The balance sheet reflects the financial position of the enterprise at a particular point, ordinarily the end of a fiscal year — that is, it sets an arbitrarily established period of time beginning on one date and ending on another. The income statement shows the revenues and expenditures of the enterprise during an entire period, also ordinarily a fiscal year. The commercial audit report also contains an "opinion" by the auditor that the financial statements do or do not present fairly the results of operation of the enterprise during and at the end of the fiscal year.

Compliance Audits. The Financial and Compliance Audit — described in the Illinois State Auditing Act (ISAA), *Illinois Revised Statutes*, Chapter 15, Sections 1-13 — conducted by the auditor general's office includes financial statements that are somewhat different from those of the commercial audit report, but they convey the same kind of information. However, this compliance audit also contains an extensive "Compliance Report," based on the requirements of the ISAA and explained in the "Audit Guide For Performing Compliance Audits of Illinois State Agencies." The compliance audit shows the legislature:

1. The financial results of an operation.
2. The extent to which the agency is complying with requirements relating to: purchasing, travel, personnel, control and custody of property under agency control, receipt and disbursement of funds, and similar "compliance" requirements established by the legislature.

3. Whether the agency is in compliance with specific limitations, restrictions, or directions imposed by the legislature.
4. Whether the agency is carrying out functions mandated by the legislature (but *not how well* it is carrying them out).
5. Whether the agency is in fact carrying out functions *not* assigned to it by the legislature or prohibited to it by the legislature.
6. Whether the agency is reporting the results of its operations (other than financial) fairly.

A compliance audit of every agency of state government is conducted every two years, with an arbitrary assignment of agencies to each year in the two-year cycle.

Certain agencies are audited annually. For instance, agencies that have the authority to issue bonds are audited annually in order to ensure that bond-holders will be informed about the financial position of the agency. Agencies essential to the operation of state government, such as the treasurer and comptroller, are also audited annually. Agencies that have demonstrated a record of poor administrative practices are audited annually in order to provide closer legislative oversight. Finally, the statutes require several agencies, such as the Illinois Housing Development Authority or the Illinois State Board of Investment, to be audited annually.

Because of the biennial audit cycle, certain major revenue producing agencies are not audited in the off year. However, the ISAA mandates the conduct of an "Annual Review of the Receipt and Collection of Revenues" by state agencies in the year in which an audit is not conducted. Under criteria established by regulations of the auditor general (74 Illinois Administrative Code 420.510), such annual reviews are conducted for all agencies which collect revenues in excess of \$250,000 annually.

Special Audits. The auditor general is also authorized to conduct *special audits*, or financial audits of special or limited scope. For example, a special audit might be conducted with respect to a particular revolving fund within a given agency or of a particular division or function, such as travel control, property control, or purchasing. Special audits are limited to a review of the financial transactions involved and considerations which are directly related to those financial transactions.

Audits of any kind, whether compliance, management, or performance as well as special studies, investigations, and so on, may be done either by the staff members of the Office of the Auditor General or by contractors, operating as special assistant auditors general under the direct supervision and direction of an audit manager from the auditor general's office. In some cases, the audit may be undertaken by a team consisting of both staff members and contractors.

In most cases, the outside contractors are C.P.A. firms, because of the involvement of financial analysis and reporting aspects of many of the audits. However, other contractors from such fields as data processing, law, statistical

design, and so forth, may also be employed, depending on the subject of the audit.

Regardless of the staff involved, whether office staff or contractor, the audit is under the direction and control of the staff of the auditor general's office, and they are responsible for all phases of the audit.

CUSAS Review. The auditor general also performs an annual review of the "Comptroller's Uniform Statewide Accounting System" (CUSAS). An understanding of the function of a CUSAS review requires an understanding of the respective functions of the comptroller and the treasurer.

The comptroller is the chief accounting officer for the state of Illinois. All moneys belonging to the state must be reported to the comptroller, who keeps a record of such moneys through various accounts, described as "Funds." For example, the comptroller maintains records showing the receipts, expenditures, and available balances in the General Revenue Fund, the Road Fund, and the Common School Fund. The office administers approximately 300 other funds as well. These funds do not represent *funds* as that term is used in everyday conversation. Here the term represents a set of accounts used to reflect the transactions in which the "cash" has been involved.

Actual money is under the care and custody of the state treasurer. Most of it is appropriated on the basis of legislation passed by the General Assembly and that authorizes agencies to spend certain moneys for certain purposes from certain funds.

When a state agency proposes to expend money, it executes a *voucher*, i.e., a request to the comptroller to issue a *warrant*, which is substantially the same as a check, payable to the order of the payee as designated by the paying agency. This voucher is examined by the comptroller to make sure that:

- the voucher is in proper form and order,
- the agency has been given an appropriation from which payment can properly be made,
- a sufficient balance is available in that appropriation account to pay the amount requested, and
- a sufficient balance is available in the fund from which payment is to be made.

When the comptroller is satisfied that these conditions have been met, he issues and signs a warrant in accordance with the terms specified in the voucher. The comptroller then forwards this warrant to the treasurer, who verifies that there is sufficient cash on hand to make the payment. The treasurer countersigns the warrant and sends it to the payee. A warrant is not valid unless signed by both the comptroller and the treasurer.

This brings us back to the CUSAS, which has been fully operational since 1974. It contains information about cash received by the state, the amounts appropriated by the legislature to the various agencies, the balances in the several funds, the expenditures that have already been made, and the amounts of spending authority that remain. The auditor general conducts an annual

review of CUSAS to make sure it is doing its job and to determine whether it is assisting in the auditing function.

Performance Audits. The auditor general's Performance Audit Service Program conducts both management and efficiency audits and performance audits. The first type of audit addresses such questions as:

- Whether an agency is managing its resources, personnel, and programs efficiently and economically so as to achieve the maximum amount of effort for the least cost.
- The causes of inefficiencies or uneconomical practices.

Performance audits (also called *program results audits*) address questions of:

- Whether an agency is carrying out the purposes and programs assigned it.
- Whether those programs are effective in achieving the desired results.
- The causes of any lack of effectiveness.

A management and efficiency audit was conducted to determine if the Department of Rehabilitation Services (DORS) was reaching the maximum number of disabled persons through its rehabilitative assistance programs. Audit results indicated that DORS had not been adequately planning, controlling, or evaluating agency operations, and that DORS' effectiveness, as measured by client rehabilitation, had been declining for several years. Audit recommendations included a requirement that the agency report to the Legislative Audit Commission the status of remedial measures taken to correct various deficiencies. In addition to its impact in Illinois, the report has evidently been used as a model by other states in evaluating their rehabilitation agencies.

Another example of a performance audit was the one used to determine whether the former Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) had been effective in reducing employment discrimination in Illinois. The Fair Employment Practices Act had given FEPC a dual mission: to reduce job discrimination in Illinois and to provide redress to individuals who had been victims of job discrimination. FEPC had concentrated most of its resources in its Individual Complaint Program, thereby emphasizing the narrower objective of providing individual redress and de-emphasizing its broader mission of alleviating job discrimination.

The FEPC performance audit suggested that the General Assembly consider the relative efforts put into achieving the agency's two primary objectives to determine whether the emphasis on the narrower objective was consistent with legislative intent. The FEPC function was absorbed by a new Department of Human Rights in 1980.

Unlike compliance audits and annual reviews of receipts and collection of revenue, which are performed periodically as prescribed in the ISAA, performance audits are carried out following a resolution passed by the House of Representatives, the Senate, the House and Senate jointly, or the Legislative

Audit Commission. Such resolutions direct that the audit be done, state the determinations to be made, and prescribe the manner of reporting. In these audits, the legislature directs that the audit be done, but the manner in which it is carried out lies entirely with the auditor general. This well-designed approach assigns to legislative judgment the question of *what* is to be audited, while it preserves the total independence of the auditor general as to *how* to conduct the audit.

Special Studies. The ISAA also authorizes the auditor general to conduct *special studies*. These consist of reviews and analyses of information contained in post audits or investigations previously completed by the auditor general, or of data maintained by the comptroller or the treasurer. Special studies are not post audits. They do not include the collection of new data. Further, special studies can be undertaken by the auditor general only at the direction of the chairman and minority spokesman of an appropriations committee acting jointly, a joint committee having jurisdiction to review public funds, or the Legislative Audit Commission.

Investigations. The auditor general is authorized to conduct *investigations*, defined as inquiries into specified acts or allegations of impropriety, malfeasance or nonfeasance in the obligation, expenditure, receipt, or use of public funds of the state, or into specified financial transactions or practices which may involve such impropriety, malfeasance, or nonfeasance. Here again, the auditor general is authorized to undertake such investigations only when authorized by a resolution adopted by the Senate, the House, the Senate and House jointly, or the Legislative Audit Commission.

Such resolutions must specify the acts, practices, or transactions which are to be the subject of the investigation and may specify to whom the report is to be made and whether it is to be made public. The Legislative Audit Commission may order all or part of an investigation report to be made public.

THE LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COMMISSION

The Legislative Audit Commission is a key element in the audit function. Its origins are rooted in legislative vs. executive branch politics. When a post-audit function was first established in Illinois in 1957, there was considerable controversy over whether that audit function should be a part of the legislative or the executive branch of government. A compromise was reached under which an executive branch Department of Audits was established, headed by a gubernatorial appointee called the auditor general. This auditor general was subject to Senate confirmation.

At the same time, the Legislative Audit Commission was created as a permanent commission of the General Assembly. It was given general oversight and review authority over many of the functions of the auditor general and does so in several ways. First, the commissions' program of review of all reports of the auditor general provides a continuing opportunity to review the quality and utility of the audit product. Second, the hearing process affords an opportunity for agency management to express disagreements with

the audit before a public legislative forum. This serves as a check on the conduct of the audit function by the auditor general. Third, the commission conducts a financial and compliance audit of the auditor general's office.

From its inception, the commission developed a tradition of bipartisan (as distinct from nonpartisan) operation. That tradition was formalized in 1973 by an amendment to the statutes which guarantees perfect partisan balance. The commission consists of twelve members, six from each house, and is evenly divided between the two parties.

Moreover, commission membership includes legislators who also serve on the appropriations committees of the respective houses. This links audit information and commission judgments with the budgetary process of the legislature. The commission and the auditor general have also undertaken programs in recent years to improve the exchange of information among appropriations committee staffs, commission staff, and staff of the auditor general.

The commission conducts public hearings, usually on a monthly basis, which are attended by the auditor general, members of his staff, representatives of C.P.A. firms who may have participated in the audit, agency management, and any other interested persons, including the press.

All audit recommendations fall into one of two categories: (1) those that can be implemented by administrative action of the agency affected or by some other administrative agency of government and (2) those that can be implemented by legislative action. The commission addresses those recommendations that can be implemented by agency action through the hearing process and by applying "moral suasion" to agency officials through that hearing process.

Prior to a commission hearing, the agencies are afforded an opportunity to provide updated responses and commentary on the audit reports to be reviewed that day. At the hearing, the commission then reviews individual findings and recommendations with agency management and the staff of the auditor general. In cases of controversy over a particular finding or recommendation, the commission makes every effort to make a policy judgment on that finding or recommendation. If the commission agrees with the finding or recommendation, it will strongly urge the agency both to accept and implement it. If the commission determines the finding or recommendation to be erroneous, insignificant, unnecessary, or not justified in terms of cost-benefit considerations, it will so advise the agency and the auditor general, which eliminates the need for further consideration of this matter.

At commission hearings, all audit findings are classified by commission staff into one of four categories:

Implemented
Accepted
Not accepted
Under study

Implemented recommendations are routinely reviewed for verification in the course of the next regular audit. Recommendations that are reported by

the agency to have been accepted by it are usually the subject of an inquiry as to the timetable for converting them from *accepted* to *implemented*.

For findings classified as *not accepted*, the commission inquires into both agency management's justification for refusing to accept and the auditor general's justification for including the recommendation in the first place. From this proceeding, the commission will usually arrive at a consensus position which either advises the auditor general to drop the matter in subsequent audits or communicates to agency management its continued support for acceptance.

For findings *under study*, the commission actively pursues a program to turn recommendations under study into recommendations implemented, accepted, or not accepted.

In a few instances an agency has been adamant in its refusal to accept and implement a recommendation. In these cases the Audit Commission Act directs the commission to advise the governor promptly of the disagreement. The governor is required to respond to the commission within sixty days, setting forth his views on the disagreement and indicating the corrective action taken by his office, if any. If the governor takes no corrective action, he is required to indicate the reasons for his failure to do so. The same procedures apply to agencies coming under the jurisdiction of other elected officials.

If these procedures do not resolve the matter to the commission's satisfaction, the matter becomes a political issue between the executive branch agency and the legislature; legislators tend to support their own branch and its agencies, particularly the Legislative Audit Commission. Thus adamant nonacceptance is rare and rarely successful.

The commission pursues a follow-up program in two ways. The auditor general routinely reports in subsequent audits on the status of recommendations previously reported by the agency to have been accepted or implemented. In recent years, the audit reports have dated such recommendations. For example, the 1981 audit report of a particular agency will include in parentheses the date of the audit report in which a recommendation was first made (e.g., 1976) as well as an indication of the year in which the recommendation was reported to have been accepted or implemented (e.g., 1979). In this way, the attention of both the commission and the agency can be directed to the commission's efforts to achieve final resolution of all audit report recommendations.

In some cases, the commission continues the hearing on a particular audit and instructs the agency to return at a later date to provide further information. In other instances, the commission requests the agency to provide written data relating to audit findings.

Some recommendations must be implemented by legislative action. For these cases, the commission maintains a permanent Sub-Committee on Legislation. For each biennial legislative session, the sub-committee prepares a package of bills designed to make those legislative revisions the commission deems desirable. Obviously, this ability to take legislative action in areas of

commission concern also lends added leverage to the commission's program of "moral suasion" to achieve change by administrative action.

THE AUDIT CYCLE

In an average year, the auditor general conducts approximately 300 audits, studies, and investigations, all of which are carried out through a uniform process which follows a routine series of steps.

Step 1: Survey. The first step is the survey, during which a review of literature concerning the subject matter is conducted. In addition, a cursory review, or walk-through of the affected agency, its records, personnel, procedures, and practices is undertaken. This walk-through is not intended to provide definitive information but is to identify the areas within which detailed *field work* will be undertaken. (See the following description in Step 3.)

Step 2: Entrance Conference. When the survey is completed, a conference is arranged with the principal management of the agency or agencies being audited. At this conference, the scope of the inquiry to be conducted is explained. Records and personnel from whom information will be required are identified, and agency management is given a general idea of the work to be conducted within the agency. The entrance conference is essential both to the auditor general's staff and to agency management as a means to identify and resolve problems about access to specific data.

Under the provisions of the ISAA, the auditor general is specifically authorized to have access to any documents or information held by any state agency deemed necessary for the conduct of an authorized audit. Even information that is confidential for any and all other purposes must be disclosed to the auditor general for audit purposes. However, because of the sensitivity of some information, it is often necessary to make arrangements with an agency and assure it that the information will be treated as confidential while it is retained by the auditor general as it would be by the custodial agency.

Step 3: Field Work. The data collection process is called *field work*. At this step, auditors from the office of the auditor general make every effort to coordinate with and use the work product of an agency's internal audit staff. Bear in mind, however, that internal auditors and external auditors serve different masters. The internal auditor for an agency performs a staff function for management and reports to agency management. The auditor general is an external auditor who reports about top management and serves as an agent for the legislative branch. The internal auditor pursues his or her responsibility with a view to his or her obligation to provide management with useful data for internal evaluation and improvement. Disclosure, in the form of external reporting, is not and should not be his or her concern. On the other hand, disclosure is a primary objective for the auditor general.

Step 4: Draft Report. Data are assembled in the form of a draft report which sets forth findings and recommendations.

Step 5: Exit Conference. The draft report is submitted to the agency (or agencies) undergoing the audit. The agency is provided a period of time to review the draft report, following which an *exit conference* is held, at which the draft report is discussed with agency management. Agency management has an opportunity at this point to comment, disagree, explain, or discuss. In the course of the exit conference, revisions, additions, or deletions may be agreed on or taken under consideration.

Step 6: Final Report. A final report is prepared and forwarded to agency management, which is once again provided time to prepare formal written responses and comments and to return these to the auditor general. These responses are incorporated, in their entirety, in the final report. A "Report Digest" sets forth a brief summary of the report and the agency's responses and is placed at the beginning of the full report.

Step 7: Distribution. Auditor general reports are distributed to the full leadership of both parties in both houses, the Legislative Audit Commission, the governor, the agency that is the subject of the report, the secretary of the Senate, and the clerk of the House. In addition, "Report Digests" (but not the full report) are distributed to all persons who have requested in writing to be placed on a mailing list to receive them. The agency copy is delivered to the agency at least one day prior to the release of the other copies, so that the agency may be prepared to respond to inquiries.

It is not possible to pinpoint the amount of time required to complete a typical audit cycle. The principal reason is that there is no typical audit. Agencies run the gamut from small study commissions, for which the audit can be completed in a matter of days, to major agencies for which the audit may require nearly a year. Performance audits of significant complexity may require more than a year.

Since 1976 the auditor general has had a program to speed the delivery date of compliance audits. This program is not addressed to decreasing the total time to do the audit but to move forward its time of delivery. To accomplish this, the audit itself has been split into two elements, a compliance and a financial portion. The compliance work is begun in early spring, before the end of the fiscal year; the financial portion is then completed after the end of the fiscal year. As a result, 80 percent of all audits are now delivered to the legislature by April 1, nine months after the end of the fiscal year.

EFFECTIVENESS OF AUDITING

It is difficult to quantify the results of the audit program. On any given audit, the number of findings and recommendations may vary from zero to seventy-five, and the nature of the findings and recommendations may range from the mundane to the highly significant. However, a number of general observations can be made with confidence. There can be little argument that the increased level of legislative oversight, including in particular that exercised by the auditor general, has been effective and has operated to change the rules of the game.

There has been a heightened awareness of the existence of the audit function and its purposes by the legislature and the administrative agencies. This has meant a greater utilization of the content of the audit reports in the legislative process. Over time there has been an increase in the number and sophistication of the comments, inquiries, and exchanges among members and staff of the legislature and the staff of the auditor general. Further, audit findings have become the foundation of increasing numbers of successful legislative proposals. For example, during the first regular session of the 82nd General Assembly (1981-82), forty-five pieces of legislation were introduced which were direct consequences of the audit process. Of these, thirty-seven passed the legislature and were sent to the governor.

Agency management throughout state government has come to realize that an improved internal audit function contributes not only to improved agency management but equips agency management to cope better with the state audit program administered by the auditor general. There has been significant impact in the fiscal area in particular. Two bonding agencies, the Illinois Armory Board and the Illinois Building Authority, have in effect been "unsetted" because the audit function demonstrated they were no longer necessary in the administration of state government. In long-term debt management, a restructuring of legislative oversight has been established, again in response to the audit function. In higher education there has been a total evaluation, review, and restructuring of the fiscal oversight system employed by the legislature. As a result, institutions of higher education have restructured their fiscal administration, thereby providing greater disclosure and increased accountability of university fiscal practices to legislative review.

As the audit process is refined and further improved, it will mean that agency management will have to assume greater responsibility for demonstrating that current year funds are being used for purposes requested, that agency goals are capable of measurement, and that the requests for funds next year are justifiable and defensible in the light of this year's experience.


The agency budget function is becoming an integrated part of agency management and not just an isolated function of the legislative process. In addition, the ongoing review of fiscal and management practices conducted by the Legislative Audit Commission has placed more emphasis on the technical, fiscal, and managerial skills required for successful agency management. The best interests of democratic government will not be achieved through technical management competence alone. Nor will the best interests of democratic government be achieved by sound agency policy judgment alone. Legislative oversight is accelerating the need for sound policy judgment as well as the ability to implement that policy effectively.


The astute agency manager today will make every effort to use the state audit program as a tool not only to improve performance by paying specific attention to legislative response to the audit of his or her own agency but also to Legislative Audit Commission proceedings generally. Through such effort, an agency manager can learn a good deal about current legislative


attitudes in the areas of fiscal administration and agency management. The manager can notice possible future trends and anticipate future events. The manager can create within the agency an attitude of sensitivity and receptiveness to legislative concern. In turn this can generate legislative sensitivity and receptiveness to an agency's programs and appropriations requests. However, increased legislative oversight capabilities make it clear that benefits to the agency manager will be sustained only so long as that agency can demonstrate a willingness and an ability to implement change and improvement based on legislative judgments.


An illustration may serve as an appropriate conclusion. In fiscal 1981 the auditor general issued a report on the Office of the Commissioner of Banks which pointed out that the commissioner was not fulfilling his statutory mandate to examine all banks on an annual basis. The commissioner responded that he would be unable to discharge that examination mandate effectively without increased personnel and an appropriation to support the increased personnel. Rather than responding negatively to a finding which the commissioner could have easily demonstrated to be beyond his control, the commissioner seized on the finding and aggressively addressed to the legislature his request for adequate funds, in support of which he cited the auditor general's report. As a result, the commissioner's staff level was increased, funds were provided for additional employees, and the commissioner is now able to discharge his examination responsibilities. The commissioner even took the trouble to call the auditor general, not to berate him for an adverse finding, but to thank him for providing an indispensable ingredient to a program which the commissioner considered to be in the state's best interest.
















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Chapter 7

LOBBYISTS AND INTEREST GROUPS

Robert E. Cook*

As you settle into your office in Springfield as a new agency head, your secretary comes in to tell you a Mr. Jones is on the phone to make an appointment. An aide informs you the caller is the lobbyist for the Illinois Association of Widget Manufacturers, a group that is regulated by your agency.

Your aide describes the lobbyist, his organization, its relations with key legislators, and the size and importance of his constituency. You ponder what to do. How do you handle a lobbyist? What does he want? Should you keep him at arm's length, or embrace him? Sure, you've read stories about lobbyists and special interest groups. You recall vaguely something about "pluralism" and interest groups from your introductory political science course in college, but this is different. You are now a part of government, and the person on the phone is a real lobbyist who wants to talk. Frankly, you're at a loss about what to do next.

Scenes such as this are not uncommon, as people with little experience are frequently appointed (or elected) to important government positions. They need to learn very quickly about the role of the individual lobbyist, to find out about each interest group. Are there differences among groups, or are they all pretty much the same? Who belongs to these groups, and why? Will they help the new agency head, or should he be wary of them? This short chapter provides some answers to these questions. At the very outset I must tell you I am a Springfield lobbyist and have been one for thirty-three years. But before you discount what follows as self-serving rationalization, hear me out.

THE LOBBYIST AS COMMUNICATOR

You may be inclined to view the lobbyist solely as the protector of a special interest. However, it is more precise to see the lobbyist as a link between citizens who will be affected by some public policy decision and the elected or appointed officials who will be making that policy. The lobbyist facilitates the process of two-way communication between citizen and government. This function is often overlooked. The lobbyist is more frequently seen only in that

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Terry Lutes, political affairs assistant for the Illinois Association of Realtors. Mr. Lutes was chief fiscal officer for the Illinois Department of Agriculture in 1973-76.

part of his or her role that requires him or her to represent a group's interests to government.

The lobbyist strives to maintain his organization in its present (or enlarged or a more profitable) form. He also seeks to maintain or enhance his own position within his organization. When one considers how the lobbyist works to build the size and enhance the image of his organization, this two-way communications role becomes apparent. He must constantly reconcile what he must do to build his organization with what he must do in the political arena to advance or protect his group's objectives. In reconciling these sometimes quite different objectives, the lobbyist may seem to represent two different groups: (1) the membership he represents officially and (2) not always so obvious, the government and political officials whom the lobbyist comes to know and rely on for advice, support, and favorable action. Though the needs of both are similar, they are not always compatible. There are times when group needs and demands on governmental officials exceed even the ability of sympathetic allies in government to deliver. When this occurs, the lobbyist must be the one to communicate that impossibility to his members and to suggest a compromise that would be in the group's best interests.

A lobbyist must know (1) the limits of possible favorable action by legislative and executive branches; (2) the distance which sympathetic allies in government will travel to help achieve that action; and (3) the minimum position acceptable to his group. The lobbyist must contend with group members who oppose any compromise, who insist the lobbyist go all out on each issue. An experienced lobbyist builds contacts, and friendships, and credits over the years—in and out of government—assets that should be called on wisely. Those who oppose compromise will want the lobbyist to expend these limited assets on the current issue, rather than to reserve some for future, more important issues. In such a situation, the lobbyist serves somewhat as the political system's representative to the group, to explain why a desired action is just not possible at this time, and to suggest that compromise is in order.

The agency head should appreciate and capitalize on this role of the lobbyist as a two-way communicator between government and interest group. In addition, lobbyists are also professional students of the political environment in which they work. They can spot political quicksand from a safe distance and can help the newcomer avoid stepping in. This takes trust. The first step, communication, can be established immediately. The second step, that of trust, takes time; but it will never have a chance of developing unless there is communication.

So my advice is to respond to that lobbyist and agree to meet with him. You should neither embrace him, nor hold him at arm's length. Let him know from the outset where you stand on certain matters and what you hope to accomplish in your new job. Then sit back and listen. What concerns him and the group he represents? As he or she talks, keep in mind that although you are hearing one voice, it represents the collective concerns of

many. Those others have hired him or her to speak to government on their behalf; this is a fundamental right of the governed in a free democracy. Sure, those concerns may be narrowly defined, they may benefit one group over another, but keep in mind that specific and particular interests are the consequence of a complex and diversified society and economy.

Your job is to balance the legitimate interests and concerns of that one voice with all the others you will be hearing. Though the person talking with you would be overjoyed if you agreed with everything he said and took immediate action to resolve his group's concerns, he doesn't expect that to happen. The lobbyist understands your limits and is well aware of other interests and concerns you must take into account. He simply wants to make sure that his group's concerns and objectives are included in your deliberations.

TOWARD UNDERSTANDING GROUP DYNAMICS

In addition to understanding the relationship between the individual lobbyist and his organization, the agency head needs to learn as much as possible about the organizations themselves. For this reason it is important that you make an effort to attend the functions of as many groups as possible. Avoid making your presence merely ceremonial; interact with the group's leaders and members. A wide variety of organizations is represented in the capital. Some are well organized and effective, with large staffs and big budgets, and are perceived as having "clout." Others are relatively unorganized, amateurish, and lack the financial and staff resources necessary to promote their group's interests effectively. Most lie somewhere between.

Each group has its own structure and internal dynamics. Some comprise individuals who belong to a statewide organization, some belong to local chapters, boards, or councils that in turn comprise the statewide organization. Others are composed of several companies, corporations, or large institutions, such as schools and hospitals. Still others represent a single entity.

Underlying these differences is the function the organization performs for its members. This function may be material, symbolic, or both. Material benefits include professional certification, insurance and other direct financial benefits, and training. Other material benefits relate to changes in government rules and regulations that affect an industry or profession, minimum wage laws, workers' compensation, unemployment benefits for workers, and subsidies, loans, and other direct economic benefits granted by government to certain classifications of people or industries.

Symbolic benefits are psychological in nature. Organizations that promote social causes fall into this category. These groups usually promote or oppose change on behalf of persons outside their membership or for the public in general. They can be permanent organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, or organizations that develop around an issue of the day, such as those that supported or opposed the passage of ERA. Groups such as

the Illinois Agricultural Association (Farm Bureau) and the state Farmer's Union provide social opportunities and a sense of togetherness — important symbolic benefits — as well as several material benefits.

It should be noted here that, while you need to develop personal relationships with group representatives, a member of your staff will probably handle this function on a day-to-day basis. Either the same staff person or another one at about the same level will be responsible for liaison with the legislature. These persons may have titles such as assistant director, administrative assistant, legislative liaison, and public information officer. You will be well served if you can retain or obtain experienced and knowledgeable persons for these positions.

If your appointment requires Senate advice and consent, you will have an early opportunity to evaluate these staff persons. How well do they brief you for your confirmation hearing with the Senate committee? Do they anticipate the questions? Are the suggested answers appropriate and adequate? Are background descriptions of lawmakers and lobbyists useful? Do your assistants have balanced, professional relationships with pertinent interest groups and legislators? Or do they always appear to accept their perspectives without question?

WHO ARE THESE LOBBYISTS AND WHAT GROUPS DO THEY REPRESENT?

There are over 650 registered lobbyists in Springfield. They represent 400 entities: trade associations, labor unions, corporations, and units of local government.¹

There are at least five lobbyist categories. One is the executive director of a trade association. This person is also responsible for membership services, conference planning, and all activities required to sustain the organization. Second is the governmental relations representative of a large association, major company, or union. The Illinois State Chamber of Commerce and Caterpillar, for instance, both have several governmental relations specialists. Third is the contract lobbyist. This person represents several clients. Two well-known representatives from this category are Thomas J. Duffy and Richard Lockhart. Duffy lists ten clients, from the Illinois Association of County Clerks and Recorders to the Wine Institute.² Lockhart lists thirteen, including the Illinois Press Association (community newspapers) and the Illinois Public Transit Association.

Fourth are the Chicago law firm lobbyists. These lawyer-lobbyists are often retained because of a combination of legal skills and experience and contacts in government. James L. Fletcher, former top deputy to Governor Thompson, has this combination. He lists six clients, among them the Illinois State Medical Society and U.S. Leasing Corporation, a California company. Fifth are the lobbyists representing government. Education provides a good example. The Illinois Association of School Boards has a lobbyist who represents school boards; lobbyists for the Illinois Education Association represent one of several teachers groups; and Robert Leininger is the

lead lobbyist for the State Board of Education. Sixth are the many volunteer lobbyists — registered and unregistered — who spend time in Springfield in behalf of students, senior citizens, and cultural and other groups. Groups represented in Springfield also fall into several categories, e.g., business, labor, education, agriculture, and government itself.

Business includes a wide range of economic activities, from small, one-family stores and shops to large factories employing thousands of people. Although there will be times when almost everyone in this entire category will support a specific public policy or issue position, more often business will subdivide into small clusters of narrowly defined groupings. For example, major corporations divided and fought intensely in 1982 over legislation that proposed changes in the way their operations located outside Illinois were to be taxed. And the large banks continually seek to expand their branching powers, over intense opposition from the generally small community banks.

Labor still exerts a considerable amount of political muscle, even though it is no longer as powerful as it once was. In recent years, unions have been divided on such issues as usury (or interest) rates and education. Most labor groups favor statutory ceilings on interest rates. However, the important building trades unions oppose ceilings that might diminish the flow of capital into home mortgages. The Illinois Education Association represents suburban and downstate teachers, while the Illinois Federation of Teachers membership is primarily in Chicago. These unions traditionally oppose one another on approaches to collective bargaining and school aid formula changes.

Sometimes the legislature directs interest groups with fundamentally different positions, such as labor and management, to work together to develop an "agreed bill" outside the legislative arena. This has been the case with labor and management over proposed changes in workers' compensation rates. The rationale is that these groups have greater knowledge, larger stakes, and more intense interest in these complex subjects than do legislators. Therefore, it is in their interest to achieve a compromise rather than to leave the decisions to an uncertain fate in the legislature. Sometimes anxiety about the unknown has generated agreed bills; at other times, the conflict has had to be resolved by the legislators.

There is far greater agreement than disagreement among the groups representing various agricultural interests in the state capital. In part this is because so many issues affecting agriculture are national rather than state issues. Another reason is that their interests are represented in Illinois government by a cabinet department mandated to be their advocate.

Government is also well represented in the Springfield political arena. First, there are the state agencies with a full-time staff assigned to lobby the legislature and maintain liaison with other state agencies and branches of government. Second, there are the lobbyists who represent associations of county sheriffs, coroners, clerks, and road commissioners, among others. Third, there are representatives of municipalities and special districts. Others represented in Springfield include hospitals, clinics, nursing homes, or pro-



fessional associations which speak for professionals such as doctors, dentists, pharmacists. Not to be overlooked are those who represent welfare recipients, foundations, churches, citizen groups, and consumers.

During the height of the legislative session, the full lobbying complement may be seen in and around the capitol. They congregate around the third floor brass rail in the rotunda, in the chamber galleries, in committee rooms, in back corridors and offices throughout the building — anywhere they can bend an ear, get a point across, cajole, reassure, and monitor.

In addition to this army of professional lobbyists, there are ordinary citizens who have journeyed to the capital to press a specific individual cause. Some of these citizen-lobbyists are mobilized and brought to the capital by the professionals. They are often well-briefed, organized, and goal-directed. Others are well-intentioned, unaffiliated citizens, who in the pursuit of a single issue and cause, descend upon the capitol building behind placards and slogans, their lapels adorned with buttons and stickers. This citizen-lobbyist represents a time-honored tradition in American political life, that of the citizen petitioning government to redress a grievance. Some of these ad hoc citizen-lobbyists will come to Springfield for only a day; others will camp in the corridors for an entire session; still others, such as those who supported or opposed ERA, will come year after year in pursuit of their cause.

Some citizen-lobbyists may not have much success. Part of the reason for this stems from the do-or-die, uncompromising goals many have established for themselves. In leaving no room for compromise — many of them view compromise as an evil — they put themselves in a win-it-all, or lose-it-all situation. These people seem to have missed an essential element of the American political system: the principle of compromise, so important in a diverse society. A successful lobbyist knows limits and sees compromise as a healthy and necessary thing.

Another reason some of these citizen-lobbyists are unsuccessful is that many of them try to imitate the approach of the late sixties anti-war and civil rights groups, which clearly achieved a measure of success. These groups do not seem to understand that these are different times, and that few causes can draw the support, or generate the political heat, of those earlier citizen movements. The moralistic, reform passions of that era have cooled, at least temporarily. At present the American political system is in the process of digesting the reforms of that period. It is part of a cyclical response to a period of social and economic upheaval.

The way to affect public policy today is not through the march, the demonstration, or the mass protest, but is instead through quiet, deliberative lobbying of decision makers. The news media, the politicians, and much of the citizenry have become tired of "pushy" tactics, and now shrug them off. Thus the successful lobbyist will usually avoid the limelight, preferring instead to present his position to individual decision makers on a one-to-one basis.

WHY CHANGE IS SO DIFFICULT

Most of the programs that you manage will have the same components: the enabling statute, the annual appropriation, and the people who work with the program. In addition to full-time agency employees, some programs have advisory committees, boards, and commissions with part-time volunteers. It is important that you understand the various ways in which appointments are made to these bodies. You have the authority to make some of them, others the governor will make, often upon your recommendation. You should also understand the tradition by which these appointments have been made in the past. In many instances you will discover that by tradition you are expected to make certain appointments based upon the recommendations of a group. If you break with tradition, you should determine in advance that the benefits will exceed the costs.

Another component of a program is its constituency. Somebody either benefits from the program or is subject to it. A new agency head would be well advised to survey all programs in his agency to ascertain which groups have vested interests in what programs. Your top staff will have a working knowledge in this regard. In addition, your division, bureau, and program chiefs are likely to have close relationships with many persons in the groups interested in their respective programs.

Interest groups are often instrumental in creating programs. They have a proprietary interest in nurturing, protecting, and expanding these programs. Thus if you decide to alter a program, the interested group(s) may try to stop you. You should, therefore, have a clear understanding of whose toes you may be stepping on. Know what you're getting yourself into before you get into it. Each policy defeat you suffer tends to diminish your stature, and the effects of several defeats cumulate. This will increase the willingness of other groups to oppose changes you have in mind.

Assume for purposes of analysis that you want to eliminate a program that benefits somebody, a program administered by a bureau in your department. Assume, further, that this is the only activity of a bureau that employs twenty people, and that there is a well-organized group that will be adversely affected by the elimination of the program.

The first thing that will occur is alarm in the bureau. They will not trust you, no matter how much you assure people that their job security will not be affected. You will be upsetting their lives. Individuals within the bureau who have close relationships with representatives of an affected constituent group will contact those people for aid in resisting the proposed change. The group rallies to resist your proposed change. You decide to go ahead nonetheless.

The fight is on!

The group has many options available and many routes of resistance to ambush your plans. You should assume they will use all of them.

Their first step will probably be to appeal to your reason, to have you reconsider your plans. If this is unsuccessful, they will enlist people who they

feel have influence with you. At the same time they will contact sympathetic legislators to begin the process of lining up support to stop you in the legislature, if it goes that far.

Their next step will be to approach the governor or some of his key aides. Even if you have had the foresight to get the governor's approval in advance, there is no assurance that he will not change his mind, especially if the group is important to his re-election chances.

If the governor holds firm in support of you, your next obstacle will be the legislature. This body may well pose your greatest challenge. In addition to eliminating the program from your proposed budget, you will have to get a bill passed that eliminates the statute that created the program. Though it will be helpful if the governor and the leadership of both houses of the legislature are from the same political party, this will in no way assure you of legislative victory. Effective interest groups have allies on both sides of the aisle from which they can develop coalitions.

Here is a good place to note an important principle. It is easier to beat a bill than it is to pass one. The route your bill must travel is long, circuitous, and studded with roadblocks. The group's advantage is that it only needs to stop you at one of these roadblocks, while you will have to overcome each one to win. You need a majority on your side in each committee and in both chambers.

Throughout the legislative struggle, the group may also be conducting a campaign in the media that can affect legislators. It can also influence the governor, who may change his mind at any time during the entire process.

The number and scope of machinations that can occur in a fight like this are too numerous to mention in this short chapter. They are limited only by the imagination, tenacity, resources, and inherent power of the group you've angered. Win or lose, you will bear some scars, but that's part of the process.

YOU AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE

There are many people who have been in government service for a short time and have found the experience a good one; others experience frustration and return to their previous businesses and careers with a negative attitude toward government service. Your personal attitude and your level of understanding about the political process before entering government service will have a significant impact on your experience as an agency manager.

Our purpose in this short chapter has been to give you a brief look at the world you are entering from the perspective of a lobbyist. In the past thirty-three years, I have seen untold numbers of bright and dedicated people enter government service in Springfield with fresh enthusiasm and new ideas, determined to do good, to be better, to change things, and right wrongs. While many have succeeded, far too many well-intentioned people have had their bright hopes dashed by their inability to understand, or to cope with, the realities of the political process.

It is my hope that this chapter will contribute in a small way to your success. I wish you well.

Footnotes

1. The list of individual lobbyists and their employers is available from the Index Division of the Illinois Secretary of State, Springfield. The Illinois Legislative Council also publishes a directory of lobbyists.
2. These examples are taken from the list of lobbyists dated June 14, 1982.

Chapter 8

THE PRESS CORPS AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

Bill Miller

“Come on fellas. Give us a break, will ya? Give us a break, my friends in the press.”

That was the plea of state Senator Robert Egan, Chicago Democrat, to reporters in press row in the Illinois Senate in the spring of 1980 when he sought passage of a bill to increase pensions for legislators. The measure had been sailing through the legislative process until the media made it page one news and the public reacted.

“A pox on the press! If you were here and we were there, you wouldn’t be any different, and facts wouldn’t be any different, and the Union might survive,” Egan continued.

This is but one example among many highlighting the conflict between government and the press.¹ Journalists, for the most part, consider an adversary relationship with the government as healthy. They claim it is their responsibility to keep government honest and that the way to do so is to assume the role of “watchdog.” Public officials recognize they are under constant surveillance by the media and are sensitive to the “power of the press.” Ask any legislator who has tried to sneak through a legislative pay raise bill; ask Governor James R. Thompson about the role the press played arousing public opinion over his involvement in that issue.

The capitol press corps, a group of journalists headquartered on the mezzanine floor of the Illinois statehouse, is responsible for informing the public about what is happening in state government. The press corps has unearthed scandals in state government that have sent state officials to prison, forced two Illinois Supreme Court justices to resign, and generally caused bureaucrats to be wary about engaging in any wrongdoing for fear of being caught.

Who makes up this group of government snoopers? How do they function? Do bureaucrats try to manipulate the press and, conversely, does the press try to manipulate bureaucrats? To get the answers to these and a variety of other related questions, interviews were conducted with more than a score of statehouse reporters, along with others who have observed the statehouse press over the past decade.²

HISTORY AND COMPOSITION OF THE PRESS CORPS

Until the mid-forties, relatively few reporters were in Springfield to cover state government. Only the Chicago metropolitan dailies, national wire services, and a few downstate papers sent reporters to the capital to join those from the *Illinois State Journal* and *Illinois State Register*, now merged into the *State Journal-Register*. There was no specific space allotted to the reporters; they found working areas where they could — under stairwells, in anterooms, in corridors. In 1947 the state provided four rooms for the press, and as government grew and media interest intensified, additional space was provided.

The press corps organized in 1946 into the Illinois Legislative Correspondents Association (ILCA), a group dominated for many years by reporters from the Chicago metropolitan dailies. In the 1950s only the "heavy hitters" had desks — reporters for the *Chicago Tribune*, *Chicago Sun-Times*, the now defunct *Chicago American*, and *Chicago Daily News*, along with wire service staffers. Other reporters, those from downstate newspapers — the "Little Leaguers" — were relegated to a "pool room" to fend for typewriter space and telephones. Radio reporters, referred to as "dry cell boys," were not welcome in the domain of the print journalists and had to fight for their rights. Moreover, they were not permitted to bring microphones into news conferences during the terms of Governor William G. Stratton (1953-61) and the late Governor Otto H. Kerner (1961-68). Broadcast reporters were forced to try to corner the governors later to get recorded statements. It was not until the administration of Governor Richard B. Ogilvie, in 1969, that radio and TV reporters were allowed into the news conferences. By this time, the Chicago dominance over the ILCA had begun to wane, and broadcast journalists became more insistent in their demand for equal treatment.

The press corps soon outgrew the four rooms it had been granted in 1947, and in 1967 the state moved reporters to expanded quarters. Still later, in 1976, the press corps was again moved, this time into an expansive 6,566 square foot area on the mezzanine floor of the capitol. An ILCA committee, working with state officials, planned the space. It includes a number of private offices, a blue-draped room for news conferences, and a kitchen area. The cost to state taxpayers was \$830,000, according to T. Lee Hughes, who was bureau chief for the Associated Press at the time and did a lengthy series of articles on the new facilities in which he raised the question of whether the press should pay rent for the space. Charles N. Wheeler III, statehouse correspondent for the *Chicago Sun-Times* since 1970 and elected president of the ILCA in 1978, said the organization has taken no official stand on the rent issue because there is "no unanimity" among the membership on the question. ILCA charges each bureau an annual membership fee of \$50. Membership is voluntary, and Wheeler said nonmembers who want to use pressroom facilities to cover the legislature are welcome.

A mid-1981 survey showed twenty-two news organizations — newspapers, wire and audio services, newspaper groups, radio and television stations —

staffed the capitol pressroom on a full-time basis. The permanent cadre numbered thirty-eight reporters—twenty-seven men and eleven women (see Figure 8.1). Other media were represented on nonlegislative days, and the four Chicago TV stations (Channels 2, 5, 7, and 9) sent crews to Springfield when major news was breaking that affected the Chicago metropolitan area. The number of reporters in the pressroom also mushrooms when eighteen graduate journalism students from Sangamon State University's Public Affairs Reporting program intern with the various bureaus during the first six months of each year. Therefore, on a big news day, during the peak of the legislative session when votes on key issues are taken, as many as sixty to seventy reporters may converge on the pressroom.

There has been a steady increase in the number of women journalists in the press corps. Two pioneers were Pat (Milligan) Harris, who in 1948 was bureau manager for International News Service (which later merged with United Press to become United Press International), and Bernadine Martin of the *Peoria Journal-Star*, who covered the legislature in the fifties and sixties. By 1977, of the twenty-eight full-time statehouse reporters, eight were women; in 1979 nine of the thirty-four were female; and in 1981 eleven of thirty-eight were women. There was but one black and not a single Latino.

In the ten-year period from 1971 to 1981, there were sixty-three different bureau chiefs heading the twenty-two full-time bureaus in the capitol press corps, an average of nearly three chiefs per bureau in a decade. Only two of the twenty-two bureaus had no changes in chiefs during the period: Copley News Service, headed by Ray Serati, and the *Chicago Defender*, run by the only black in the pressroom, Simeon Osby. One newspaper, the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, had seven different bureau chiefs during the ten-year period. Not only do the bureau chiefs come and go, but staff members do so as well. Of the forty press corps reporters pictured in the 1971 *Illinois Blue Book*, only six remained in 1981. A scant four who were in the pressroom in 1970 were still there eleven years later. By contrast, of the twenty-three reporters whose photos appeared in the 1960 *Blue Book*, eleven—nearly half—were still in the pressroom ten years later, indicating relative stability in former times.

There are varying reasons for the heavy turnover of personnel but most commonly mentioned is career advancement. Reporters often get an opportunity to move up to home office positions. A few have progressed up the journalistic ladder to responsible positions with the national media.³ Of course, some retire, and others move into often more lucrative jobs in public relations or public information. Government officials are anxious to hire reporters for public relations work since they are skilled writers, know many of the journalists in the pressroom, and understand what sort of news is wanted. Traditionally, Illinois governors have staffed their press section with pressroom reporters lured away for higher pay and shorter working hours. In our interview with him, ILCA President Wheeler lamented that, with the exception of the Chicago dailies and a few other major media, "pay scales do not reflect the responsibility and importance of the jobs." And Al Mann-

FIGURE 8.1. ILLINOIS STATE CAPITOL PRESSROOM STAFFING (AUGUST 1981).

Media	Number of Full-time Staff	Male or Female	Number of Different Bureau Chiefs — 1971-1981
<i>Full-time Staffed Bureaus</i>			
Alton Telegraph	1	M	3
Associated Press	4	M	5
Belleville News-Democrat	1	F	1
Capital Information Bureau ^a	3	M-2; F-1	2
Chicago Daily Law Bulletin	1	F	2
Chicago Defender	1	M	1
Chicago Sun-Times	2	M	3
Chicago Tribune	1	M	3
Copley News Service ^b	2	M-1; F-1	1
Gannett News Service ^c	1	M	5
Illinois Issues	1	F	1
Illinois News Network ^d	1	F	3
Lee Enterprises ^e	3	M	2
Paddock Publications ^f	1	M	2
State Journal-Register	4	M-3; F-1	3
St. Louis Globe Democrat	1	M	7
St. Louis Post-Dispatch	1	M	3
United Press International	4	M-1; F-3	4
WCIA-TV, Champaign	2	M-1; F-1	3
WICS-TV, Springfield	1	M	3
WMAY Radio, Springfield	1	M	3
WSSR Radio, Springfield	1	M	3
Totals	38 ^g	M-27; F-11	63
<i>Part-time Staffed Bureaus (normally staffed when legislature meets)</i>			
Bloomington Pantagraph			
Peoria Journal-Star			
Suburban Trib			
WAND-TV, Decatur			
WBBM Radio, Chicago			
WGN Radio, Chicago			
Channel 2, Chicago (CBS) ^h			
Channel 5, Chicago (NBC) ^h			
Channel 7, Chicago (ABC) ^h			
Channel 9, Chicago (WGN) ^h			

^a CIB provides audio service to about 50 radio stations in Illinois and Missouri.

^b Copley newspapers in Illinois: The Beacon News, Aurora; Daily Courier News, Elgin; Joliet Herald News; Wheaton Daily Journal; and State Journal-Register, Springfield. Sixteen additional newspapers subscribe to Copley service on a regular basis and 40 on a syndicated basis.

^c Gannett newspapers in Illinois: Rockford Register-Star and The Commercial-News of Danville.

^d INN, a radio audio service, ceased operations August 1, 1982.

^e Lee Enterprises' newspapers serving Illinois readers: Quad-City Times, Davenport, IA; Kewanee Star-Courier; Decatur Herald & Review; and Southern Illinoisan, Carbondale.

^f Paddock Publications' flagship newspaper is the Arlington Heights Daily Herald.

ing, political columnist and reporter for the *State Journal-Register* since 1971, claimed that, "if salaries of reporters were better, you'd encourage more people to stay longer."

Obviously, with the influx of new reporters in recent years, there is a collective loss of historical perspective. As Wheeler put it: "New people coming in cold don't have the perspective to see how issues have evolved in the past to be able to judge against some historical background the events of today in order to interpret their relative significance, meaning, or impact, and because of that it makes them more susceptible to being manipulated by politicians seeking to put forth their best image."

Most of the pressroom reporters have covered news in local governments before coming to Springfield — something Barbara Hipsman, bureau chief for the *Belleville News-Democrat*, feels is essential: "I'm tired of the flash-in-the-pan journalist who has never covered a five-hour hearing on whether to lay a sewer down Main Street or a school board meeting where they talk about tubas until two o'clock in the morning." Most of the resident journalists have attended journalism schools; ten are graduates of Sangamon State University's Public Affairs Reporting program.

Chicago vs. Downstate Coverage. The consensus among reporters in the pressroom is that downstate readers, listeners, and viewers get much more information about state government than do those in the Chicago metropolitan area. Kenneth Watson, political columnist for the *State Journal-Register*, who has covered the capital since 1953, commented: "When I started out, Chicago papers were far and away better than anyone else but now downstate papers are doing a better job." But Watson said he doubts the average Chicagoan cares much about what goes on in Springfield since Chicago residents are more attuned to happenings in City Hall: "They think Springfield is a place that takes their money and doesn't give them anything in return." Bill O'Connell, of the *Peoria Journal-Star*, who started legislative coverage in Springfield in 1955, agrees that downstate newspaper coverage of Springfield news is superior to that of Chicago: "Chicago media do not devote enough space and time to state capital news. The Chicago audience wants more."^a

On the other hand, Wheeler says the Chicago media simply cannot provide as extensive coverage of the legislature and state government as downstate papers, which concentrate on local and regional news while the Chicago media cover issues which more directly affect the citizens of Chicago. The facts seem to bear out these assertions.

Paddock also publishes dailies in the suburbs of Buffalo Grove, Des Plaines, Elk Grove Village, Hanover Park-Streamwood, Bartlett, Hoffman Estates-Schaumburg, Mt. Prospect Heights, Palatine-Inverness, and Rolling Meadows, and weeklies in six suburbs.

^a This number increases to 56 from January through June when 18 graduate journalism students from SSU's PAR program become full-time interns with pressroom bureaus.

^b Chicago TV stations are normally present only when major news affecting the Chicago metro area is breaking.

While it is true that the *Chicago Tribune* and the *Chicago Sun-Times* have full-time bureaus, the news space allocated to Springfield news by the two metros has dwindled over the years. Moreover none of the Chicago TV stations cover the Illinois General Assembly on a regular basis. Crews are sent to Springfield when major news affecting the Chicago area is breaking, e.g., the governor's budget message or the mass transit problems in 1981. Until 1980, WGN-TV (Channel 9) had a reporter, Steve Schickel, stationed in Springfield to cover the legislature gavel to gavel. Subsequently, his reports were confined mainly to WGN radio, and TV crews were sent to Springfield only sporadically, depending on what news was breaking. A major deterrent against more Chicago TV coverage is the cost factor of salaries for four-person crews — a reporter and sound, lighting, and audio personnel. WBBM radio has covered the General Assembly with a full-time reporter starting with Alan Crane in 1979, followed by Steve Crocker. Chicago area radio listeners can also get news reports from stations subscribing to radio audio services operating in the pressroom.

ROLE OF THE PRESS CORPS

Most members of the capitol press corps see their role as providing their audiences with news of what government does that affects citizens' lives. Obviously, such pocketbook issues as taxes, license fees, and utility rates get priority treatment. Also attracting prime attention are schools, transportation, public aid, child abuse, mental health, public health, and corrections.

Journalists struggle with the question of whether they should give their audiences what "they need to know" or what "they want to know." Wheeler said he writes "what I think is important for people to know to become informed citizens." He is respected for his mastery of the state budget story and provides his readers with lengthy stories on that subject. He said he realizes many readers don't bother to read the stories but feels "the decision makers and people high in the power structure of society in important places rely on the press to provide them with the news of what is going on in state government."

Shaping Government Policy. There is no question that the press dramatically affects certain policies of state government. The emphasis placed on certain issues has a profound effect on the public. For example, the press corps swings into action every time the legislature considers a pay raise for its members. Stories on this issue rile the public, and lawmakers hear from their constituents. Press attention to a legislative pay raise in 1980, rammed through in the eleventh hour, created a public furor. There were even stories hinting of collusion between legislative leaders and Governor Thompson with the result that thousands of tea bags were dumped in the governor's office in a re-creation of the Boston Tea Party.

O'Connell is convinced that legislation strengthening the Implied Consent Law in the 1981 session would not have passed had it not been for the emphasis placed on it by the press. Bob Springer of the Associated Press, a

statehouse reporter since 1977, commented, "If there is a hot political issue on which there are allegations of phony-baloney funny business, you can have an incredible impact. You can bring things to light and can put people's backs to the wall and force public officials to make decisions." With respect to passage of the Cutback Amendment in 1980 (reducing the House size by one-third), Springer feels the media played a major role in "facilitating an attitude that already existed and highlighting the mood that was ready to be shaped." Media organizations blocked passage of a bill, the Illinois Uniform Information Practices Code, in the 1981 session which they claimed would have closed government records to the public. The Senate Executive Committee voted twelve to one against the bill after the Illinois Freedom of Information Council, a coalition of state journalism groups, and the Illinois Press Association, representing Illinois newspapers, presented testimony that the measure was more a "right of privacy" bill than a "freedom of information" measure. A cosponsor, Senator George Sangmeister, Mokena Democrat, commented: "Now we know the power of the press." Wheeler contends the press helps set the agenda for government. When legislators file a bill or vote on an issue, he believes the question bothering them most is: "What will the press say about this?"

Most statehouse reporters feel their work contributes to good government. Manning suggests that, "when officials know the press is there to check on them, it contributes to good government because they don't want to be shown in a negative light." And Bill Lambrecht, bureau chief of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, pointed to a bill in the 1981 session which, if enacted into law, could have sent librarians to jail for having shelved books containing obscene material: "Reporters got onto it, wrote many analytical stories, editorials, and the bill failed miserably in the House." He termed this a "vivid example of how the press can rally around an issue, particularly one that is close to the interests of journalists, and can change the tide of events."

FOCUS OF COVERAGE

There was near unanimity among statehouse reporters that the Illinois General Assembly and the governor get most of the attention from the press corps and that too little attention is paid to agencies in the executive branch of government. Reporters also generally concede that press coverage of the judiciary is poor. Indeed, the press association name — Illinois Legislative Correspondents Association — clearly suggests that the legislative branch is regarded as the press corps' area of concentration.

Why? Because the legislature is an active, dynamic body where decisions are made openly. Veteran journalists describe it as "more visible, more colorful, more flamboyant" than the executive branch where decisions are often made in the privacy of a bureaucrat's office. Reporters frequently do not find out about executive decisions until a news release is issued or a news conference is held. The legislature is simply easier to cover. Some bureaus, however, specialize in agency coverage. Lee Enterprises and Copley News Service, for

example, spend considerable time and effort checking for stories in departments, agencies, and commissions.

Covering the Legislature. The 1970 Illinois Constitution mandates annual legislative sessions, which means that lawmakers are in Springfield a good deal of the time.⁴ This too has caused increased media attention.

Reporters find much of the legislative coverage very tedious, especially during the early months of a session when most of the copy comes from committee meetings. There may be as many as a dozen House and Senate committees meeting simultaneously and reporters must, therefore, select those that are discussing legislation generally considered important. The wire services — Associated Press and United Press International — have the most difficult task since they must provide news for many newspaper, radio, and television clients which have varied demands. If one committee is considering a coal issue, for example, the wires must cover it for central and southern Illinois clients; if another is taking action on mass transit, the wire reporters must be there, too, to satisfy Chicago and other urban clients. Reporters from noncompeting media will often trade stories or get a "fill" on what transpired at a particular committee meeting from some other reporter who covered it.

Floor action during the closing months of the sessions is also extensively covered by the media. Reporters from the major full-time media are provided seats in "press row," flanking the rostrums of the Speaker in the House and the president in the Senate. They follow the progress of bills through a weekly digest, distributed by the Legislative Reference Bureau, which capsules the thrust of measures and indicates action at each step along the legislative process. When reporters are not present to observe floor action, they are often in their press room offices listening to the debate over speakers through audio feeds provided to each bureau from both the House and Senate.

Broadcast media frequently tape-record and film committee hearings and floor debate when key issues are being considered. Permission to tape and film must first be obtained from the presiding officer or committee chairperson; this is normally granted.

Covering the Executive. The chief executive of the state is frequently singled out for massive media coverage, particularly when a major issue is in the news, since the governor is normally an active participant at such times. During the RTA crisis of 1981, for instance, Governor Thompson was usually surrounded by a horde of reporters every time he stepped from his office. When he held a news conference, the room was packed.

But there is consensus among the press corps that some of the less visible agencies in the executive branch are overlooked by reporters, and they concede they should be paying more attention to them. Lambrecht, a stathouse reporter since 1973, says there is a direct correlation between the extent of coverage given a state agency and its distance from the pressroom: "The farther away an agency is from us, the less attention it gets. For example, the Department of Transportation is seven miles away, and it doesn't get the scrutiny it should." He and others contend that while the legislature

decides how the tax money is to be spent, the executive branch actually spends it and should get more news coverage. Springer explained why some of the agencies do not get covered: "We don't have the time nor manpower available to cover the smaller agencies." He said the press should be reporting on how these agencies make and initiate rules, regulations, and policies that affect people. And Hipsman said: "We report on stories that people want — transportation, schools, and taxes. These are the stories that get Page One, the stories that the editors want. It's hard to find out what goes on in the code department unless you have a lot of time to devote to it."

Former Governor Dan Walker was critical of the press corps for giving more emphasis to the legislative than to the executive branch. He contended that the executive has a far greater impact on the everyday life of Illinois citizens and that reporters tended to ignore such items as rules and regulations formulated and enforced by the executive branch.

The Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), virtually ignored in previous years by the media, began getting closer press scrutiny in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Previously, reporters were content to get ICC news from news releases announcing approval or rejection of rate hikes for utilities, but in recent years the media, both print and broadcast, have been attending public hearings to give expanded coverage of ICC actions. However, the ICC, under the Illinois Open Meetings Act, is permitted to deliberate its decisions privately, and thus the public is frequently not privy to arguments advanced by ICC members for or against increases.⁵ Bills have been filed in the General Assembly in recent sessions to remove that exemption.

Covering the Judiciary. The judicial branch of state government is virtually ignored by the media. Practically the only coverage given is to opinions handed down periodically by the Illinois Supreme Court. On opinion days, a committee from the ILCA examines the court decisions to determine which might have relevance to various segments of the press. Copies of those selected are made and distributed to the pressroom media desiring them. Very little effort is made to examine how judicial decisions are reached.

What Turns Reporters "On" and "Off." Statehouse reporters will give myriad answers to questions concerning what they find most and least rewarding about their jobs. Threaded throughout most of the responses, however, is the satisfaction of knowing that the reporter is doing something significant — informing the reader, viewer, listener about what is transpiring in state government. One reporter described it as, "the feeling that what I do is important, and I'm able to develop a perspective to identify issues that are significant. If only a few people listen, at least they get something out of it." Ray Serati, of Copley News Service, who has been covering state government since 1960, says it is rewarding to him to "inform the public and taxpayers of what happened and what meaning it has on their everyday lives." Mike Lawrence, veteran reporter of Lee Enterprises, said he feels the general public has little knowledge of how government operates, and "it is important for us to inform them on how decisions are made." Other reporters cited as re-

warding aspects of their jobs the close proximity they have to governmental power, beating a competitor to a good story, uncovering wrongdoing in government, and audience reaction to their stories.

Responses concerning the least rewarding aspects of the job were varied. Some cited the tedium of sitting through lengthy legislative committee hearings, covering the same stories session after session, the lack of time their superiors give them to work on and develop in-depth stories, and the exposure to "inane political rhetoric."

Persons joining state government who want to establish and maintain a good relationship with the press corps should learn a few basics quickly: (1) return telephone calls from reporters, (2) be accessible, and (3) be candid, forthright, and above all, truthful. Those statehouse reporters who were surveyed, almost without exception, listed the foregoing as attributes they found essential in developing and continuing good relationships with public officials. Reporters, often working under deadline pressure, want to get answers to questions quickly and are turned off when the secretary to some public official whines into the phone, "Oh, he's in a meeting and can't be disturbed." When the official fails to return the phone call for the remainder of the day, the journalist is understandably irritated. Reporters also frown on public officials who have unlisted phone numbers, thus making them inaccessible during nonworking hours. Accessibility can be carried to extremes, though, according to many reporters. Newspersons are busy, and they don't relish frequent visits to the pressroom by government officials who merely want to chitchat.

Another annoyance to the press corps is the tendency on the part of some officials and agencies to put out non-newsworthy news releases. When a bureaucrat or government department consistently floods the pressroom with meaningless news releases, reporters are quick to brand them as publicity seekers and the releases often wind up in the wastebasket. As veteran public information officer (PIO) Bill Schaub, a former newspaperman, put it, "never serve thin soup. If it doesn't have meat in it, don't serve it. It is insulting to the press to give them non-newsworthy press releases."

Public officials caught lying to reporters are seldom, if ever, forgiven. Lambrecht said he remembers people lying to him "eight years ago and I've never forgotten it. Be honest because if you have something to hide, it will eventually come out." Manning said, "In politics, you're only as good as your word. If you get a reputation for not telling the truth, you can never recover from it."

The notion that reporters can be "bought" has long been a problem. In the pre-Watergate era, it was not uncommon for state officials to deliver cases of liquor to the pressroom at Christmastime for distribution to reporters. One former secretary of state had flowers delivered to the wives of reporters; another state official in the 1960s gave reporters portable radios as Christmas gifts. That practice has stopped. Many newspapers and broadcast media have adopted codes of ethics which prohibit the acceptance of gifts of material value from public officials.⁶ One reporter was even cautioned by her office

to return an inexpensive wall calendar given her by a statewide association at Christmastime.

Most reporters said they saw nothing wrong with public officials attempting to "cultivate" them, i.e., to establish friendships, to visit them on occasion in the pressroom (not during pressure or deadline situations), or to treat them to a beer at the corner tavern. As veteran legislative correspondent O'Connell explained, "It's OK for them to try to cultivate us because we sure as hell will try to cultivate them." Nonetheless, some newsmen cautioned government employees in lower echelon positions against speaking out. Warned Springer: "If you're a person who wants to hold onto your job, you should just shut up." But reporters expect answers from key government officials, and they want them to be truthful, candid, and to talk in layman's language, not in bureaucratese.

METHODS OF COVERAGE

Very few statehouse reporters "run a beat," i.e., make regular visits to code department and agency offices to get news. In this way, they differ in their method of operation from local government reporters who get much of their news from the "beat," whether it is city hall, the county courthouse, or a police station. State government is so far-flung and its offices are located over such a wide geographic area that "beat" reporting is impractical. Statehouse reporters develop many sources within government and use the telephone to keep in frequent contact with them. Enterprising journalists also develop a network of tipsters who are invaluable in providing information on what transpires behind the scenes in government. These tipsters are usually promised confidentiality, and reporters follow up on their "tips" to get the story verified from other sources. Then too there are occasionally "whistleblowers" within the system; these are usually employees who are incensed at some wrongdoing and tip a reporter anonymously.

Much of the news from the executive branch of government is announced through news releases or at news conferences. Most government departments and agencies have public information officers whose job it is to keep the media informed of news developing within the particular governmental unit. Public Information Officers (PIOs) are helpful to reporters in serving as a liaison between the press and government. They are obviously eager to let reporters know when something good is happening and reluctant to reveal information that reflects adversely on their bosses or agencies — that is when newsmen use investigative reporting techniques. A "no comment" from a PIO or public official whets the news appetite of a reporter to pursue a story more aggressively.

Investigative Reporting. Only a few reporters in the statehouse pressroom specialize in investigative reporting, usually defined as digging deeply into a serious subject, penetrating any secrecy that may surround it, unearthing facts that officials try to keep hidden. The subsequent news report then fully explains or explores the significance of the story. Investigative reporting is not the

forte of all journalists. The newsperson must be totally committed to the possibility of spending days, weeks, even months, gathering information for a story. And then the reporter may run into a dead end — no story. Much effort, time, and money are spent poring over records, interviewing sources, checking and double-checking facts to ensure their accuracy. Media owners are often skittish about potential libel suits and want to make sure the stories clear the media legal department before publication.

Among statehouse reporters recognized for their investigative work are Mike Lawrence of Lee Enterprises, Bill Lambrecht of the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, and G. Robert Hillman, bureau chief of the Chicago *Sun-Times*.

A number of major scandals in Illinois government have been uncovered through the persistent efforts of investigative reporters in the statehouse. A former state auditor was sent to the penitentiary after George Thiem, reporter for the now defunct *Chicago Daily News*, began checking state records.⁷ Two supreme court justices were forced to resign when a former reporter for the *Alton Telegraph*, Ed Pound, who went on to join the *New York Times*, developed some conflict-of-interest stories.⁸ There have been many other cases.

Most observers agree there has been less investigative reporting in recent years compared to a decade or more ago. Barbara Hipsman blames the decline on time constraints which prevent them from "doing a lot of digging." She also feels that TV has caused the public to want news more promptly: "They don't want you to sit around and analyze. It is frustrating when you try to do an investigative piece, and you simply don't have the time to do it."

Others contend that the degree of probing depends on the relationship between members of the press and the governor. During the Walker years (1973-77), there was significant tension which led to confrontations and may account for the increased level of investigative reporting. The Thompson administration, marked by a friendlier relationship with the press, has come under less sharp scrutiny. Al Manning commented: "Thompson, with his background in law enforcement, set as a top priority a scandal-free administration. By and large, he's been able to do that. There isn't a whole lot for reporters to dig up." Lambrecht feels it is the turnover of pressroom personnel that has contributed to the decline of investigative journalism: "It's a Catch 22 situation. If you're around here too long, you get jaded and cynical, but if you're not around here long enough, you don't develop the sources it takes to do investigative reporting." He also claims that lack of time prevents them from digging through records: "There doesn't seem to be the willingness on the part of news organizations to devote the weeks or even months to peruse records and develop what is needed for a solid investigative story."

While there has been a dramatic increase in the number of investigative units within the Chicago media, seldom do they come to Springfield to probe into governmental activity. The major dailies in Chicago have had investigative task forces for a number of years, but only recently have the broadcast media ventured into this field of journalism. For example, in 1981 the CBS station, Channel 2, hired nationally-known investigative reporter Pam Zekman from the *Sun-Times* to develop an investigative unit. Zekman gained

national fame in connection with the *Mirage Tavern* series, when she and other newspaper reporters "operated" a tavern to catch unsuspecting city inspectors accepting bribes to overlook code violations.

Pack Journalism. There is a tendency for many in the statehouse press corps to work "in a pack"; i.e., reporters tend to band together to cover the same stories, rewrite the same news releases, and report on the same news conferences. There is a definite sameness to much of the news coming from the state capital. A major reason for this is obvious — certain key issues emerge during every legislative session on which reporters focus their attention. So, when Thompson holds a news conference, most reporters flock to it — none daring to skip it in fear that the governor may say something unexpected which the reporter would miss and the competition would get. Another reason for the "pack journalism" practice, so aptly described in Timothy Crouse's book *Boys on the Bus*, is that the press corps is a closely knit group, clustered in the same pressroom; many reporters also socialize with each other. Springer terms it a "collective mindset" more pronounced in the 1980s than when he first entered the pressroom in 1977. Mike Strand, who was bureau chief for Sangamon State University's educational FM station, WSSR, from 1978 to 1981, said the wire services and Chicago metro newspapers concentrate on certain issues and the rest of the press corps follow: "Every time the Governor walks out of his office, this place goes up for grabs. Everyone chases him. No one wants to be left out for fear he'll miss something." Strand also said that since the press corps is confined to a certain area, this leads to pack journalism and that if the press offices were scattered across Springfield there would be a more diverse selection of stories covered: "You'd have agencies covered that are not covered now because reporters would be thinking individually instead of as a pack."

Some reporters, however, don't agree with the majority view. Hipsman says she doesn't follow the pack and points to a number of other downstate reporters who go their own way. She says she and others go to the news conferences with the "pack" to listen but seldom write any stories from them, depending on the wire services to provide stories for their papers. Lawrence feels pack journalism is not practiced as much in the 1980s as it was when he first entered the pressroom in 1966: "Many downstate papers are now off doing their own thing."

Some reporters say they must follow the "pack" or they will hear from their home offices. Lindsay Gedge, who was bureau chief for TV Channel 3 in Champaign from 1978 to 1981 before leaving for a TV position in St. Paul, said she heard from her producer when she missed a story. "If my station saw something on the wire, they wanted to know why I didn't have it." And Ben Kiningham, manager of Capital Information Bureau (CIB), an audio service for some fifty radio stations in Illinois and Missouri, said he must provide "voices of the newsmakers" to his radio clients to match stories on the wires. If Governor Thompson makes an announcement and the wires carry it, CIB had better have an "actuality" in Thompson's voice or Kining-

ham will hear from his clients wanting to know why. Therefore, he is forced to follow the "pack."

Deadline Pressures. Reporters for the wire services (Associated Press and United Press International) feel they have a "deadline every minute." They are under constant pressure to get breaking news on the wire quickly; if one wire service consistently trails the other on news items, clients will complain and perhaps threaten to switch services. So, wire service journalists must be fast writers.

All newspapers have deadlines, which vary from paper to paper, but they are normally several hours before distribution time. Radio stations, too, have deadlines although they enjoy much more flexibility than do newspapers and even more than TV stations. A radio reporter can pick up a telephone and be on the air with a news bulletin seconds after the newscaster gets it. TV reporters could do likewise, but it is seldom done due to the nature of the medium. Only in unusual circumstances when the news is of very great importance will a TV station interrupt regular programming for a news insert. Normally, the news item is held until the next regularly scheduled news program.

The radio audio service CIB packages a series of news stories, each usually about one minute in length, and records them on a tape. Clients are provided an unlisted telephone number which, when dialed, activates the playback machine containing the taped stories; the stations can record these off the phone line for use in their news programs. These news stories usually include "actualities," or voices of the newsmakers, with "wraparounds," which contain introductions and closes for the actuality inserts by the news announcer.

MEDIA-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

Journalism teachers suggest to their students that if they want to cover government, they should develop a sense of skepticism—not cynicism.⁹ Students are advised that good reporters always question decisions and actions by government and emphasize the "why" of stories. They are cautioned against being overly suspicious of bureaucrats, not always to ascribe ulterior motives to them. In other words, they should not begin coverage of government with the attitude that all politicians and public officials are crooks.

Veteran statehouse reporters concede it is difficult to stifle cynicism while covering state government. Springer feels there is a "tremendous amount of cynicism" in the pressroom. He admitted that when he first became a statehouse reporter in 1977 he "had little respect for an institution simply because it was an institution." He added that after watching the institution of state government in operation, his "cynicism was heightened because it was justified." But, he quickly added, he now has a much better understanding of why government operates as it does.

Former WSSR reporter Strand contended that every reporter should have a "healthy dose of skepticism" but that reporters soon reach a point after being "burned out by all the rhetoric" when they ask themselves: "Can I

believe anything I hear?" Hipsman disagrees and feels she is less cynical than when she entered the pressroom in 1978: "I see now how the system operates. If they [public officials] make fools of themselves, it isn't the press that makes them do something illegal or stupid; they do it themselves." And Gedge said: "We all have a basic commitment and interest in what is going on, and if we hated it, were very cynical about it, I don't think we'd be here."

Manning blamed the cynical attitude of some reporters on past government scandals: "If they [reporters] weren't cynical when they came in, they become so very quickly." James Bray, capital correspondent for Paddock Publications, said cynicism is a "disease" of reporters. Dan Egler, bureau chief for the *Chicago Tribune*, thinks there is nothing wrong with reporters being cynical: "All reporters are cynical, you have to be. You just don't take the pap and believe everything you read in a press release without questioning it." Lambrecht observed philosophically: "It's not hard to become cynical when you see attractive proposals that would seemingly be good for the people go down the drain early in a legislative session. Sure, I think anyone who has been around here more than four or five years gets cynical or else they are not doing their jobs." Lambrecht pointed to the ebb and flow in the adversarial relationship between the press and government which reached its peak in the post-Watergate years and waned during the late 1970s.

The relationship between the media and government also depends on the behavior of the administration in power — particularly the governor. As mentioned earlier, the relationship with Governor Walker was extremely hostile, while with Thompson, it is much friendlier. Lambrecht explained: "By the end of Walker's administration in late 1976, there was a great tension between reporters and Walker's office, largely because of what was perceived then as an attempt by certain Walker aides to mislead reporters and, in some cases, what were generally regarded as untruths." In contrast, "Thompson has been very open and accessible in most cases, and he understands reporters better than Walker did."

It was obvious from the beginning of his administration that Thompson wanted a friendly press. He made frequent visits to the pressroom, often unannounced, and roamed the offices engaging in small talk with reporters. This was disarming to some journalists. Veteran statehouse reporter O'Connell gave this assessment: "It's hard to maintain an adversarial relationship when he [Thompson] has his feet on your desk drinking one of your beers." O'Connell said he feels it is proper for public officials to have a friendly relationship with reporters but doesn't want them to get the idea they are "good pals." Lawrence said Thompson's visits made him "feel uncomfortable." He said, "I'd be sitting there writing an analysis about him, trying to point out what he is doing well and what he is doing badly, and then here comes this big guy who lays down on my couch and props his feet up on my desk."

Springer went so far as to label Thompson's pressroom visits "offensive" and termed his relationship with the media as "phony." Springer said, "He's very accessible to the press when he wants to be and when he's got something

good to say, when he's strutting as a winner or when he's pleading or begging for something" but it is a different story when "he's losing and is in a grouchy mood. It's like turning on the light in the basement and all the cockroaches run. You won't find Thompson. In that sense, I think he's phony." Springer added that "Thompson knows how to play the press like a violin. He's smart that way, and I think the press sometimes likes to be played by him."

Relationship with Governor's Press Office. Governors, in recent years, have made it a practice to hire top reporters as press aides. Ex-reporters have certain qualities and a background that helps establish and maintain good relations with the press corp. As former reporters, they know what the press wants and are quick to respond to queries. They also know what issues to avoid and can suggest to their boss ways to circumvent items that might make "bad" press. And they are on a first-name basis with pressroom reporters; they socialize with them and therefore have a friendly relationship as contrasted with someone the governor might bring in from out of state.

Governor's press offices have dealt with the press corps differently over the years. During the Ogilvie administration (1969-73), the press office was headed by retired newspaperman Fred Bird and was operated in a less formal way than in succeeding administrations. Bird welcomed informal visits by reporters to ask questions or merely talk about the weather. Under Walker (1973-77), there were great tensions between the press corps and the governor's press office, also operated by a former newspaperman, Norton Kay. The problems began with the release of Walker's first budget in 1973. Normally, pressroom reporters are given copies of the budget documents several days prior to the governor's formal presentation to the legislature so they can analyze them and have sufficient time to prepare stories in advance to be released simultaneously with submission of the budget to the General Assembly — such was not the case in Walker's first year. His press office did not release the budget to the media until a few hours prior to the formal presentation, and reporters were angered because they had no time to scrutinize it. That initial hostility not only lingered but even intensified during the later Walker years, even though subsequent budgets were released and explained during the week prior to formal release.

Thompson's press office is headed by a former *Tribune* reporter, David Gilbert, assisted by ex-reporters David Fields and James Skilbeck. They generally have a good relationship with the press corps; Fields, for example, was head of the UPI Springfield bureau from 1977 until he joined the Thompson press office in 1981. Some reporters did have complaints about the office, however. Hipsman said, "They kowtow to the Chicago media." And Gedge said, "They make me feel I am imposing on them when I ask a question. They make me feel I'm part of the pygmy press." But Dana Cvetan, reporter for the Champaign-Urbana *News-Gazette*, who spent six months as a pressroom intern, gave the Thompson press office high marks: "They know what everybody is looking for, since they were former reporters." She said this

benefits Thompson because "they can put their people in a better light. The governor has a really good thing going for him."

Relationship with Government PIOs. The number of public information officers throughout state government has grown tremendously since 1969, starting with the administration of former Governor Ogilvie. In 1981 practically every state agency had someone on staff to handle press inquiries and prepare news releases. Many PIOs have journalism backgrounds, some have been in the press corps but left to take what were frequently more lucrative government jobs. Most reporters praise a majority of the PIOs, crediting them with helping journalists gain access to public officials and government information. Some PIOs, however, have reputations for attempting to keep information from the press, particularly if it is damaging to their bosses or agencies. Jim Broadway, bureau chief for the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, said, "Ninety percent want to give out information, the other ten percent try to shield their bosses." Reporters generally want to talk to department heads and agency directors rather than the intermediary — the PIO. Kiningham said he relies heavily on PIOs for information, but when he wants a voice for his radio news reports he wants that of an agency head since that will lend more authenticity to his reports.

A slang term used by the press to define a PIO is "flack" (the origin of the word is unknown, but it is generally thought to mean someone who protects a superior from taking "flack" from the press). Some PIOs are offended by this label, considering it a label of derision. Others, like Jim Skilbeck, assistant press secretary to Thompson, flaunt it. In fact, Skilbeck had "FLACK" inscribed on his license plates. And veteran reporter Lawrence criticized his colleagues for deriding PIOs: "I think it is a ruse of some editors and publishers to indoctrinate reporters that it is somehow not clean to go to public relations work so they wouldn't have to meet the economic terms of reporters." Gedge said, "some [PIOs] are excellent, some are horrible." Those she criticizes are the PIOs who never make their superiors accessible to reporters and see their jobs as shielding agency officials from the press rather than imparting information and providing accessibility.

An arm of government that has grown and become more sophisticated over the years is the Illinois Information Service (IIS), which distributes news releases, radio feeds, and TV reports to the media. Critics refer to it as a "propaganda arm of the governor's office." The size and scope of IIS burgeoned under the Ogilvie administration when it started making free government news reports available to Illinois radio stations. This was in direct competition with private audio services operating out of the pressroom. Many radio stations, particularly smaller ones operating on limited budgets, used the free government service even though they were getting partisan news, designed to favor the administration in power, as contrasted with the offerings of the private audio services which provided news reports from all parts of the political spectrum. IIS also prepares a daily press summary containing news clips of major state news stories from newspapers throughout the state.

This press summary, scanned daily by pressroom reporters, is offered to the media at a nominal cost. IIS, in addition to disseminating printed press releases of government news, also prepares TV videotapes for stations that do not send reporters to Springfield for regular coverage.

Manipulation of the Press. A majority of reporters contend there are constant attempts by government bureaucrats to manipulate them. This manipulation, they claim, comes in the form of "media events," when officials make themselves available to say something that will make them look good, and when they can flood the pressroom with innocuous press releases.

There is no question that public officials concoct "media events" to attract reporters. The "fly-arounds," so prevalent during the Walker administration, have become standard practice. The stops on the "fly-around" are announced in advance, and preparations are made at the various cities on the tour for news conferences to give the local reporters an opportunity to ask questions. Normally such trips begin in Chicago, with stops at the major cities — Rockford, Peoria, the Quad-Cities, Springfield, Champaign, and Carbondale. Reporters, particularly in cities outside of Chicago and Springfield, are attracted to these airport stops because they don't often get a chance to rub elbows with well-known public officials. Capitol press corps reporters are forced to cover the Springfield stop because the public official might say something newsworthy — something that wasn't said earlier, and newsmen want to be there for fear their competition might get a "scoop."

Springer said government agencies have become much more sophisticated in their manipulation of the media: "They know how to wrap the media around their little fingers. They see what headlines play on TV and radio and write news releases geared toward what they know is playing well in Peoria, knowing that we will be trapped." Reporters claim public officials also manipulate them by using them to float "trial balloons" to sample public reaction. For example, a legislator may call a news conference to announce plans to file a bill on a certain subject. The press covers it, disseminating information about it to the public, and the legislator awaits public reaction to determine whether to consider pushing for passage of the measure.

Marcia Stepanek, who left the statehouse UPI Bureau in 1982 for a job with the *Detroit Free Press*, said she felt manipulated, not so much by politicians but by the Chicago TV media. She contends that news conferences are often scheduled so the news is timely for the 6 p.m. newscast. She commented, "I can't fault politicians for that; TV producers encourage it." And Lawrence thinks manipulation is a two-way street: "Politicians know their chances of re-election depend on how they are handled by the press. They are self-serving. So is the press. We want the news to be broken on our time. We have self-interests so why not also public officials?"

CONCLUSION

The statehouse press corps serves as an important link between Illinois government and the public. It provides citizens with vital information so they are

better able to make decisions in a democratic society. A healthy, adversarial relationship exists between the press and state government which diminishes the possibility of malfeasance among public officials. Competition within the pressroom forces reporters to be constantly on the lookout for news stories and whenever possible to "scoop" their colleagues and thus brighten their future professional opportunities.

A sign hangs on an office wall in the statehouse pressroom which reads: "No man's life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in session." Reporters joke about it but recognize, too, that the General Assembly has tremendous power over individual citizens. Journalists see among their roles that of protector — to alert the public to what they perceive as legislative excesses.

In general, reporters feel they provide an objective and balanced offering of news, without taking sides, thereby upholding another sign on a pressroom office wall: "I'm neither for nor against apathy."

Footnotes

1. "Press" is referred to in this chapter in the generic sense, to include both print and broadcast.
2. In addition to those identified in the text, the people surveyed included: Tom Massey, Illinois Legislative Correspondents Association press secretary; Dennis McMurray, bureau chief for the *Alton Telegraph*; and Simeon Osby, bureau chief for the *Chicago Defender*.
3. Ray Coffey, formerly with UPI, heads the Washington bureau of the *Chicago Tribune*; Edward T. Pound, formerly with the *Alton Telegraph* and Chicago *Sun-Times*, is with the *New York Times*; Tony Fuller, with UPI in Springfield, is national correspondent for *Newsweek* in New York; Frank Maier, formerly with the *Chicago Daily News*, heads the Chicago Bureau of *Newsweek*; Mary Galligan, a Sangamon State University Public Affairs reporting intern with *Illinois Issues*, is a reporter in the Chicago Bureau of *U.S. News and World Report*; Morton Kondracke, former statehouse reporter for the Chicago *Sun-Times*, is executive editor of *The New Republic*; Larry Green, formerly with the *Chicago Daily News*, heads the Chicago bureau for the *Los Angeles Times*; Robert Secter, formerly with the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, *Chicago Daily News*, and *Chicago Sun-Times*, is now bureau chief in Bangkok, Thailand, for the *Los Angeles Times*.
4. For example, the legislature met for varying lengths of time during eleven months in 1980.
5. The Illinois Open Meetings Act was strengthened by action of the General Assembly in 1981. Attorney General Tyrone Fahner, joined by media organizations such as the Illinois Freedom of Information Council, Illinois Press Association, and Illinois News Broadcasters Association, shepherded a measure through the legislature to clarify language in the statutes so that both government officials and the public will more clearly know which meetings are to be open and which can legally be closed. For the first time, a "meeting" has been defined as a gathering of a majority of a quorum of members of a public body to discuss public business. Other major changes in the revised act are: (1) all meetings must be open to the public and can be closed only by a vote of a majority of a quorum present with the specific exemption cited for closing the meeting; (2) written minutes must be kept of all meetings; (3) advance notice must be given to the public of all meetings; (4) any citizen can file a court suit challenging the legality of a closed meeting; and (5) a court may rule null and void any actions taken at a meeting found to have been held in violation of the provisions of the act.

6. Many codes of ethics are patterned after one adopted by the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, in 1973. The code states, in part: "(1) Gifts, favors, free travel, special treatment, or privileges can compromise the integrity of journalists and their employers. Nothing of value should be accepted; (2) secondary employment, political involvement, holding public office, and service in community organizations should be avoided if it compromises the integrity of journalists and their employers. Journalists and their employers should conduct their personal lives in a manner which protects them from conflict of interest, real or apparent. Their responsibilities to the public are paramount. That is the nature of their profession." Other sections of the Code of Ethics deal with responsibility, freedom of the press, accuracy and objectivity, and fair play.
7. Former State Auditor Orville Hodge served seven years in the Illinois State Penitentiary after pleading guilty to state embezzlement charges in 1956.
8. Former Illinois Supreme Court Justices Roy J. Solfisburg, of Aurora, and Ray I. Klingbiel, of East Moline, resigned from the bench in 1969.
9. *Cynicism* for the purposes of this chapter is defined as ascribing to public officials' motivations driven principally by self-interest rather than the public interest.

Chapter 9

PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR NEW AGENCY HEADS

James D. Nowlan

David Kenney, director of the Illinois Department of Conservation, recounts overhearing a conversation two years ago among state government employees in which he heard himself referred to as "the new director over at Conservation." At the time Kenney had held the job for four years and was a senior director in the Thompson administration. The body of Illinois government bureaucracy is permanent. Agency heads are transient; most stay only three or four years. Agency heads should view their jobs not as new careers but as relatively short periods of service. Goals and objectives should be established within the context of a relatively brief tenure in a system for which change comes slowly, grudgingly.

One of the first problems faced by new agency heads is the question of where to live. Kenney strongly recommends that they live near their principal work place. Another agency head concurs:

Take a close look at where you plan to live while you are serving as director. I have seen people try to maintain two homes. This has a lot of built-in hazards and tends to take you out of circulation. If I had chosen to keep my home in _____, I could have paid a dear price in indigestion, sleeping too little, drinking too much, or what have you. For example, when you are away from home many nights out of a week, ladies can begin to look too good to you or other bad habits can develop. I've seen several directors burned out by a lifestyle in which they tried to operate away from their agency's base.

For some agency heads it may be difficult to determine his or her principal place of work, for in reality there are two state capitals in Illinois: Springfield and Chicago. Springfield may hold the formal title, but two-thirds of Illinois' 11.4 million citizens live within sixty miles of Chicago's downtown lakefront. Because of this, most major agencies have offices in both cities. As of 1982 most Chicago offices are located in or near the twenty-two-story State of Illinois Building at 160 North La Salle Street, in the block north of Chicago's City Hall. A dramatic, futuristic new state office building is under construction across the street from the grimy, unappealing office building at 160 North. This new structure is likely to make working in Chicago more logical and attractive than ever.

The agency head questionnaire revealed that sixteen of forty-eight respondents from the Thompson administration spent more time in Chicago than in Springfield. While nine of these sixteen were with small agencies with fewer than fifty employees, five of the respondents manage several thousand persons each. Agencies that have their primary offices in Chicago include the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, the Department of Human Rights, and the Pollution Control Board.

In the aggregate, respondents estimated they spent slightly less than half of their time (47.5 percent) in Springfield, 37 percent in Chicago, and 16.3 percent in the field away from their office(s). These cumulative figures are skewed a bit toward time in Chicago by eleven generally small agencies which have no Springfield office at all.

New governors always confront problems in recruiting their "cabinet" of seventy agency heads. In addition to statutory salary ceilings that are often unattractive to candidates from the private and university sectors, many candidates from urban areas are highly reluctant, even unwilling, to move to Springfield. Governors have approached this problem in different ways. Richard Ogilvie was liberal in authorizing Chicago area residency for agency heads. Dan Walker was unwilling to grant this, and nearly all his agency heads resided in Springfield. Jim Thompson appears to have become increasingly lenient in his residency policy during his terms, and he has granted many formal exemptions to the traditional requirement that agency heads, especially code department directors, live in Springfield. It is ironic that many agency heads who move to the capital with some reluctance come to find the city of about 100,000 a comfortable setting for their families.

Several agency heads felt strongly that a Springfield base was important to success in the job. "While there is a lot of travel on Air Illinois and state planes between Springfield and Chicago," said one, "most of the action still takes place in the capital. That's where most of the governor's staff operates. The BOB works solely from Springfield, and that's where the legislature meets. If you're not there most of the time, you reduce your effectiveness."

Agency heads work long hours. The composite agency head devotes less than 40 percent of his or her workweek to internal administration of the agency. On the following page is a summary of how sixty-six agency heads responded to the question: In an average workweek, approximately how many hours do you devote to each of the following activities?

	Hours per week (Mean response)
Relations with the governor's office	2.9
Relations with the Bureau of the Budget	2.3
Legislative relations (average per year)	6.0
During session	11.1
Nonsession periods	2.3
Media relations	2.0
Public meetings and speeches outside office(s)	5.5
Office appointments with interest groups, lobbyists, citizens	6.3
Internal agency administration	20.6
Other	10.2
Total hours in average workweek	<u>50-60¹</u>

During the spring and fall legislative sessions, managers can expect to devote significantly larger blocks of time to legislative matters than at other times. These activities include testimony before committees, appointments and phone calls with lawmakers and staff, and dinners and receptions where legislators and interest groups expect their presence. These allocations of time are estimates, and the categories sometimes overlap. As one director said:

I try to spend three-and-a-half to four days a week in Springfield. If it's less than that, I find that I get in trouble back at the agency. It is difficult to separate external from internal activities. For example, I spent part of this afternoon with a citizens' group and legislators over a question of how a department grant should be expended in the group's community. Now, that is both external and internal in nature, as I see it.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT COMPARISONS

Since so many new agency heads come to government service from the private sector, and because many readers may feel that they have a somewhat better notion of private enterprise, it is useful to compare private and public sector experiences of persons who have been managers in both environments.

Thirty-one of the respondents to our agency head questionnaire had previous management experience in the private sector. These persons, with an average of eight years in business, were asked to compare their experiences. Figure 9.1 displays their responses. As noted in Chapter 4, most found hiring and firing more difficult in the governmental sector. In addition, nearly all said they devoted less time to budgeting in the private sector.

In this book we have made much of the sticky, constraining web of government. Private sector managers also have their webs of superiors, subordinates, and outsiders. Indeed, the managers with private and public sector experience were rather evenly divided as to where they found "more inde-

FIGURE 9.1. PUBLIC SECTOR AND PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT COMPARISONS.

	State Government	Private Sector	No Difference
In comparing your management experience in government and in the private sector, in which have you:			
Found hiring top quality personnel more difficult?	26	1	4
Found firing an employee more difficult?	25	1	5
Devoted more time to personnel matters?	19	4	8
Found the more diligent personnel working for you?	6	8	17
Found the better trained personnel working for you?	8	12	11
Found the more capable personnel working for you?	7	10	14
Devoted less time to budget activities?	2	26	3
Had more adequate budget resources?	6	20	5
Had more independence in decision making?	13	14	4
Had greater pressure?	19	2	10
Worked longer hours?	12	5	14

pendence in decision making." In state government the web constrains certain managers more than others, and it imposes itself more on policy than on administrative decisions. For example, code department directors tend to receive greater direction from the governor's office than do managers who report to gubernatorially appointed boards. Certain agencies have greater political salience than others. Governors have different management styles. Dan Walker and his staff tried to exercise more control over his agencies than has Jim Thompson. As to the different types of decisions, i.e., internal administrative decisions and public policy choices, one manager put it this way:

Operational planning for the agency is done internally. There is no need to deal with the governor's office on such matters. On our legislative package there is joint development among my staff, the governor's agency liaison, his legislative liaison office, and sometimes the Bureau of the Budget.

In other words, the outside world does not seem to care if the manager changes his system for processing occupational licenses, but it cares a great deal about whether an occupation should be licensed and how much the licenses cost.

Several managers mentioned difficulties in shifting from traditional "bottom line" measures in business to government objectives, that is to such less precise objectives as avoiding public criticism, and fulfilling statutory program requirements with available resources and according to accepted practices. "Efficiency is penalized," said one. "If you improve productivity in one area, you lose employees there whom you could use to improve another aspect

of your operation." Others mentioned that public managers operate in a media fishbowl. This was unknown to them in business and increased stress on the agency manager. "No one cares what an executive in a private corporation does, short of crime; a government executive is constantly criticized in public for his judgment calls. . . . Eventually every director gets a roll in the media barrel, sometimes for a week, sometimes for a season or two."

What follows is some guidance directed at you, the new agency head. It is gleaned from the specific and generalized comments of experienced agency heads as well as from lessons learned by me as a new agency head on three separate occasions.

YOU AND YOUR AGENCY

Before you walk into your new office for the first time, learn as much as possible about the agency you are about to direct. Take your predecessor to lunch. Study carefully the statutes that govern the agency. Read press clips about its problems. Check the index of *Illinois Issues*, the monthly magazine published by Sangamon State University and the University of Illinois, for any articles written about your agency. Find out whom it affects. Read the most recent compliance and performance audits. According to Hugh Heclo:

The power of the bureaucracy is mainly passive, not active. It consists in the capacity to withhold needed services rather than in the capacity to oppose political superiors directly. Therefore, political executives' first necessity is to help themselves. They do this by extending their networks and relationships . . . so as to gain confidence about the nature of the surrounding political forces.²

Thus, once you have done some initial background research, your next challenges are, as one manager said, to "grab hold of the staff and the purse strings." Be highly visible around agency offices in the first several weeks. Introduce yourself to the "little people" as well as to the management staff. One director recommends "sitting down with everybody in the first two levels of the agency to ask them to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the agency. They won't do this, but the interaction will give you a chance to check out one another."

The Agency Staff. Tables of organizations vary across state agencies, yet there are key staff positions central to almost every unit. These include the fiscal (budget) officer, personnel officer, legislative liaison, internal auditor, legal counsel, deputy director for operations, your executive assistant, and your personal secretary.

Since this group comprises your team, it is imperative that you determine whom you can depend upon for what, and that you do so very early on. This team will make or break you. They run the agency day to day, and they serve as your eyes and ears both inside and outside the agency.

Delegate specific tasks to your key staff. This will help you evaluate their strengths and weaknesses, indicate their responsiveness to you, and help you understand how the agency functions. This is required anyway in larger agen-

cies; not to do so may result in your being swallowed up in detail and becoming a captive of agency processes. While you should delegate extensively, do not assume the old-timers in the agency know what they are talking about. Sometimes they don't. For example, one director explains that "my staff told me there were 'peaks and valleys' in our agency operations. This was a myth. We made some systems changes which have eliminated this longstanding problem."

Many but not all Illinois agency heads recommend you bring with you one or more of "your own guys." A director of a large, complex agency put it this way:

Soon after you arrive, I think it is important to bring your own guy into the agency. This is preferably someone familiar with the programs and problems of the agency in whom you also have the utmost trust and confidence. It is also important to know the type of person you need, that is, do you need a numbers person, a hatchet man, or a good guy? Do you need someone to complement you, someone with special skills you don't have? This person serves typically as executive assistant to the manager and the foremost quality this person can possess is loyalty to the manager.

Another manager expressed caution about this tactic:

Do not bring anybody else in with you, at least not immediately. If you do, you run the risk of isolating yourself from the agency. If you must bring people in, don't let them get between you and the agency.

Based on his study of high-level federal appointees and the permanent bureaucracy there, Heclo cautions against importing a large number of outside lieutenants.³ By bringing subordinates into an agency, the new head amplifies his own difficulties. That is, the subordinates will also need orientations and a learning period, and it will take even more time to develop good working relationships and trust among old and new staff. Heclo recommends the new manager spend some time to find the most productive and responsive subordinates within the agency and "ride them as far as you can."

Regardless of how the new head proceeds, the fact remains that each agency presents a unique set of demands, problems, and capabilities. Get the lay of the land before you begin making major management and policy decisions. Resist the temptation to reorganize the agency immediately. A neater organization chart won't render miracles and may compound any existing problems. Set your own timetable for assessing the agency and your objectives for it. Legislators, interest groups, and the press will grant you a grace period of several months; they won't blame you for the sins of your predecessor. Use the grace period effectively.

Budget Issues. Budget and fiscal management in government consume a great deal of time. At the outset a new manager should talk extensively with the fiscal officer to master agency expenditure patterns, projections, and problems. Learn the transfer possibilities and limitations. Review contractual ob-

ligations of the agency. Don't hesitate to ask questions. One manager suggests this introduction to fiscal matters:

As to fiscal control in an agency, signatory authority is normally given to several people, including the fiscal officer. If the agency is not too large, you might consider retaining signatory authority initially. Thus all bills would come to you. This would give you a sense of the bill paying process and the nature of the bills which come in.

Then require a monthly expenditure report to assist you and your fiscal officer in extrapolating spending patterns over the course of the fiscal year.

YOU, THE GOVERNOR, AND HIS STAFF

As a new agency head, you are one of seventy who report directly — or almost directly — to the governor. You are not likely to have the kind of direct access you had expected or feel you deserve. Thus it is important that you, the governor, his chief of staff, the program office liaison to your agency, and the budget director develop an understanding at an early point in your term about the objects, priorities, and management concerns for your agency. If even one of the above persons is not clear about the authority you feel is requisite to your role, then others may well try to assume some of that authority. Once established, your authority can be maintained and protected by:

- keeping the governor's office fully and regularly apprised of your initiatives and important activities,
- appreciating the governor's political agenda and working within that framework,
- developing several lines of communication with the governor's office, rather than with just the agency liaison,
- acceding agency credits to the governor while absorbing the heat from any criticisms, and
- displaying loyalty to the governor during the time that you are a manager.

Each governor has his own management style. Based on interviews and questionnaires, it appears that Dan Walker and his staff exercised more control over agencies than has been the case with Governor James Thompson. Two Walker agency heads commented:

- I anticipated greater coordination in achievement of administration goals; I did not expect the deputy governor to exercise so much discretionary, arbitrary, and capricious power.
- I was not counseled on matters affecting the affairs of my department mainly because certain people below the governor wanted to control the government and make decisions which should have been within a director's authority.

Several Thompson managers echoed similar concerns, as represented by this lament:

I didn't realize how time consuming and difficult it would be to operate as a manager. Often, you feel you have no control over your resources. Your freedom to act is severely constrained by the BOB, the governor's office, and the Department of Personnel. It is often frustrating.

However, by far the greater number of responses from Thompson agency heads suggest you should not expect much direction from the governor's office. Comments from two major agency managers reflect this:

- I was given an enormous latitude in terms of management of the agency and the policy development within the agency. In part this may have been because it was a new administration when I came in, and I was perceived to have some special knowledge of the subject matter.
- Administrative and operational policy is set within the agency. And while it is smart to request input from the governor's office on major internal changes, it doesn't seem they have a great deal of direct concern as such.

Either way it makes sense to devote whatever time is necessary to developing good working relations with the governor's office, and appreciate that this office can be helpful to an agency because of the resources on which it can draw. As one manager recalls:

I recommended to the governor that an interagency management task force come in and analyze our systems and operations. This has proved most valuable. This task force included capable specialists in data processing, personnel, forms control, and cash control. They had long experience in state government, yet they brought fresh perspectives to the problems of my agency.

YOU AND THE LEGISLATURE

Neither fear the legislature nor take it lightly. While there are exceptions, most lawmakers want to be helpful, want to see state government deliver services in a manner of which they can be proud. Yet because they don't really create much policy at the front end, legislators have felt a need to participate somehow in the administration of government, and this can be frustrating to agency heads.

The Illinois General Assembly of the 1980s is dramatically more active and assertive than it was thirty years ago. In that earlier era, the lawmakers met for one relatively short session every two years, worked without staff, never overrode gubernatorial vetoes, and served as a rather passive, reactive board of directors. Today the legislature is likely to meet for at least part of every month every year; professional staff far outnumber the 177 lawmakers. Together the legislators and staff have begun to probe into each agency and its programs.

So it is in your interest to get to know the players and the procedures of the legislature. Observe committee hearings of the appropriations and substantive committees that handle your subject matter. Sit in the House and Senate galleries to get a flavor of floor sessions. Take your legislative liaison

along to provide the play-by-play description. As soon as possible, pay courtesy calls on:

- Legislative leaders of both parties, in both houses.
- Chairmen and minority spokesmen of the pertinent appropriations committees, in both houses (each house has two full committees for appropriations review).
- Chairmen and minority spokesmen of your substantive committees, e.g., the agriculture director should meet with the agriculture and natural resources panels.
- Staff directors for the appropriations committees, from both parties.
- Other lawmakers and staff who take a special interest in your subject matter, as identified by the governor's office and your agency legislative liaison.

Identify and develop strong working relationships with more than one respected legislator in each house who would be willing to shepherd your agency bills through the process. These lawmakers should be given regular briefings by you and your staff team. They should be invited for VIP tours of your offices and facilities, so they can develop an understanding of your operations and feel they are a part of your team.

Your governor represents a single political party, but you should be bipartisan in your approach to the legislature. Illinois legislative politics are highly partisan and competitive. You will need good relations with both parties. While the governor's budget, redistricting, revenue, and election law issues are deliberated on a partisan battleground, most issues affecting agencies are evaluated in a bipartisan context. Often the legislators of both parties will join together in a devil's advocate approach, challenging you as the executive branch representative to see if legislative intent and concerns are being met.

Most legislators are practical people who have some sense of the limits of what you as an agency manager can and cannot do for them. The key is to respond promptly and openly to their requests for information and assistance. Make sure you understand the legal and ethical limits of what you can do. Remember that there are legislators who will try to induce you to go beyond those limits, in behalf of their constituents; don't.

As acting director of the state occupational licensing agency, I received frequent calls from lawmakers whose constituents had failed licensure exams. More than once the oblique request was that I somehow provide a constituent with a copy of or inside information about the next exam. Clearly I could not and would not do this, but I could direct the constituent to legitimate study guides and private tutors who might be helpful. As one director notes: "Don't go beyond your bounds to respond to politically influential people. The really important ones will usually appreciate a responsible 'I can't do it.'"

Be prepared to stand up to legislators with whom you have legitimate administrative, policy, and philosophical differences. You should listen

closely, try to understand the perspectives of others, explain your position fully, then proceed as you feel is appropriate and necessary.

A key to your success in legislative relations will be your mastery of detailed information about your programs and operations. Of course, you cannot know everything at the beginning. When you don't know something, admit it. Respect from legislators tends to grow as you develop broader and deeper insight into your agency. A senior director explains it this way:

Nothing slows down the process for a manager more than his inability to answer questions from legislators and the press. You must be able to defend yourself on any conceivable question which a legislator might ask in a committee hearing. This is not a business where you can be comfortable on 97 percent of the agency activities and take a risk on the other three percent. You will invariably be questioned on the latter, and if found wanting, you will be roundly criticized. I would rack my brain at night trying to think of questions that might be posed to me the next day in a committee hearing.

YOU, THE PRESS CORPS, AND THE LOBBYISTS

The press corps and interest groups are your primary means — outside of government channels — for communicating with the public. They need you, and you need them; but they don't work for you. As your key links to the outside world, there are several broad generalizations that can be applied to your relationship with each:

- Respond to their inquiries promptly, honestly, and with as much straightforward information as possible.
- Try to keep interested persons from both sectors apprised of agency developments and of changes in your operations. As with other actors in the web of government, these people don't like to be surprised.
- Don't create expectations you can't fulfill. For example, the state occupational licensing agency has never effectively monitored all of its 800,000 licensees. However, an increase in investigative journalism activity in recent years has raised expectations in this area. A new manager for that agency should not promise miracles, because they aren't going to happen, at least not in short order.
- Don't expect too much assistance from either lobbyists or reporters. From time to time each can be helpful, but criticism, not commendation, makes good news, and agency problems, not perfection, provide a *raison d'être* for lobbyists.
- Be visible to key people in the press corps and interest groups, but don't promote yourself. It's the governor's administration, not yours.

State government is Springfield-oriented; the media are Chicago-oriented. Two-thirds of Illinois households are within the Chicago television market, yet not one of the Chicago-based television stations maintains any presence in Springfield. The Chicago daily newspapers maintain small staffs in Springfield; their coverage has been modest in recent years and has tended to

focus on either electoral politics or scandal, not on the accomplishments of your agency. So if you have information of statewide significance, try to make it available early on the same day in both Chicago and Springfield.

The Chicago newspapers can be helpful through their editorial policies. They try to have frequent editorials about state government, especially during legislative sessions. Thus it makes good sense to identify and pay a courtesy call on the editorial page writers assigned to your agency's subject matter at each Chicago paper. Later, you can take your case regarding a policy initiative to these writers. This may result in either a favorable editorial or a better-informed one. An editorial in one or both Chicago papers increases the significance of your issue in the eyes of legislators, as most legislators read one or both Chicago dailies each morning before Springfield session days.

YOU AND THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT

In the first chapter, I spoke of the web of government. In interviews, agency heads often referred to this as "the system." Whatever you call it, your success will depend heavily on the number of positive personal relationships you develop in this web. Reach out to people in all its components.

Take your BOB analyst to lunch at a restaurant frequented by politicos, such as Baur's or Maldaner's Upstairs. She or he will appreciate the legitimate deference. Do the same with certain lawmakers and staff, the agency liaison from the governor's office, and the auditor general. Pepper them with questions about their perceptions, attitudes, and objectives regarding your agency.

Join the local chapter of the American Society for Public Administrators (ASPA). ASPA has member bureaucrats who can help you build a broad and deep network. Get to know your fellow agency heads. They share your problems, have been through your initiation in office, and will often be helpful.

Try to discern how you are perceived by others, especially the lobbyists. They are the primary word-of-mouth communicators in the political system. A health agency manager emphasized this:

How do they perceive you, correct or not? Do they think you're "pro life" or "pro choice"; conservative or liberal? Do they think you're a good administrator, or a bad one? And once you evaluate these perceptions, you may want to publicly alter that perception. For example, if you are perceived as being poor at handling red tape, then you should zero in and prove to them your capability in that area.

Although this book has focused on the state level, the federal government is also of significance to many state agency managers and should not be overlooked. A fair number of state agencies have complicated funding and regulatory relations with one or more federal agencies. Get to know your counterparts at Region V of the federal government, headquartered in Chicago. A transportation manager explains:

Federal bureaucrats at the regional and state level are sensitive to being circumvented. Sometimes, however, the governor or others feel a need to go directly to Washington to try to achieve their objectives. Thus they appreciate my keeping them on top of what is going on, and they generally understand when we have to go to Washington, so long as they have heard about it.

If I didn't maintain this kind of working relationship they could delay—not block, but delay—the transmission of funds to us for projects. And they could come down on us on some of the jobs we are doing with federal dollars and close the job for awhile, saying we weren't doing everything by the book.

In other words, they could be a real pain in the ass if they wanted to and if we didn't try to keep on good terms with them.

Be sensitive to the objectives and needs of others in the system. As another transportation manager said:

I would tell a technically trained person coming into state government management to start work on a public administration degree. Many of our engineers have no administrative experience and sometimes lack common sense. For example, the book may say you can't put up on the highway a sign directing people to a college because the traffic volume doesn't warrant the expense. However, if a local legislator wants that sign badly enough, it sometimes makes sense to bend the book a little if indeed you will achieve larger objectives in the future.

The typical agency head salary is modest, certainly less than you will come to think the job is worth. A corporate manager responsible for multi-billion dollar budgets and thousands of employees, as in the public aid and mental health departments, would earn far beyond the \$52,000 salary paid by Illinois.⁴ Don't compensate for the salary shortfall by abusing the perquisites of office. Furniture and the state airplane fleet are instruments of the state. They are not to be used for personal aggrandizement. In each administration, one or two agency heads have lost their posts in the glare of media reproof for lapses of judgment in such matters.

Frustration is endemic among state government managers. The budget process never ends; dollar figures are never certain. Personnel matters consume great blocs of time, even though your flexibility is more limited than in the private sector. At times the actors in the political system seem to comprise one complex electrical resistor, prizing the status quo because it is known and understood.

An agency head shares his or her agency with many people from the web of government. Enormous energy is devoted to relations with this web, in keeping them apprised, in reassuring them, in fending off unreasonable demands.

There are many highly competent, professional people throughout state government. They can help you, and you can help them, through the exchange of information. Thus, once you have established your network, keep them informed of what you are doing. That shows your respect for them,

provides pieces of information important to the ever-changing mosaic in their minds, and can generate valuable information in return.

Experienced agency heads recommend you keep calm and develop a tolerance for turmoil. Appreciate that those who have come before you generally found the experience satisfying. A former director looks back and reflects that, "The job was more fascinating, thrilling, exciting than I had any reason to expect. Trying to solve administrative problems conscientiously for the benefit of the citizens of Illinois — in the context of a political Arab bazaar — is stimulating, to say the least."

Footnotes

1. Several respondents provided ranges, rather than precise estimates, for one or more categories. In coding, we split a range down the middle, i.e., 6-8 hours became 7 hours. Other respondents estimated for some categories and not others. The workweek for most respondents was fifty to sixty hours.
2. Hugh Heclio, "Political Executives and the Washington Bureaucracy," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 92, no. 3 (Fall 1977), pp. 395-424.
3. Ibid., pp. 415-16.
4. This was the salary level for these posts in 1982. Most other agency heads received less, from about \$38,000 to \$52,000.

Appendix A

ILLINOIS: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY*

Samuel K. Gove and Anna J. Merritt

This bibliographic essay was prepared as a resource guide for the study of Illinois government and politics. The quantity of material available to both teacher and student is considerable. The documentation for studying Illinois government and politics is quite good, especially compared to other states. Much scholarly literature has been written about Illinois and its major city, Chicago. There are also many good histories on both Illinois and Chicago.

Before discussing Illinois documents, it is well to consider the broad characteristics of the state. Illinois is a large industrial and agricultural state in the Midwest. The population is now eleven million. The state has been described as a microcosm of the nation from both an economic and political perspective. For this reason alone, Illinois is well worth studying. It has played an important role in several recent federal elections, and at the state level its politics continue to fascinate researchers concerned with political behavior. As for the economic sphere, it should be noted that Illinois exports more products than any other state in the Union.

It has been said that Illinois is not a natural community. It is a sharply divided state — politically, economically, even culturally. The major division is between Chicago and the rest of the state, usually referred to as "down-state." Much of this is due to the strong Democratic political machine in "the Windy City." To understand the full import of this diversity requires a careful reading of both historical materials and contemporary documents and reports.

GENERAL REFERENCES

The best overall reference for all three branches of state government is the *Illinois Blue Book*, published biennially by the secretary of state and available at no cost. A shorter version, also published by the secretary, is the *Handbook of Illinois Government*. The *Blue Book* contains biographies of all Illinois federal and state officials; descriptions of all state agencies; lists of newspapers and radio and television stations; lists of county and city officials;

* An earlier version of this essay was published in the American Political Science Association *News for Teachers of Political Science* (Winter 1982); the authors gratefully acknowledge the association's support for the development of the bibliography.

lists of past governors and other state officers; the text of the state constitution; and much more. The State Board of Elections publishes many other valuable resources on Illinois government and politics, including a yearbook (published biennially) for each political party. The yearbook lists party officials throughout the state (precinct committeemen in downstate and ward and township committeemen in Cook County). The Illinois Legislative Council publishes a *Directory of State Officials*, which has a heavy emphasis on the legislative branch and is updated after each even-year election. Another useful telephone directory is put out by the Department of Central Management Services (formerly the Department of Administrative Services). It is the best general source for phone numbers and addresses of state officials and employees.

The Illinois Legislative Council also publishes a *Directory of Registered Lobbyists in Illinois*. It is organized in categories, has an index, and contains some useful information in a brief introductory statement. Another list of lobbyists is distributed by the secretary of state's office; this mimeographed listing appears fairly frequently and is in alphabetical order by lobbyist (not organization). The Illinois Municipal League has a detailed directory of municipal officials; county officials are included in the *Blue Book* and publications of the Board of Elections. The latter also publishes lists of municipal, township (road district), school, and community college officials. The State Board of Education lists appointed school officials in its publications.

The State Library, located in Springfield and under the jurisdiction of the secretary of state, is an excellent resource for those interested in state government and politics. Its charge is to maintain a library for state officials and employees, operate a government research service, to secure and distribute documents and materials, and provide research library services to all state agencies and their staffs.

Most of the materials and documents mentioned in this essay are available through large university libraries or through local libraries that are part of ILLINET (Illinois Library and Information Network). ILLINET provides access to the specialized collection of the State Library to all residents of Illinois. Library development is carried on in conjunction with the eighteen state-supported library systems and their member libraries.

ILLINET includes four reference and research centers — the Chicago Public Library, the University of Illinois, Illinois State University, and Southern Illinois University. These centers can provide access — via teletype, telephone, and mail — to users in any library system to a vast array of specialized collections and reference services. In other words, ILLINET makes statewide library resources available to all public library cardholders. It is augmented by a referral system to other major libraries in the nation. In addition to the research and reference centers, there are three other valuable special resource centers — the John Crerar Library in Chicago, the Northwestern University Library in Evanston, and the University of Chicago Library.

State law requires that at least three copies of all publications produced with state funds be submitted to the State Library. If the library receives a sufficient number of copies of an item, these are distributed to the three dozen depository libraries located throughout the state and elsewhere. In addition, the library prepares a semimonthly list of publications received and distributed to the depository libraries. It also prints a list of state publications, which is, however, way behind current documents.

There are several bibliographies on Illinois government. The Institute of Government and Public Affairs published two, one in 1953 and another in 1965. Copies of the latter are available from the institute. Neal Peirce, in his *Megastates* (1972) lists significant references at the end of the chapter on Illinois. An updated bibliography is contained in a later (1980) study, *The Great Lakes States*, done by Peirce and John Keefe. A recent (1978) but incomplete bibliography by Robert Harmon may be ordered from the publisher, Vance Bibliographies in Monticello, Illinois. In 1972 the Center for Governmental Studies at Northern Illinois University published *Chicago's Politics and Society: A Selected Bibliography*. Kenney's textbook, *Basic Illinois Government*, published in 1974, also has good bibliographic references.

A number of general academic studies and textbooks on Illinois government are in print. The newest is by the Illinois Political Science Association, edited by Edgar Crane and published in 1980 by Kendall-Hunt. It is entitled *Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance* and contains a series of chapters contributed by Illinois political scientists and others. An earlier reader by William Hall (1975), entitled *Illinois Government and Politics: A Reader*, was also published by Kendall-Hunt.

An older (1974 revision), but still valid and quite useful textbook is David Kenney's *Basic Illinois Government*, published by the Southern Illinois University Press; it contains much material descriptive of governmental structure. Neil Garvey's *The Government and Administration of Illinois* is quite dated (1958) but good for historical purposes. There are also some textbooks specifically prepared for high school classes, and the handbooks put out by the League of Women Voters, the state, the city of Chicago, and Cook County on various aspects of state and local government should not be overlooked.

Illinois Issues is a relatively new (since 1975) monthly magazine that fills a void on discussions of current state public affairs. It is published by Sangamon State University in cooperation with the University of Illinois and is patterned after the *National Journal*. It contains lead articles, several regular columns, news and notes, lists of state reports, and more. The magazine is indexed yearly, and between 1975 and 1979 the editors published four issues of an annual of reprinted articles designed primarily for classroom use. From time to time it also prepares a special monograph on a particular topic, such as *Illinois Elections, Second Edition* which appeared in 1982. Finally, *Illinois Issues* publishes a wall chart, which gives a good overview of the structure of state government.

A newsletter that contains information on the legislature and state elections generally is the *Illinois Political Reporter*. It is privately published by Social Engineering Associates of Chicago and appears ten times a year.

There are many academic studies on particular phases of Illinois state and local government. Two stand out. Materials published in the late thirties at the University of Chicago by Charles E. Merriam and associates on metropolitan problems of Chicago were — and are to this day — very impressive. More recently, the staff of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois has prepared a number of books and monographs on state affairs. In fact, one textbook author has said, "No modern student of government in Illinois can fail to be indebted in large measure to the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois for its numerous publications of the past two decades." Three institute series, the Assembly papers, *Illinois Government Research*, and *Occasional Papers in Illinois Politics*, are particularly useful.

At this time, no statewide public opinion poll is conducted on a regular basis. The Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois and other polling organizations do, however, from time to time take statewide surveys on specific topics. A one-time comprehensive mail survey, "Illinois: Today and Tomorrow," was done in 1978 by the University of Illinois College of Agriculture and other university units. The results were published in three ways: in a general report produced in tabloid form, in a series of eleven regional reports, and in a series of fourteen issue-oriented reports. All are available from the Cooperative Extension Service at the university. A summary of findings was also published in the newsletter of the state Department of Local Government Affairs (now the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs).

The Survey Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois conducts the *Illinois Poll* about twice a year. Any individual or organization, with the exception of political candidates, may purchase questions to be asked in this scientific telephone survey of a sample of about 1,000. Results of each poll are made available only to those involved and are not necessarily made public immediately. However, after three years, all data from these polls are available to anyone interested.

Newspapers are a good source for material on state government and politics. The two major papers in Chicago are the *Chicago Tribune* and *Sun-Times*. There are also the *Chicago Defender*, devoted primarily to black community interests, and the *Chicago Reporter*, a monthly newsletter on racial issues in metropolitan Chicago. *Crain's Chicago Business* (a weekly publication) frequently runs stories about Chicago government policies and administration. *Crain's Illinois Business* (a quarterly publication) began publication in the fall of 1982.

Surprisingly, the only newspaper in Illinois that is indexed is the *Chicago Tribune* and that paper has only been indexed since 1972. There is now (since January 1979) a monthly Bell and Howell index for the *Sun-Times* as well as an online index of the *Chicago Tribune* from the Information Bank

(formerly the New York Times Information Bank) that covers the period since July 1976. The *Chicago Defender* was also indexed by the Information Bank from October 1971 to December 1974, but it is no longer included.

Downstate there are a number of dailies and weeklies. The 1979-80 *Blue Book* lists over eighty dailies in Illinois, and the weeklies cover six single-spaced pages of print. The St. Louis papers have considerable Illinois government coverage. Several years ago the State Historical Library microfilmed all the files of at least one newspaper in every county. The collection provides a wealth of information from every section of the state.

Of particular value to researchers is the *Illinois Daily Press Summary* published by the Illinois Information Service for use by officials of Illinois state government and the state university system. There is a subscription fee for those eligible to subscribe.

HISTORIES

The literature on Illinois history is a rich source for students of Illinois government and politics. National leaders out of the past, such as Lincoln, come readily to mind. Of more recent interest is Adlai Stevenson II. Some of the historical figures were extremely colorful, especially those from Chicago. Mayor "Big Bill" Thompson falls into that category. Others, like state Auditor Orville Hodge and Secretary of State Paul Powell, have become famous because they were involved in major scandals. Numerous books have been written about all these persons and many others.

Among general histories, Robert P. Howard's *Illinois: A History of the Prairie State* (1972) is the most recent and comprehensive study. Jensen's *Illinois: A Bicentennial History* (1978) is new but less complete. A two-volume reader edited by Robert P. Sutton, *The Prairie State—A Documentary History of Illinois* (1976), also provides helpful background. An earlier standard work is Pease's *The Story of Illinois*, last revised by Mrs. Pease in 1965. Another classic is Thomas Ford's volume, *A History of Illinois, from Its Commencement as a State in 1818 to 1847*, published in 1854 and reprinted in 1945 and 1946.

In 1929 Illinois became the first state to establish a state archive, a separate administrative unit under the office of the secretary of state in Springfield. The State Archives building was constructed in 1938. The archive staff maintains state records of permanent, legal, administrative, or historical value; arranges them in the order of their creation; and prepares them for public use. The archives are a very valuable source for the student and researcher of Illinois government. Recently (1978) "A Descriptive Inventory of the Archives of the State of Illinois" was published in loose-leaf form. Accompanying the descriptive inventory is a separate 131-page index.

A great many historians have written about Illinois and its rich heritage. In 1977 the *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* published a comprehensive list of doctoral dissertations on Illinois history. It took forty single-spaced pages to list them all. It is an excellent resource, although it is

often difficult for teachers and students to locate copies of unpublished dissertations and master's theses.

The *Journal*, published quarterly, is itself an excellent source on Illinois government and politics; although as might be expected, the emphasis is on historical articles. The library of the historical society is also a valuable resource place.

For students of Chicago, the *Journal of Chicago History* is helpful. At the University of Illinois, the Illinois Historical Survey is also useful for research on Illinois subjects.

ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

Illinois adopted a new constitution in 1970, following a year-long effort by the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention (1969-1970). One side benefit was the creation of a body of exceptional literature on Illinois constitutional developments.

Earlier constitutional conventions had been held in 1818, 1848, 1862, 1870, and 1922. These, especially the unsuccessful 1922 effort, have been well described and analyzed. For a comprehensive study of this effort, see Cornelius, *Constitution Making in Illinois 1818-1970*, published in a University of Illinois Press series mentioned below.

Much preparatory work went into the 1969 convention. Two works about it are notable — Braden and Cohn, *The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis*, and *Con-Con: Issues for the Illinois Constitutional Convention*, prepared by the Governor's Constitution Research Group and edited by Gove and Ranney. The former work is a most careful analysis of all aspects of the 1970 constitution. The latter is a collection of papers on public issues that the delegates were expected to face.

The post-convention literature is also voluminous. The official documents from the convention are excellent sources of information. The most valuable is the seven-volume record of proceedings. These include the daily journals with floor roll call votes, the transcript of all floor debates, and committee reports. Some of the latter contain valuable lists of references.

In addition, there is an overview analysis of the convention, entitled *The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention* by Gove and Kitsos and published by the National Municipal League (1974). A more in-depth analysis may be found in a ten-volume series edited by Joseph Pisciotte. It was published by the University of Illinois Press for the Institute of Government and Public Affairs. In addition to the Cornelius work already cited, the series includes *For the First Hours of Tomorrow: The New Illinois Bill of Rights*, by Elmer Gertz; *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention*, by Ian Burman; *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform*, by Rubin Cohn; *Ballots for Change: New Suffrage and Amending Articles for Illinois*, by Alan Gratch and Virginia Ubik; *Politics of the Purse: Revenue and Finance in the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention*, by Joyce Fishbane and Glenn Fisher; *A Fundamental Goal: Education for*

the People of Illinois, by Jane Buresh; *Roll Call! Patterns of Voting in the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention*, by David Kenney, Jack Van Der Slik, and Samuel Pernacciaro; and *Electing a Constitution: The Illinois Citizen and the 1970 Constitution*, by JoAnna Watson. The capstone volume, entitled *Charter for a New Age: An Inside View of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention*, is by Gertz and Pisciotte.

Illinois constitutional conventions, especially the 1970 meeting, have generated many doctoral dissertations at Illinois universities. Most of these are listed in the *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* (August 1977) mentioned earlier. There have also been many law review articles published on specific issues raised by the 1970 constitution.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Probably because most governors of Illinois have not played important roles in national politics, studies about governors are relatively infrequent. Compared to governors in other states, Illinois governors are granted strong executive powers by the constitution, but their political power has often been topped by the mayor of Chicago, especially during the Richard J. Daley era. This is just one more illustration of the point made at the outset of this chapter about the complexity of this state.

John Peter Altgeld, who served as governor between 1893 and 1897, was the subject of at least two biographies; Harry Barnard's "*Eagle Forgotten*": *The Life of John Peter Altgeld* (1938) is the best known. The next governor to have national visibility was Frank O. Lowden (1917-1921), the subject of a two-volume biography by William T. Hutchinson of the University of Chicago. Newsman Tom Littlewood, now at the University of Illinois, wrote a biography (published by Northwestern University Press) of Henry Horner, who was governor from 1933 to 1940. Horner was best known for his successful challenge to the Chicago organization in the 1936 gubernatorial primary. Adlai E. Stevenson II, the most recent nationally prominent governor of Illinois, is the subject of many studies. Most highlight his activities after he left the governorship to seek the presidential office in 1952. Historian Walter Johnson has published a monumental eight-volume collection of Stevenson's papers. Volume three contains the papers for the period when he was governor, 1949-53. The current governor is the subject of a good biography by Robert Hartley entitled *Big Jim Thompson of Illinois*.

Except for the very early governors, the papers of Illinois governors are generally not available in published form. They may be found in the state archives and the State Historical Library. One governor who did make an effort to have his papers published was Richard G. Ogilvie (1969-73). He published his executive papers in two volumes, *Major Legislation, 1969-72*, and the Bureau of the Budget (an agency created by Ogilvie) published *Papers in Public Finance — The Ogilvie Years*.

With the expanded veto powers given the governor by the new constitution, messages from that office are fairly frequent and complex. For many

years the governor's legislative messages (mainly vetoes) were published by the governor's office. Between 1973 and 1977 the Illinois Legislative Council took over this task; it is no longer being done.

During his term of office, Governor Ogilvie called for a change in the traditional biennial executive budget. The 1970 constitution instituted such a change, and today the budget is prepared annually and completed by March 1. It is a good resource document on the agencies of the state government and their functions. Detailed fiscal data are published in an Appendix, and a Personnel Detail includes numbers and classifications of personnel by agency. The value of the detail varies from agency to agency — thus we learn that in FY1981 there were 1425.41 full professors at the University of Illinois, whose total salaries amounted to \$49,838,600.

Another source of information on programs by state agencies is the thick loose-leaf *Guide to Illinois State Services*, prepared originally in 1974 by the state Department of Commerce and Community Affairs. It was revised in 1979. The Legislative Council also has published *A Guide to Services of State Administrative Agencies* (1978).

The executive branch of Illinois state government has been reorganized several times since the turn of the century. In fact, Illinois was a leader in executive reorganization with the Lowden reorganization and the enactment of the Civil Administrative Code. The reorganization was a result of the report by the Efficiency and Economy Committee in 1915 during Governor Dunn's term. Another reorganization report was by the Commission to Study State Government (Little Hoover Commission) which reported during Governor Stevenson's term. The Commission on State Government — Illinois reported to Governor Kerner in 1967. In 1976 gubernatorial candidates Thompson and Howlett created a bipartisan reorganization committee that prepared a report, *Orderly Government*. There have also been other study reports over the years, which frequently offer valuable insights into the structure and function of state government.

A new development in reorganization at the state level is reorganization by executive order as provided by the 1970 constitution. The use of this power and a discussion of the various reorganization studies can be found in the Gove-Carlson chapter in the Illinois Political Science Association book *Illinois: Political Processes and Governmental Performance*, mentioned earlier.

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Illinois General Assembly is an open body (compared to some other states), and documentation on it is good. Students interested in specific information have easy access to it through the published record.

The best single source on the legislature is the Gove, Carlson, Carlson work, *The Illinois Legislature: Structure and Process* (1976). Of particular value to the student is the ten-page bibliographic essay that comprises Chapter 8. An earlier, more academic look at the legislature is contained in *Legislative Politics in Illinois* by Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove.

Several state legislative agencies serve the General Assembly. Some are concerned with substantive areas, others with a general service function. Examples of the latter are the Legislative Council, a general research and service agency, and the Legislative Reference Bureau, primarily a bill-drafting unit. In addition, the legislature is well staffed, certainly in comparison with earlier years.

Among official documents, the most valuable is the *Legislative Synopsis and Digest*, published weekly by the Legislative Reference Bureau. It provides considerable information on the status of pending legislation, amendments, and committee and floor actions. Those interested in even more current information on the status of bills and other procedural questions will be happy to learn that these are on computer. The floor debates of the General Assembly are not printed, but they are transcribed, and the State Library is in the process of putting the debates on microfiche. The transcribing is quite slow, so recent debates are not available. Those that are completed may be obtained from the Index Department of the Office of the Secretary of State. The tapes for the debates are located in the archives. House committee debates are taped but not routinely transcribed. An index to some of the transcripts was prepared by Mary Redmond, formerly reference coordinator for the Illinois State Library.

Every session several thousand bills are introduced for consideration by the legislature. These bills used to be generally available around the state, but now the bill rooms of the two houses in Springfield are the best place to find them. There is no charge. House bills are now also available (without charge) on microfiche from the clerk of the House. Amendments are not included. Senate bills are not on microfiche.

Each house publishes a daily journal which records all floor actions and roll calls. The House alone includes committee votes in its journal. No charge is made when the journals are picked up at the bill room, but they should also be available in most libraries. Several months after the session concludes, the journals are bound and indexed by each house.

The Legislative Information System publishes a *Weekly Report 10*, giving the status of bills at the end of each week. At the end of each session, it publishes a *Final Report 10*. These are sent to state agencies and are available free of charge to the general public from the LIS office in Springfield. The LIS also offers a computer-based Bill Status System that subscribers can access by telephone for display on their terminals. The status of bills is updated approximately every fifteen minutes during legislative sessions. There is an annual fee for the service.

Each day the legislature is in session a calendar for each house is prepared. These are designed to fit in coat pockets or purses. They list all bills, resolutions, and motions that are before each house on the floor. The bills are listed in order of action, i.e., first reading, consideration postponed, and so forth. The calendars are available each day from the bill room of each house at no charge.

A helpful reference document is the *Handbook* of each biennial General Assembly. The rules of the two houses are contained in this volume. It also includes the legal description of senatorial districts, occupational information on members (more and more just list themselves as legislators), seniority lists, and much more. The number of *Handbooks* is somewhat limited. One's legislator might help in securing a copy.

A private organization, the State Capital Information Service, provides the best summary of the previous day's legislative action in committees and on the floor. There is a substantial charge for this service.

After the session — in fact several months later — the bills and resolutions adopted by that General Assembly are published by the secretary of state. Because of the large quantity of legislation, these usually comprise two volumes.

The continuing legislation adopted by the General Assembly is codified after every session and published biennially — with an annual supplement — in the *Illinois Revised Statutes*, State Bar Association Edition. The 1981 edition comprises five volumes. The annotated statutes comprise 112 volumes.

The Comptroller (earlier the Department of Finance) publishes annually in a separate volume all the appropriations bills approved by the General Assembly.

Several legislative directories are published. The most extensive is by the Illinois Legislative Council. Several private interest organizations have directories for their members. As mentioned earlier, the Illinois Legislative Council publishes a list of registered lobbyists.

Every ten years, apportionment of legislative districts is a big issue for state legislatures. Prior to the 1981 General Assembly session, the secretary of state put out a volume, *Apportionment Maps and Descriptions — Congressional, Legislative, and Judicial*. Two other sources of information on this issue are the legislative *Handbook* mentioned above and *Redistricting: An Exercise in Prophecy*, published by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs in 1982.

The Illinois legislature has recently taken a greater interest in the administrative rules adopted by state agencies. The Joint Committee on Administrative Rules reviews such proposed rules and comments on them. The proposed and adopted rules are published in the *Illinois Register* by the secretary of state. More on this general topic is contained in *Legislative Oversight: A Final Report and Background Papers of the Illinois Assembly on Legislative Oversight* published in 1982 by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs.

THE COURTS

Court decisions are important in determining the course of state government and politics. Understanding the decisions is not always easy for the nonlawyer.

The state's court decisions are published in the *Illinois Supreme Court Reports* and the *Illinois Appellate Court Reports*. Since the publication of these volumes takes some time, the reporter of decisions prepares combined

advance sheets that come out biweekly. From time to time the advance sheets list relevant law review articles and attorney general opinions. The decisions of the circuit courts generally are not available and are not published in a series similar to those of the supreme and appellate courts.

The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts issues an annual report that contains much administrative and statistical data pertaining to the state's courts.

Of more value are the opinions of the attorney general. Although not binding, as court opinions are, they have considerable impact until reversed by the courts or the legislature. A selection of opinions is published in an annual volume by the attorney general.

In recent years the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) has prepared and published an annual report on the effect of federal and state supreme and appellate court decisions on the Illinois Constitution and statutes; they are available from the LRB.

There are many law reviews in the state: ten are published by university law schools; in addition there is the *Chicago Bar Record*, *Illinois Bar Journal*, *Illinois State Bar Association Quarterly*, and the *Chicago Law Times*. None of the university law reviews is devoted solely to Illinois legal affairs. The *University of Illinois Law Forum* does have an annual article reviewing decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Although this essay is about state government, local governments cannot be ignored in Illinois, especially since there are more of them (over 6,500) than in any other state. Most of these units are single-purpose (special district) governments. Readers interested in financial aspects of these are advised to refer to the annual reports put out by the state comptroller's office.

But there is one government that is more important than all the rest, namely Chicago. Chicago is a special case and has already been referred to in several places here. For Chicago documents, the Municipal Reference Library is an excellent source. It issues a biweekly checklist of Chicago municipal documents along with the documents of other government units that have jurisdiction over the Chicago area.

The literature on Chicago politics is voluminous. One of the classics on this subject is still in print, *Machine Politics, Chicago Model*, by Harold F. Gosnell; it was first published in 1937.

In recent years a large number of books have appeared on the late Mayor Richard J. Daley. Some were written before he died in 1976 — several after. A sampling of the better books are Royko's *Boss*, O'Connor's *Clout* and *Requiem*, Rakove's *Don't Make No Waves: Don't Back No Losers* and *We Don't Want Nobody Nobody Sent: An Oral History of the Daley Years*, and Kennedy's *Himself*.

Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs and the University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs jointly published a series

of monographs (primarily by academicians) on the post-Daley era entitled *Chicago Politics Papers*. These papers were later (1982) published by the University of Illinois Press in a single volume entitled *After Daley: Chicago Politics in Transition*; it is edited by Samuel K. Gove and Louis H. Masotti.

Two good sources for a serious discussion of governmental problems in Chicago are the book-length reports of two Chicago Home Rule Commissions. The 1954 report, *Chicago's Government*, was published by the University of Chicago Press; in 1972 *The Chicago Home Rule Commission Report and Recommendations* was published by the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. A more detailed textbook, *The Governments of Chicago* (1958), is by Harvey Karlen. It is basically descriptive as is *The Key to Our Local Government*, a handbook put out by the League of Women Voters. The Legislative Council has published a report entitled "Structure of Local Government in Illinois" (1978) which includes material from early LWV pamphlets. For downstate cities a new resource study is *The Middle-Size Cities of Illinois: Their People, Politics, and Quality of Life*, edited by Johnson and Veach. Separate chapters are devoted to Bloomington-Normal, Champaign-Urbana, Decatur, East St. Louis, Peoria, Rockford, Rock Island-Moline, and Springfield.

One local government issue of great significance to state government is the very liberal home rule power granted to cities and counties by the 1970 constitution. Cities over 25,000 population and counties with a chief executive officer (i.e., Cook County) automatically receive home rule powers. This has had an important impact on state-local relations. The publications from the Home Rule Clearing House Project at the University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs should be helpful to students interested in this issue. Since the conclusion of the Home Rule project, the state Department of Commerce and Community Affairs has been monitoring home rule developments.

For the student of home rule and municipal government in general, a very valuable reference is the two-volume loose-leaf *Illinois Municipal Law* (1978), edited by Stewart Diamond. It contains twenty-six chapters, each on a different topic and each by a different author.

ILLINOIS ELECTIONS

Statewide data on election returns are readily available. *America Votes* (Election Research Center), which has been appearing regularly since 1956, contains a county-by-county breakdown of election results of the contests for president, U.S. senator, and governor, as well as by ward for Chicago. More detailed data for the same elections, as well as the primaries for each year, may be found in the biennial *Official Vote* now published by the state Board of Elections (formerly by the Office of the Secretary of State). An historical compilation of county data is found in *Illinois Votes, 1900-1958*, edited by Gove and published by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs. The foreword describes sources of earlier election data. The institute

also published two companion compilations, *Illinois Major Party Platforms: 1900-1964* and *Illinois Major Party Platforms II: 1966-1980* compiled by James D. Nowlan.

The Board of Elections has published much material on election procedures designed to help election officials better administer elections according to legal guidelines.

The numerous academic studies analyzing Illinois elections have been referred to at several places throughout this essay. The best and most recent analysis of trends is the *Illinois Issues* monograph, *Illinois Elections*, revised in 1982.

DATA GENERALLY

Trying to find data on certain aspects of Illinois government is difficult. One document that makes the task less onerous is Mary Redmond's *Guide to Statistics in Illinois State Documents* (1979). It is published by the secretary of state; the original guide was published in 1976. The new 200-page supplement is well indexed and well referenced. Included in the supplement are references to official state publications, department and agency reports, monthly and annual reports required of various agencies, and a wealth of other statistical material.

A good source for historical data is *The Illinois Fact Book and Historical Almanac, 1673-1968*, published by the Southern Illinois University Press in 1970 as a sesquicentennial document. It was prepared by John Clayton and contains a wealth of governmental data.

An annual data source is the *State and Regional Economics Illinois Data Book*. The 1982 edition, the seventh, was published by the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs.

For governmental, political, and other data on Chicago's history, see *Chicago Since 1840: A Time Series Data Handbook*; it was compiled by Wesley G. Skogan and published by the Institute of Government and Public Affairs in 1976.

There are many more sources of data on special topics (tax assessments, local government finance) or on special functions (public health). The existence of the Redmond *Guide* makes locating them much easier.

It seems fitting to conclude this chapter with a comment on two studies dealing with the future of this state. The Task Force on the Future of Illinois, created by the General Assembly "to evaluate and articulate state goals and objectives regarding the future of Illinois and to recommend an agenda for implementing actions," submitted its final report in January 1980. This report, entitled "Illinois: The Future," contains a wide variety of data and a discussion of their possible impact on the state. Another group concerned with the future of Illinois was formed by the Chamber of Commerce and was called the Illinois 2000 Foundation. Its report, "Illinois 2000: Alternative Economic Futures for Illinois," was published in 1978 and also contains a wealth of information.

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Appendix B

ILLINOIS AGENCIES, BOARDS, AND COMMISSIONS*

ELECTED EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Secretary of State
Comptroller
Treasurer

CODE DEPARTMENTS

Aging, Department on
Agriculture, Department of
Central Management Services,
 Department of
Children and Family Services,
 Department of
Commerce and Community Affairs,
 Department of
Conservation, Department of
Corrections, Department of
Energy and Natural Resources,
 Department of
Financial Institutions, Department of
Human Rights, Department of
Insurance, Department of
Labor, Department of
Law Enforcement, Department of
Mental Health and Developmental
 Disabilities, Department of
Mines and Minerals, Department of
Nuclear Safety, Department of
Public Aid, Department of
Public Health, Department of
Registration and Education,
 Department of
Rehabilitation Services, Department of

Revenue, Department of
Transportation, Department of
Veterans Affairs, Department of

PERMANENT NONDEPARTMENTAL AGENCIES

Abandoned Mined Lands Reclamation Council
Arts Council
Banks and Trust Companies,
 Commissioner of
Bureau of the Budget
Capital Development Board
Civil Service Commission
Commerce Commission
Court of Claims
Dangerous Drugs Commission
Delinquency Prevention Commission
Elections, State Board of
Emergency Services and Disaster Agency
Environmental Facilities Finance Authority
Environmental Protection Agency
Ethics, Board of
General Assembly Retirement System
Guardianship and Advocacy Commission
Health and Physical Fitness, Governor's Council on
Health Finance Authority
Historical Library
Housing Development Authority
Human Rights Commission
Illinois Building Authority
Industrial Commission

* Adapted from the *Directory of State Officials*, Illinois Legislative Council, Springfield, Illinois, August 1981.

Appendix B

Industrial Development Authority	Legislative Reference Bureau
Investment (Pensions), State Board of Judges Retirement System	Legislative Space Needs
Law Enforcement Commission	LEGISLATIVE COMMISSIONS
Liquor Control Commission	Atomic Energy Commission
Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers' Training Board	Children, Commission on Cities and Villages Municipal Problems Commission
Medical Center Commission	County Problems Commission
Military and Naval Department	Criminal Sentencing Commission
Pollution Control Board	Data Information Systems Commission
Prisoner Review Board	Economic Development, Commission for
Racing Board	Election Laws Commission
Savings and Loan Commissioner, Office of	Energy Resources Commission
State Employees Retirement System	Insurance Laws Study Commission
State Fire Marshal	Judicial Advisory Council
Teachers Retirement System	Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, Commission on
Toll Highway Authority	Motor Vehicle Laws Commission
EDUCATION AGENCIES AND INSTITUTIONS	Nutrition, Council on
State Board of Education	Pension Laws Commission
Board of Higher Education	Public Aid, Legislative Advisory Committee on
Board of Governors	Recreation Council
Board of Regents	Regulatory Agency Reform, Select Joint Committee on
Community College Board	School Problems Commission
Southern Illinois University	Spanish Speaking Peoples Study Commission
University of Illinois	Special Events Commission
Scholarship Commission	Transportation Study Commission
University Civil Service System of Illinois	Visit and Examine State Institutions, Commission to
University Retirement System	Water Resources Commission
	Women, Commission on Status of
LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT AGENCIES	JUDICIAL AGENCIES
Administrative Rules, Joint Committee on	Supreme Court
Auditor General	Judicial Inquiry Board
Audit Commission	State Appellate Defender, Office of State's Attorneys' Appellate Service Commission
Economic and Fiscal Commission	
Intergovernmental Cooperation Commission	
Legislative Council	
Legislative Information System	
Legislative Investigating Commission	

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